The influence of corporate disclosure on investor confidence
in Thai listed companies by Kosaiyakanont, Amonlaya
University of Southampton Research Repository
ePrints Soton
Copyright © and Moral Rights for this thesis are retained by the author and/or other 
copyright owners. A copy can be downloaded for personal non-commercial 
research or study, without prior permission or charge. This thesis cannot be 
reproduced or quoted extensively from without first obtaining permission in writing 
from the copyright holder/s. The content must not be changed in any way or sold 
commercially in any format or medium without the formal permission of the 
copyright holders.
  
 When referring to this work, full bibliographic details including the author, title, 
awarding institution and date of the thesis must be given e.g.
AUTHOR (year of submission) "Full thesis title", University of Southampton, name 
of the University School or Department, PhD Thesis, pagination
http://eprints.soton.ac.uk 
 
UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHAMPTON 
 
FACULTY OF LAW, ARTS AND SOCIAL SCIENCES 
 

















The influence of corporate disclosure on investor confidence  



















Thesis for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy 
 
 June 2011  
 
i
UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHAMPTON 
ABSTRACT 
 
FACULTY OF LAW, ARTS, AND SOCIAL SCIENCES 
SCHOOL OF MANAGEMENT 
 
Doctor of Philosophy 
 
The influence of corporate disclosure on investor confidence  
in Thai listed companies. 
 
by Amonlaya  Kosaiyakanont 
 
 
The thesis is a study of corporate disclosure and stock market liquidity in Thailand. It 
uses a two-phase exploratory design in which the results from the qualitative method 
phase of the study are used to inform the quantitative method phase. The qualitative 
phase of the study aims to gain an understanding of corporate disclosure and the 
sources of information used of by financial analysts and the fund managers in 
Thailand. Specifically, it explores the use financial analysts and fund managers make 
of different sources and channels of communication, and their views on the purpose 
and the quality of disclosure and of the reasons why companies may choose to 
disclose information voluntarily. It also explores financial analysts’ and fund 
managers’ perceptions about the value of the audit report. The qualitative study is 
based upon interviews with financial analysts and fund managers working in Thailand 
and uses grounded theory to analyse the interview material. The quantitative phase of 
the study examines the relationship between the voluntary information disclosure by 
Thai listed companies and stock market liquidity. In particular, it examines the 
relationship between stock market liquidity and: (i) categories of information 
disclosure; and (ii) channels of information disclosure. It also examines the 
relationship between information disclosure and: (i) audit firm size, and (ii) analyst 
following. Disclosure is measured in two ways: first using ratings by financial 
analysts and fund managers of companies’ public and private disclosures and second 
by means of a disclosure index. Stock market liquidity is measured using information 
obtained from the Stock Exchange of Thailand ‘SET Market Analysis and Reporting 
Tool’ database. The empirical results show strong evidence to indicate that disclosing 
more voluntary information, particularly through public disclosure, reduces 
information asymmetry, improves investor confidence and enhances the stock market 
liquidity. In addition to the results of the primarily investigation, this study also finds 
that there is a significant and positive relationship between the audit firm size and the 
level of voluntary information disclosure. Moreover, the results report that not all 
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1.1 Background of the research 
 
The unexpected collapse of a number of major companies from the Asian Financial 
Crisis has emphasised the importance of high quality information disclosure for 
investors and the public generally. Most of the extant finance and accounting 
literature suggests that the levels of information disclosure, generally used as a proxy 
for the quality of information disclosed, by listed companies has an impact on the 
functioning of capital market, in particular on the liquidity and pricing of individual 
stocks. By disclosing more information, companies are seen to reduce information 
asymmetries and by so doing, increase an investor confidence.   
 
There are various ways that companies may disclose information to investors and 
other participants in the capital market. A distinction is often drawn between public 
and private disclosures. Public disclosures are frequently made through the 
companies’ annual reports and other filings with regulatory bodies. The form and 
content of these disclosures are usually governed by regulation. Companies may also 2 
 
make additional voluntary disclosures. As well as disclosing information publicly, 
companies often communicate more directly with certain privileged groups such as 
securities analysts and large investors such as fund managers. This may take a variety 
of forms, in part dependent upon the company itself and the regulatory environment in 
which it is located. These private disclosures may be made, for example, in the 
context of face-to-face meeting, or telephone conversations, with companies’ senior 
management, organised company visits, or through investor relation (IR) departments. 
The level of information disclosure, the nature of the corporate disclosures, and the 
channels through which the disclosures are made, may differ between countries. This 
may be partly related to differences in legal and other regulatory rules governing the 
supply of information by companies. It may also reflect different customs and 
practices that have developed over time and these, in turn, may reflect wider cultural 
factors.  
 
The present study has two main purposes. The first is to gain an understanding about 
corporate disclosure and the use of information by financial intermediaries in 
Thailand, and the second is to examine the effect of the level of voluntary information 
disclosure on the liquidity of shares traded on the Stock Exchange of Thailand. The 
first part of the study takes a qualitative approach to explore the use securities analysts 
and fund managers in Thailand make of disclosures by companies. It explores their 
preferences as to the sources and channels of information disclosure, their views on 
the purpose and quality of disclosure and of companies’ reasons in choosing to 
disclosure information voluntarily. The study examines security analysts’ and fund 
managers’ views about the usefulness of information types contained within the 
reports as a whole as well as in individual sections, and the extent to which the 
auditors’ report enhances the value of the annual report. This part of the study both 
provides a better understanding of the phenomenon itself and forms the basis for the 
second part of the study which is an empirical investigation the effect of the level of 
voluntary information disclosure on stock market liquidity.  
 
The motivation for the second part has its roots in the Asian Financial Crisis. There 
have been many questions about the roles of accounting reporting and information 
disclosure when the financial crisis had hit the East Asian economies during 1997. 
Some have complained about insufficient transparency and the lack of information  
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(Alba, Claessens & Djankov, 1998; Alba, Hernandez & Klingebiel, 1999). It seems 
likely that the major cause of this collapse occurred because of a lack of transparency 
and accountability, especially, in the inadequate of information disclosed by 
companies. As a consequence of the crisis, investors have felt uncertainty about the 
value of companies, and this has lead to a reduction in the number of the investors 
who are interested in investing in Asian, particularly in Thailand.  
 
After this crisis, not only did the Stock Exchange of Thailand (SET) try to improve 
investor confidence by requiring Thai listed companies to increase the transparency of 
their reports and information disclosures, but most listed companies tried to improve 
transparency by providing additional information (voluntary information). It is often 
argued in the literature that companies might benefit from providing voluntary 
information to investors and financial analysts through the annual report. By 
disclosing more additional information, investors will perceive that the company is 
being transparent. This perceived transparency will increase the investors’ confidence 
in the value of the company which, in turn, increase the company’s stock market 
liquidity. 
 
The foregoing argument is closely linked with concepts of information asymmetry 
and agency theory. Low levels of public information disclosure can lead to 
information asymmetry among the investors and between companies and outside 
investors, and to adverse selection problem. In practice, this adverse selection 
problem tends to reduce companies’ stock market liquidity. To overcome the 
information asymmetry and agency problem, companies can disclose more 
information. This will reduce the information gap between the companies and outside 
investors, and between groups of investors, which in turn, will enhance interest in the 
companies’ stock and will increase the stock market liquidity (Diamond & 
Verrecchia, 1991). This argument is also supported by the study of Leuz and 
Verrechia (2000) which found that higher market liquidity can be used as an indicator 
that the companies’ stocks have become more popular investments due to the higher 
levels of information disclosed by companies.  
  
There are only few studies that document the relationship between the level of 
information disclosure and the market liquidity (Welker, 1995; Healy, Hutton & 4 
 
Palepu, 1999; Leuz & Verrecchia, 2000; Heflin, Shaw & Wild, 2001; Peterson & 
Plenborg, 2006). The majority of these studies are based on US data. In addition, 
Healy and Palepu (2001) point out some interesting issues that are not yet been 
explored in the disclosure literature. In particular, can the results from studies using 
US data be generalised to non-US countries which are characterised by a different 
institutional setting? Several institutional differences, such as the ownership structure 
and the level of investor protection, may cause a different relationship between the 
level of voluntary information disclosure and stock market liquidity. 
 
The remainder of this chapter will highlight the justification of the research, the 
research objectives and questions. This chapter also describes the research 
methodology and the definitions of terms used in the study, as well as summarising 
the structure of this thesis.  
 
1.2 Justification of the research 
 
The reason of choosing Thailand as the context for this research is motivated by 
several factors. First, Thailand is a developing country where the literature on 
corporate disclosure, particularly the relationship between the level of information 
disclosure and the stock market liquidity, is sparse.  
 
Second, most of the studies up to date focus on developed markets, while Thailand is 
considered as an emerging market. As mentioned above, the extant literature shows 
that only a few studies have directly examined the relationship between the level of 
voluntary information disclosure and stock market liquidity, and those studies have 
been conducted in developed countries, particularly US, where stock markets are 
viewed as developed.  
 
This leads to the question that whether the level of voluntary information disclosure in 
countries characterised by different institutional features (i.e. financial markets, legal 
protection, and ownership structure), such as Thailand, has the same effect in 
mitigating information asymmetry and enhancing stock market liquidity as in the 
developed countries like the US.   
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Evidence from Thai listed companies may shed new light on the association between 
the levels of voluntary information disclosure and stock market liquidity. Finally, the 
findings from this study may enable regulators and accounting policy makers to form 
a better understanding of disclosure issues and so could be of benefit to Thailand and 
other East Asian developing countries. 
 
1.3 The research objectives and questions 
 
As this thesis has two main purposes, the research objectives and the research 
questions will divided into two parts. The first part of this section presents the 
research objective for the qualitative study, and the latter part presents the research 
objective and research questions for the quantitative investigation. 
 
The qualitative study 
 
The qualitative study aims to provide a better understanding of corporate disclosure 
and the use of information based on the views of the financial analysts and the fund 
managers in Thailand. Therefore, the main research objective for this part is: 
 
“to gain an understanding of the corporate disclosure and the use of 
information by financial analysts and the fund managers in Thailand.” 
 
The specific research objectives for the qualitative part of this research are to gain an 
understanding of: 
 
  The use financial intermediaries make of different sources and 
channels of communication. 
 
  Financial intermediaries’ views on the purpose and quality of 
disclosure. 
 
  Financial intermediaries’ views on the reasons why companies 
may choose to disclose information voluntarily. 
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  Financial intermediaries’ views on the usefulness of different 
types of information contained within the annual report.  
 
  Financial intermediaries’ views on the extent to which the 
auditors’ report enhances the value of the annual report.  
 
The quantitative study 
 
The quantitative study explores the relationship between the level of disclosure, 
information asymmetry, and the stock market liquidity based on a sample of Thai 
listed companies. The main research question for this part begins with the question: 
‘How does the level of voluntary information disclosure effect the liquidity of shares 
traded on the Stock Exchange of Thailand.’ Thus, the main research objective, which 
is also the benchmark test of this study, is:   
 
“to examine the relationship between the stock market liquidity and the 
level of voluntary information disclosure.” 
 
Apart from the benchmark test, this part of the study incorporates additional variables 
into the conceptual framework. The research objectives for the additional analysis of 
this study are summarised below: 
 
  To examine the relationship between the stock market liquidity 
and categories of information disclosure: information in the 
strategy section, financial section, and non-financial sections of 
the annual report: information provided by investor relations and 
other channels of information disclosure. 
 
  To examine the relationship between the stock market liquidity 





  To examine the relationship between the size of the company’s 
auditor and information disclosure. 
 
  To examine the relationship between the stock market liquidity 
and the size of the company’s auditor. 
 
  To examine the relationship between a company’s analysts 
following and information disclosure. 
 
1.4 The research methodology 
 
The study uses a two-phase exploratory mixed methods research design. This begins 
with the qualitative study and is followed by the quantitative study. The results of the 
qualitative method phase can help develop or inform the quantitative method phase 
(Greene, Caracelli & Graham, 1989). This research design is based on the premise 
that the qualitative study enables the researcher to explore and obtaining a better 
understanding of the phenomenon. It is particularly useful in developing a research 
instrument when one is not available and for identifying variables for inclusion in the 









Part I: Qualitative Research 
 
            
 
 




          
 
 
Part II: Quantitative Research 
 
     
     
 
 




     
Develop Instrument 
Qualitative data collection 
Findings 
Quantitative data collection 
Quantitative analysis 
Results 
Consider themes & write items for 





Document analysis, and 
questionnaire survey 
Regression analysis 
Determine the relationship 
between dependent & 
independent variables 
adapted from (Creswell & Plano Clark, 2007)
 
Figure 1-1: The sequential exploratory design: Instrument development model  
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As summarised in Figure 1-1, this study is divided into two phases: the qualitative and 
the quantitative study. This study begins with the qualitative phase in order to gain a 
better understanding of the phenomena, and which then informs the quantitative 
phase, particularly in the development of instruments to measure the level of 
disclosure. This research instrument and new variables, which are identified in the 
qualitative phase, are then implemented in the second phase. 
 
This study employs three types of research method: interview, questionnaire survey, 
and document analysis. These methods are used to explore the phenomena of the 
corporate disclosure and the use of the information from the perspective of Thai 
financial intermediaries and to examine the effect of disclosure quality on the liquidity 
of shares traded on the Stock Exchange of Thailand.  
 
The interview method was used to investigate the research question for the first part 
of the study. The findings from the interviews revealed the preferences of Thai 
financial intermediaries towards the sources and channels of information disclosure 
and their views about the quality of disclosure. The qualitative findings informed the 
second part of the study. This part involves the development of instruments to 
measure disclosure quality. Two approaches are taken. One is to obtain the opinions 
from securities analysts and fund managers about the quality of disclosures by the 
companies they are following using the questionnaire survey method. The other 
approach is to use documentary analysis to develop a disclosure index to measure the 
level of the information disclosure. The measures of disclosure are incorporated into 










1.5 Definition of terms 
 
Definitions of terms used in this study are presented below: 
 
‘Disclosure quality’   is a complex concept. In this study, information disclosure will 
considered as high quality if the companies disclose 
information that covers all items in the disclosure index. 
Therefore, disclosure quality refers to the extent to which 
companies disclose their information publicly. 
 
‘Investor confidence’ the problems associated with information asymmetry has are 
widely addressed within the literature, with emphasise on the 
information gap between company insiders (informed) and 
outside (uninformed) investors Company insiders have access to 
more information about the company than outside investors.. It 
is possible that this group of informed investors may take 
advantage from this information gap. Therefore, information 
asymmetry in a capital market may cause the other, uninformed, 
investors to lose their confidence in the market and so lead to 
the reduction of the market liquidity.   
 
‘Market liquidity’   refers to “the ability to sell a security promptly and a price 
close to its value in frictionless markets” (Ericson & Renault, 
2006). 
 
‘Voluntary disclosure’ refers to the information that a company discloses in excess of 
the minimum disclosure requirement of the Stock Exchange of 
Thailand.  
 
‘Private disclosure’   is one of the information disclosure channels and refers to the 
personal contact between the financial intermediaries and a 
company’s managements, such as telephone conversations with 
the company’s top management, interviews, company visits or 




‘Public disclosure’   is the other information disclosure channel and refers to the 
information that a company publishes publicly, such as the 
company’s annual report, the disclosure reports on additional 
information (Form 56-1), and the company’s website. 
 
‘Big Four’   refers to the international accounting audit firms which includes 
PricewaterhouseCoopers, Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu, Ernst and 
Young, and KPMG. 
 
‘Analysts following’   refers to the number of the financial analysts that are following 
a company. 
 
1.6 The structure of the thesis 
 
The thesis is divided into two main parts. The first part of this thesis reports the 
qualitative study and the second part the quantitative study. The structure of the thesis 
is outlined in Figure 1-2.  
 
Chapter 2 reviews the disclosure literature and contains the four main sections. The 
first section presents the theory of information asymmetry, while the second section 
reviews the theory of corporate disclosure. The third section reviews the literature on 
the key variables of this study which includes voluntary disclosure and stock market 
liquidity. The final section portrays the framework of this study.   
 
Chapter 3 describes the context of the research. This includes the institutional 
arrangement within Thailand, and the information about the Thai capital market such 
as the trading process on SET and the SET’s disclosure requirements.    
 
Chapter 4 describes the research methodology for the qualitative part of the study. 
This chapter begins with a description of the research methodology. This includes the 
techniques used in collecting and analysing data. The research questions and the 
process in building a grounded theory are then explained. This is followed by a 12 
 
description of the site selection, sampling procedure and the strategies adopted to 
address issues of validity and the reliability.  
 
Chapter 5 provides the findings based on the interview data on the objectives of to 
gain an understanding about the corporate disclosure and the use of information by 
financial analysts and the fund managers in Thailand. 
 
Chapter 6 presents the conceptual framework for the second, quantitative, part of the 
study which links between voluntary disclosure, the information intermediation, and 
stock market liquidity. This chapter also provides the previous evidence and the 
development of the research hypotheses for this part of the study.  
 
Chapter 7 describes the research methodology for the quantitative part of the study. 
The chapter begins with a description of the specific research instruments and of the 
approaches used to test the hypotheses. It also describes the measurement of each of 
the variables, and the methods used to collect data for each variable. Finally, the 
chapter describes the sample selection procedures, the statistical techniques, and the 
strategies employed in order to enhance the validity and the reliability for this part of 
the research. 
  
Chapter 8 presents the results of the hypothesis testing. In particular on the 
relationship between the level of information disclosure and stock market liquidity. 
The chapter also presents a sensitivity analysis of the results from this part of the 
study. 
 
Chapter 9 presents the conclusions of the study. This chapter includes an overview of 
the research objectives and the research questions and the contributions to the 
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The aims of this thesis are to gain an understanding of corporate disclosure and the 
use of information by financial intermediaries in Thailand, and to examine the 
relationship between the levels of disclosure and the liquidity of shares traded on the 
Stock Exchange of Thailand. This chapter presents a review of the relevant literature. 
 
The chapter is divided into four main sections. The first section examines the 
problems of asymmetry between company managers and outside investors, and 
between well informed investors and less well informed investors. The cost and 
benefits of the corporate disclosure, the channels of information disclosure, and type 
of information disclosed are reviewed in the second section reviews. The third section 
reviews the literature on voluntary disclosure and market liquidity. This includes the 
incentives for company managers to disclose information voluntarily, the capital 
market consequences of voluntary disclosure, and the measurement of disclosure and 






2.1 Information asymmetry 
 
The literature points to two main areas of information asymmetry: information 
asymmetry between different groups of investors, and information asymmetry 
between company managers and outsider investors.  
 
In the context of capital markets, the information asymmetry arises when there is an 
information gap between the participants in the market, for instance when some of the 
market participants have more or better information about a company’s value than 
other investors. This causes markets to become inefficient because uninformed, or less 
informed, investors cannot perceive the true economic value of the company. The 
better informed market participants have incentives to overstate, or understate, the 
true value of a company depending on whether they wish to sell or buy its securities.  
This reduces the confidence of uninformed investors when they decide to trade with 
the other investors who may have better, or private, information. Consequently, 
uninformed investors may lower the price at which they willing to buy, and increase 
the price at which they willing to sell, a security in order to prevent the losses from 
trading with the better informed investors. This introduces a bid-ask spreads into the 
market, reflecting the problems of trading with better informed investors (Leuz & 
Wysocki, 2008). The number of securities that less informed investors are willing to 
trade may also decrease as a consequence of information asymmetries, again reducing 
the liquidity of the securities. Figure 2-1 illustrates the sequence of effects that occur 




Figure 2-1: The economic consequence of the information asymmetry  
on the capital market  
 
17
Healy and Palepu (2001) identify a way to resolve the problems arising from 
information asymmetries between groups of investors. The first solution is to increase 
information disclosure. This will enable all investors to better estimate company 
value, and reduce the ability of better informed investors to profit by under, or over, 
valuing a company. Figure 2-2 illustrates the link between level of information 
disclosure and company value.  
 
Firm's Value
Level of Information Disclosure
More  information  









Source: Rikanovic, 2005 
 
Figure 2-2: The link between the problem of misevaluation about the company’ 
value, information asymmetry, and the extent of disclosure 
 
 
In addition to information asymmetries between groups of investors, there are the 
information asymmetries between managers and outside investors. Bushman and 
Smith (2001) argue that the separation of corporate managers from outside investors 
involves an inherent conflict. Managers have an information advantage over the 
shareholders and other outside investors because they have information about 
company performance that is not known to outsiders. Therefore, shareholders and 
other outside investors cannot accurately evaluate and determine the value of 
decisions made by managers (Barako, Hancock & Izan, 2006). The literature suggests 
that voluntary disclosure is one of the solutions to mitigate this problem. Barako, 
Hancock and Izan (2006) propose that managers can provide additional credible and 
reliable information to the market in order to optimise the value of the company.  
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Healy and Palepu (2001) propose that the board of directors, whose role is to monitor 
and discipline management on behalf of shareholders, can also reduce this 
information gap between the managers and the outside investors. They also point to 
the role information intermediaries in obtain private information from the companies’ 
managers, and in uncovering any misuse of company resources by managers. 
 
 Information asymmetry, market efficiency and agency problem 
 
The literature on the efficient markets model show that the theoretical and empirical 
work concerned with the adjustment of security prices to the level of information 
disclosure. According to Fama (1970), the ideal of the efficiency market is: 
 ‘a market in which firms can make productive-investment decisions, and 
investors can choose among the securities that represent ownership of 
firms’ activities under the assumption that security prices at any time 
“fully reflect” all available information.’ (Fama, 1970, p. 383) 
 
Prior literature shows that there are three categories of market efficiency, namely 
weak, semi-strong, and strong form, which serves the useful purpose determining the 
level of information at which the hypothesis of market efficiency break down (Fama, 
1970, 1991):  
 
Firstly, weak form tests, which discussed only the relative information 
subset of interest historical price. This categorisation of the market 
efficiency addresses the question ‘How well do past returns predict future 
returns?’ 
 
Secondly, semi-strong form tests. This categorisation of the efficiency 
market concerned about the speed of price adjustment to the publicly 
available information. It addresses the question ‘How quickly do security 
prices reflect public information announcements?’ 
 
Finally, strong form tests, which concern whether any informed investor or 
insiders (e.g. managers) have superior information and can access to any 
information relevant for the formation of prices. This categorisation 
addresses the question ‘Do any market participants have private information 




The strong form of market efficiency is related to the agency problem. The agency 
problem has an inherent information asymmetry between the agent and the principal. 
Managers are likely to have privileged access to information about the companies 
than investors, therefore, manager are more likely to be better informed about the 
companies’s intrinsic value (Fama, 1991) and companies’ information than 
outside/uninformed investors. The assumption that managers have better information 
relative to outside investors leads to a breakdown of the strong form of market 
efficiency (Fama, 1991).  
 
As market liquidity is a component of market efficiency, increasing (decreasing) 
market liquidity should affect market efficiency. The literature on disclosure suggests 
that an increase in the level of information disclosed by companies can reduce the 
information asymmetry between market participants, and lead investors to better 
understand the companies. This enhances investor confidence, consequently 
improving market efficiency and increasing market liquidity.  
 
2.2 Corporate disclosure 
 
Corporate disclosure is considered as an important function of an efficient capital 
market (Healy & Palepu, 2001). Demand for financial reporting and disclosure arises 
from information asymmetry and agency conflicts between managers and outside 
investors, and between informed and less informed investors. As well as the benefits, 
there are also several costs of information disclosure.  
 
On the positive side, there are several benefits of extensive corporate disclosure. The 
first benefit of disclosure is reducing information gap between market participants. 
When listed companies disclose more relevant information in the public domain, such 
as in their annual reports or on their companies’ web site, it more difficult for some 
investors to become better informed than others. Since, all investors can easily access 
the companies’ information, it is more costly for investors to become better informed 
than others. As a result, when private information is costly to access, only few 
investors, who have ability to pay for an excess information, are likely to be better 
informed investors. Therefore, increased corporate disclosure can mitigate the  
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probability of trading with a better informed counterparty. In other words, increased 
information disclosure can reduce the information asymmetry among the investors.  
 
Second, the disclosure of more relevant and credible informational allows 
shareholders and outside investors to obtain a better understanding of a company and 
its value. This reduces the uncertainty about the companies’ value, which in turn 
mitigates the potential information advantage that an informed trader might have over 
a less informed trader. The reduction in information asymmetry among the market 
participants may lead to a decrease in the cost of equity. Leuz and Wysocki (2008) 
identify two approaches to linking information asymmetry to the cost of equity 
capital. The first approach is that greater information disclosure reduces estimation 
risk or uncertainty that may influence the distribution of returns (e.g. Brown, 1979; 
Barry & Brown, 1984, 1985); whereas the second approach suggests that the cost of 
capital is reduced because higher level of information disclosure increases liquidity 
(e.g. Diamond & Verrecchia, 1991). Therefore, it could implies that increasing 
corporate disclosure will not only decrease the gap of information among the market 
participants by mitigating agency costs but also increase the companies’ value by 
reducing the cost of capital (Lev, 1992).  
 
Third, increased information disclosure can potentially improve corporate governance 
and managers’ investment decisions, and support the corporate control mechanisms of 
the capital markets (Chen & Steiner, 2000; Chung & Jo, 1996). According to 
Bushman and Smith (2001), financial information on company performance is a direct 
input to corporate control mechanisms designed to discipline managers, to direct 
resources from “bad” projects and to prevent managers from expropriating the wealth 
of investors.  
 
As well as benefits, there are costs of corporate disclosure. Lueuz and Wysocki (2008) 
suggest that there are two types of cost occur that arise when the companies disclose 
more information. First, there is the direct cost of corporate disclosure that can arise in 
a variety of ways. Direct costs of corporate disclosure can occur at the stage when 
companies prepare the information for their annual reports. It can also arise during the 
process of certification. Since, the listed companies have to follow the legal 
requirement from the Stock Exchange, their annual reports and other quarterly reports  
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have to be audited. In addition, the direct costs of disclosure happen at the 
dissemination stage when the companies distribute their information to public. The 
other type of cost is the indirect costs of corporate disclosure. This can occur when 
listed companies information published for their investor is used, and taken advantage 
of, by the other parties, such as competitors, regulators, tax authorities, etc. 
Companies incentive to publish information may be reduced when the parties other 
than investors get benefits from the information. (Verrecchia, 1983).   
 
Channels of information disclosed 
 
Potentially companies have a variety ways of communication available to convey 
information to public and their investors. The literature on disclosure shows that there 
are two main channels of communication used by companies generally to disseminate 
information to capital markets.  
 
The first channel is public disclosure. Companies may disclose their information 
through their financial statements, interim and quarterly reports, and other regulatory 
filings. The annual report is generally perceived as the main disclosure vehicle 
(Marston & Shrives, 1991) and as an important source of information for financial 
analysts (Langberg & Sivaramakrishnan, 2008). Most of the studies in this area use 
quantitative methods and relate disclosure quality to information asymmetry, or stock 
liquidity. The disclosure literature has shown that high quality public disclosure 
reduces information asymmetry and increases stock market liquidity. Bushee and Noe 
(2000), Leuz and Verrecchia (2000), and Welker (1995) argue that market liquidity 
could be measured by both trade-based and order-based measures i.e. transaction 
volumes and bid-ask spreads. Leuz and Verrecchia (2000) assert that increased 
accounting disclosures should reduce information asymmetry not only between 
companies and shareholders but also among investors.  
 
The other channel is private disclosure. Companies can provide information through 
telephone conversations, meetings and presentations to privileged groups such as 
securities analysts and fund managers. The significance of private disclosure channels 
to analysts and financial institutions has been identified by academics and recognised  
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by UK policy makers (Holland, 1998). Most of the studies in this area use qualitative 
methods.  The study of Marston (1996), Barker (1998), Holland and Doran (1998), 
Holland and Stoner (1996), and Holland (1997, 1998), have indicated that private 
corporate disclosure was the main channel which companies sought to disclose 
qualitative information on intangibles. Holland (2001) revealed how fund managers 
emphasised the significance of intangible or qualitative factors in company valuation. 
 
Type of information disclosed 
 
The information disclosed by companies can be divided into two broad categories, 
mandatory disclosure and voluntary disclosure (see, Marston & Shrives, 1991). 
Mandatory disclosures are those required by regulators such as government, stock 
exchanges and the accounting profession. The extent to which companies comply 
with legal and other regulatory requirements depends on the strictness of enforcement 
by these bodies. 
 
Voluntary disclosure, disclosure of information in excess of the minimum, may arise 
where companies perceive the benefits of disclosure outweighing the costs (Gray & 
Roberts, 1989 quoted in Marston & Shrives, 1991). The research on voluntary 
disclosure focuses on the role of for capital markets. Companies tend to provide 
voluntary disclosures when they plan to raise finance in order to give investors 
explicit information and influence their perceptions (Healy & Palepu, 1993, 1995). 
Lang and Lundholm (1996) indicated that the provision of accounting information 
through voluntary disclosures gives financial analysts a better picture of companies’ 
financial performance and capacity, and enables them to issue superior and more 
reliable forecasts.  
 
To sum up, this section examined the benefits and costs of the corporate disclosure, as 
well as the channels and type of information disclosure. The following section deal 










Voluntary disclosure is one of the key variables in this study. The results from the 
first part of the study show that Thai securities analysts and fund managers perceive 
the benefits of additional information disclosure. They asserted that the companies 
can increase their transparency and restore investors’ confidence by disclosing more 
voluntary information, which they see as leading to increase the stock market liquidity 
and higher share prices. The second part of the study therefore focuses on the 
voluntary disclosure in particular the information disclosed in the annual report.  
 
This section reviews the literature on voluntary disclosure. It begins by looking at 
legitimacy theory and the incentives that motivate the companies to disclose 
information voluntarily to public. It then moves on to consider the capital market 
consequences of increased company disclosure. This is followed by an examination of 




Legitimacy theory has its roots in the premise that companies signal their legitimacy 
by disclosing certain information in their annual report (Watson, Shrives & Marston, 
2002). Legitimacy theory assumes a social contract or agreement between companies 
and society (Shocker & Sethi, 1974, quoted in Watson, Shrives & Marston, 2002), 
obliging companies to voluntarily disclose their activities if manager perceived that 
particular activities are of interest to outside investors (Guthrie, Petty & Yongvanich, 
2004). Legitimacy theory is based on the idea that (i) companies need to legitimise 
their activities and (ii) the legitimacy process provides benefits for companies.    
 
According to legitimacy theory, companies use information disclosure to: (i) show 
that they are operating in line with social demands by disclosing certain information, 
(ii) present a socially responsible image and (iii) gain or maintain social legitimacy  
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(Patten, 2002). A number of researchers have used legitimacy theory to explain 
disclosures in environmental and social reporting (Guthrie & Parker, 1989; Patten, 
1992; Deegan & Gordon, 1996). By disclosing information voluntarily, managers can 
communicate certain information with outside investors. This, in turn, enhances 
investor confidence in company performance. 
 
Motives for voluntary disclosure 
 
Healy and Palepu (2001) identify six hypotheses to explain companies’ decisions to 
disclose additional information voluntarily. These are the capital markets transactions, 
the corporate control, the stock compensation, the litigation cost, the management 
talent signalling and the proprietary cost hypotheses. Each of these hypotheses is 
examined in turn. 
 
i.)  Capital markets transactions hypothesis 
 
The capital markets transactions hypothesis suggests that companies are inclined to 
provide voluntary disclosures when they plan to issue public debt or equity or to 
acquire another company in order to give investors explicit information and influence 
their perceptions (Healy & Palepu, 1993, 1995). Managers do so because they want to 
reduce the gap of information between insiders and outside investors, thereby 
reducing the company’s cost of external financing. This hypothesis is supported by 
empirical studies by Lang and Lundholm (1993, 2000). They document that when 
companies are going to issue their securities there is a significant increase in the 
analysts’ ratings of disclosure six months before the offering. Another study by Healy, 
Hutton and Palepu (1999) shows that companies with increased analyst ratings of 
disclosures have an abnormally high frequency of subsequent public debt offers.  
 
ii.)  Corporate control contest hypothesis:  
 
The corporate control contest hypothesis is motivated by evidence that boards of 
directors and investors hold managers responsible for current stock performance. 
Managers tend to increase voluntary disclosure in order to make outside investors  
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aware of their managerial ability and avoid misevaluation of their actions and 
performance. There is evidence to show that CEO turnover is associated with poor 
stock performance (Warner, Watts & Wruck, 1988; Weisbach, 1988). Given the risk 
of job loss accompanying poor stock and earnings performance, therefore, managers 
disclose voluntary information to mitigate the likelihood of misevaluation and to 
explain away poor earnings performance.  
 
iii.)  Stock compensation hypothesis  
 
Managers are often rewarded with stock-based compensation plans, for example, 
stock option grants, and stock appreciation rights. The stock compensation hypothesis 
suggests that these plans provide incentives for managers to disclose additional 
information about their performance for several reasons. Firstly, managers who 
interested in trading their stock will have incentive to disclose some private 
information in order to meet restrictions set by insider trading rules. Aboody and 
Kaznik (2000) report that managers appear to plan the timing of disclosing good and 
bad news in order to maximise their compensation. Moreover, they tend to disclose 
more voluntary information in order to correct any misunderstanding about the 
valuation of their stock prior to the expiration of their stock options awards. Secondly, 
managers disclose additional information because they want to mitigate the 
contracting costs associated with the grant of stock to new employees. 
 
iv.)  Litigation cost hypothesis  
 
The litigation cost hypothesis suggests that managers tend to disclose more 
information voluntarily in order to reduce the cost of litigation that can arise when 
companies provide inadequate information or untimely disclosures (Skinner, 1994). 
Therefore, they may be able to manage the timing of the disclosure of good and bad 
news, so that litigants and courts would only focus on whether there were delays in 
the disclosure of bad news (Healy & Palepu, 2001). Skinner (1994) documents that 
companies with bad earning news are more likely to disclose more additional 
information than companies with good news. Moreover, he finds that the litigation 
costs are lower for the companies that pre-disclose bad news than companies that do 
not.   
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v.)  Management talent signalling hypothesis 
 
The management talent signalling hypothesis suggests that companies tend to disclose 
voluntary disclosure and updated earning forecasts because they want to show 
investors that they are aware of companies’ economic conditions and able to quickly 
respond to changes (Trueman, 1986). This would give a good sign to investors about 
managers' abilities, and would positively affect the stock returns and the market value 
of the company (La Porta et al., 2000; Reese & Weisbach, 2002). According to Healy 
and Palepu (2001), there is no empirical evidence to either support or refute this 
hypothesis.  
 
vi.)   Proprietary cost hypothesis 
 
The proprietary cost hypothesis suggests that companies tend to disclose information 
only if that information will be of benefit to their competitive position. If there is 
potential threat that will damage their competitive position in product markets, 
companies will have an incentive not to disclose information (Verrecchia, 1983; 
Wagenhofer, 1990; Darrough & Stoughton, 1990; Feltham & Xie, 1992; Darrough, 
1993; Gigler 1994). In contrast to the other hypotheses, the proprietary cost 
hypothesis assumes that there are no conflicts of interest between managers and 
outsiders. Consequently, the literature predicts that voluntary disclosure will always 
be credible. This hypothesis is consequently mainly focused on the economic forces 
that constrain full disclosure.  According to Hayes and Lundholm (1996), companies 
tend to disclose aggregate information about their performance across business 
segments in order to conceal information from their competitors that might be damage 
their competitive positions. Companies with declining profitability and lower 
variability in profitability are more likely to provide additional information 









Capital market consequences of voluntary disclosure 
 
The prior literature (see, for example, Healy & Palepu, 2001; Leuz & Wysocki, 2008) 
shows that there are several kinds of effect that can occur in capital markets when 
companies disclose more information voluntarily. These are a reduction in 
information asymmetry and agency costs, improved stock liquidity, reduction in the 
cost of capital and enhancement of company value, and increased information 
intermediation. Further, there is the possibility of manipulation of information. Each 
of these effects is examined below.   
 
i.)  Reduced information asymmetry and agency costs 
 
The first benefit of increasing level of voluntary disclosure is to reduce information 
asymmetry and agency costs. Previous studies of the role of voluntary disclosure 
show that voluntary disclosure reduces information asymmetry between the 
companies and their investors. Welker (1995), Healy, Hutton and Palepu (1999), and 
Leuz and Verrecchia (2000) indicate that information asymmetry, measured by the 
bid-ask spread, is reduced when the level of information disclosure is increased. 
 
Moreover, theory suggests that decreasing of information asymmetry, in particular 
between managers and outside investors, allows the companies to reduce the agency 
costs. However, the empirical evidence on the level of voluntary disclosure and the 
agency costs is mixed. For example, Low (1996) finds a negative relationship 
between disclosure and agency cost proxies such as managerial ownership and 
investment opportunities, and a positive relationship between disclosure and leverage, 
while Chow and Wong-Boren (1987) find no significant relationship between 
leverage (a proxy for agency costs) and financial disclosure in annual reports. 
 
ii.)  Improved stock liquidity 
 
The second benefit of higher level of voluntary disclosure is greater liquidity of 
company’s securities. According to Healy and Palepu (2001), Dimond and Verrecchia 
(1991), and Kim and Verrecchia (1994), voluntary disclosure can reduces information 
asymmetries among informed and uninformed investors. Therefore, when companies  
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disclose more voluntary information or higher level of disclosure, investors will get 
more information in order to make decisions about the appropriate price of the 
companies’ securities. As a result, companies are more likely to attract more investors 
because the investors will be confident that any stock transactions occur at a fair price. 
This in turn leads to an improvement of the companies’ stock liquidity.       
 
The literature provides evidence that extensive voluntary information can reduce 
information asymmetry and increase stock market liquidity. Welker (1995) examines 
the association between the stock market liquidity and corporate disclosure policy, 
and finds that the greater the information disclosure, the lower the level of bid-ask 
spreads. Healy, Hutton, and Palepu (1999) investigate whether companies benefit 
from disclosing more voluntary information by examining changes in bid-ask spreads 
and the analyst disclosure rating. Their results indicate that increase their disclosure 
rating is followed by improved stock liquidity.  
 
Leuz and Verrecchia (2000) examine the economic effects of companies listed on 
German Stock Market increasing their information disclosure. They find that the 
information asymmetry for companies listed on the Neuer Market, who report under 
the International Accounting Standards and require higher disclosure information, is 
lower than for listed companies that report under the German Accounting Standards. 
Another study that provides strong support for this hypothesis is Heflin, Shaw and 
Wild (2001). They investigate the relationship between disclosure quality and market 
liquidity and report that disclosure quality is important for market liquidity. Frost, 
Gordon and Hayes (2002) also examine the relationship between the disclosure 
system and market liquidity on different stock exchanges, and find that the strength of 
the disclosure system is positively associated with the market liquidity.  
 
iii.)   Reduced cost of capital and enhanced the company’s value 
 
The third benefit of extensive voluntary disclosure is to lower the company’s cost of 
capital and enhance the company’s value. Healy and Palepu (2001) suggest that the 
information problem between managers and investors in capital markets creates an 
incentive for managers to disclosure information voluntarily in to reduce cost of 
capital.         
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There are little literature on the effect of greater voluntary disclosure and the cost of 
capital. The first study that attempts to provide evidence for the cost of capital 
hypothesis is Botosan (1997). She studies the association between disclosure level and 
the cost of equity capital by regressing company specific estimates of cost of capital 
on the market beta, company size and a self-constructed measure of disclosure level. 
Her measure of disclosure level is based on the quantity of voluntary disclosure for 
one industry. The results for companies that attract a low analyst following indicate 
that higher disclosure level is associated with a lower cost of capital. However, for 
companies with a high analyst following there is no evidence of an association 
between disclosure level and cost of capital.  
 
Leuz and Verrecchia (2000) suggest that information asymmetry between the 
companies and their shareholders will create costs by introducing adverse selection, 
which leads to lower liquidity of the companies’ securities. To overcome this 
problem, companies have to issue their capital at a discounted price. Discounted 
prices result in lower proceeds to the companies and hence higher costs of capital. 
Therefore, Leuz and Verrecchia suggest that a commitment to expand the level of 
disclosure will reduce the possibility of information asymmetry which, in turn, should 
reduce the discount at which companies’ securities are sold, and hence lower the costs 
of issuing capital. 
 
Finally, Botosan and Plumlee (2002) evaluate the association between the cost of 
equity capital and levels disclosure in the annual report, timely disclosure, and 
investor relations activities. They use the AIMR score and the dividend discount 
model to estimate the cost of capital. They find that the cost of capital decreases with 
higher disclosure levels in the annual report, but increases with timeliness of the 
disclosures. However, they find no association between the cost of capital and the 
level of investor relations activities.     
   
iv.)   Increased information intermediation 
 
The fourth benefit of expanded levels of voluntary disclosure is increase information 
intermediation. As the above studies show that voluntary disclosure reduces 
information gap among investors, which effect on the stock market liquidity.  
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Increased stock market liquidity should make the stock more attractive to investors. 
Consequently, the number of the financial intermediaries following the company 
should increase. 
 
According to Bhushan (1989) and Lang and Lundholm (1996), the extensiveness of 
accounting information through voluntary disclosures gives financial analysts a better 
picture of companies’ financial performance and capacity, which can enables them to 
issue superior and more reliable forecasts. Therefore higher level of voluntary 
information disclosure allow the financial intermediaries to deliver high quality 
information, which in turn lead to increasing demand for the analysts services.  
Lang and Lundholm (1993) find that companies with more informative disclosure 
have larger analysts following, less dispersion in analyst forecasts, and less volatility 
in forecast revisions. Francis, Hanna and Philbrick (1998) find an increase in analyst 
coverage for companies making conference calls. Healy, Palepu and Hutton (1999) 
show that companies with increased the analyst ratings of disclosure have increases in 
institutional ownership and analysts following. This evidence supports the increased 
information intermediation hypothesis. 
 
However, Healy and Palepu (2001) claim that public voluntary disclosure can also 
prevents financial intermediaries from distributing managers’ private information to 
investors. These could lead to a decline in demand for analysts’ services. Therefore, 
the effect of voluntary disclosure on information intermediation, in particular analysts 
following, should be answered empirically. 
 
v.)   Manipulated the financial markets 
 
Another benefit of increasing voluntary disclosure is that it improves the share prices. 
Bushee and Leuz (2003) indicate that disclosure can reduce the companies’ cost of 
capital only if it is credible and not self-serving. As discussed, voluntary disclosure 
has a possible relationship with company value. Consequently, any information that is 
disclosed by a company will effect on the value of the company. Thus, there is a 
possibility that the managers will have incentives to manipulate their company’s value 
through self-serving disclosure. Security regulators often claim that companies engage 
in voluntary disclosure to artificially increase a companies’ share price.  
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Voluntary disclosure measures 
 
One of the most important limitations encountered on disclosure studies is the 
difficulty in gauging the extent of voluntary disclosure (Healy & Palepu, 2001). 
According to Cooke and Wallace (1989) ‘disclosure is an abstract concept that cannot 
be measured directly. It does not possess inherent specifications by which one cannot 
indicate its intensity or quality, like the capacity of a car’(p.51). For this reason, many 
accounting researchers endeavour to discover the appropriate approach to measure the 
quality and the level of voluntary information disclosure. The following section 
discusses the concept of the quality of disclosure and the approaches to its 
measurement. 
 
The concept of quality of disclosure 
 
Quality of disclosure is a complex concept, and has a multifaceted and subjective 
nature (Beattie, McInnes & Fearnley, 2004). Empirical evidence on the corporate 
disclosure does not make a clear distinction between quality and quantity of 
information disclosure. Previous studies on this topic generally assume that the 
quantity of information disclosed is related to the quality of information disclosure. 
Consequently, the measure of quantity of information disclosure (or disclosure index) 
is commonly used as a proxy for disclosure quality. However, the use of the quantity 
of disclosure as a proxy for quality of disclosure is still questioned and has been 
opened on the need to develop more effective measures (Core, 2001).   
 
Several approaches to measure disclosure quality are employed and be found in the 
extant literature on disclosure. Some of the studies measure disclosure quality by 
using the number of words or sentences included in the annual report (Marston & 
Shrives, 1991) as the unit of analysis. While the other studies use a disclosure index 
which considers the scope of information disclosure, rather than a number of 
sentences, as a proxy for disclosure quality (Singhvi & Desai, 1971; Cooke, 1989; 
Wallace, Naser and Mora, 1994; Haniffa & Cooke, 2002). Different findings reported 





Voluntary disclosure approaches 
 
Healy and Palepu (2001) note that several methods have been used to measure the 
level of voluntary disclosure. These include management forecasts, analysts rating, 
metrics based on the The Association of Investment Management and Research 
(AIMR) database and disclosure index, self-constructed measures (e.g., The Center 
for International Financial Analysis and Research (CIFAR), and Standard and Poor’s 
(S&P) scores.  
The objective of this study is to examine the level of the voluntary information 
disclosed in published annual reports. According to Bettie, McInnes and Fearnley 
(2004), there are two main approaches generally employed when researching 
accounting disclosure. The first approach is subjective ratings and the other approach 
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Adapted from (Beattie, McInnes & Fearnley, 2004) 
 
Figure 2-3: Approaches to analysis of narratives in annual report  
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i.)  The Subjective or analyst rating approach  
 
The first approach is the subjective approach which is based on financial analysts’ 
perceptions. This approach is primarily uses questionnaire surveys of financial 
analysts to rate specified accounting items in accordance with their degree of 
importance for decision making process. Most prior studies on corporate disclosure 
(Lang & Lundholm, 1993; Welker, 1995; Healy, Hutton & Palepu, 1999; Lundholm 
& Myers, 2002) use analysts’ assessment of companies’ disclosure practices provided 
by the Association of Investment Management and Research (AIMR
1), formerly 
known as the Financial Analysts Federation (FAF). Because these disclosure ratings 
capture a broad range of disclosure activities, including information from the annual 
report, the quarterly report and information from investor relations activities, the 
ratings are viewed as a proxy for the level of companies’ disclosure. Moreover, these 
widely used ratings arguably capture the usefulness of companies’ information 
disclosures as perceived by expert users of this information.  
 
There are several limitations of the AIMR rating. The first limitation of this rating is it 
designed specifically for large US companies only and so is not available for non-US 
companies. In addition, Botosan (1997) notes that a sample based on these measures 
may be biased towards larger companies with extensive analyst coverage. Another 
limitation is this approach is that it provides financial analysts’ perceptions of the 
overall financial disclosure rather than a direct measure of the actual disclosure. 
Moreover, the AIMR discontinued its disclosure rankings in 1997 after rating fiscal 
year 1995. Finally, there are some questions about potential bias in the ratings 
process.  
 
Healy and Palepu (2001) also identify additional limitations of the AIMR database, 
noting that ‘…. it is unclear whether the analysts on the AIMR panels take the rating 
seriously, how they select companies to be included in the ratings, and what biases 
they bring to the ratings’ (p.427). There are no disclosure ratings in other countries, 
                                                 
1 The AIMR scores are based on analysts’ perception of value-relevant information from both 
mandatory and voluntary disclosure. Thus, these scores arguably capture the usefulness of companies’ 
disclosure as perceived by a person who has high skill and knowledge of this information. Every year 
AIMR publishes a disclosure score for almost 500 companies, comprising 22 different industries based 
on a number of financial analysts assessment of the selected industries disclosure policy.  
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including Thailand, that resemble the AIMR ratings. As a result, the AIMR rating 
cannot use as the proxy for the level of information disclosure for this study.  
 
ii.) The Semi – objective or the construction of disclosure index approach 
 
An alternative approach is the construction of disclosure index. This may be of 
mandatory, voluntary, or total disclosure of accounting and certain company 
characteristics. This approach generally uses a checklist of information that may be 
disclosed in companies’ annual reports. There are two general approaches to index 
construction, externally-generated disclosure scores, and self-constructed disclosure 
scores.  
 
a.) The externally-generated disclosure indices 
 
The first approach to the construction of a disclosure index is the externally-generated 
disclosure index. Some previous studies use the CIFAR
2 index (see, for example, 
Hope, 2003; Bushman, Piotroski & Smith, 2004) which measures the average 
accounting disclosure activity of large companies across a range of countries by using 
information disclosed in the companies’ annual reports as the proxy for a companies’ 
corporate disclosure.  
 
Other studies (see, for  example, Khanna , Palepu & Srinivasan, 2004) use the 
Standard and Poor’s (S&P) Transparency and Disclosure
3 scores of international 
companies’ disclosures as the disclosure proxy. Both the CIFAR and S&P scores are 
                                                 
2 The CIFAR score is a disclosure index for different countries that scores the annual reports of at least 
three companies from each country. There are ninety accounting information items in this index, so 
each company can obtains a score from 0 to 90 and the higher number of accounting information items 
indicating the more disclosure for the company. Therefore, many prior literatures has been used the 
CIFAR score as a proxy for the accounting quality at the country level. For instance, Bushman, 
Piotroski and Smith (2005) use the CIFAR score as a proxy for the quality of financial report and 
assuming that countries with higher CIFAR scores have relatively greater financial disclosure levels. In 
another study, La Porta et al (1998) indicate that the common laws countries which tend to have 
stronger investor protection institutions, have significantly higher CIFAR scores.   
3 S&P launched the T&D rating in 2001, beginning with rating more than 300 large and liquid 
companies in emerging markets. This index examines information from the company annual report 
only. There are 98 disclosure items which divided into three sub-categories including the information 
related to ownership structure and investor rights, information related to financial transparency and 
information disclosure, and information related to board and management structure and process. Thus, 




an international disclosure index which arguably capture the quality of accounting 
information disclosure at the country level. Therefore, these scores are benefit for the 
cross country studies. However, these international disclosure scores have the 
limitation that each rating uses only a few Thai companies. Therefore, it is 
inappropriate to use these ratings as the proxy for the level of corporate disclosure for 
this study. 
 
b.) The self-constructed disclosure index 
 
The second approach to the construction of a disclosure index, the self-constructed 
disclosure index, is used as the main research instrument for this study. Many 
previous studies (see, for example, Cooke, 1989, 1991; Meek, Roberts & Gray, 1995; 
Hossain, Tan & Adams, 1994; Botosan, 1997; Ferguson, Lam & Lee, 2002; Haniffa 
& Cooke, 2002; Francis, Nanda & Olsson 2008) use the self-constructed disclosure 
index as a proxy for the level of information disclosure, in particular, to measure the 
level of the information disclosed in the company’s annual report. The approach 
generally uses a checklist in order to gauge the level of information disclosure. There 
are some limitations of using this approach, specifically the selection and coding of 
the relevant disclosure items are subjective, and this approach captures only the 
existence of particular disclosures rather than the quality of those disclosures.  
 
However, there are several benefits of using the self-constructed disclosure index as 
the main proxy for a company’s voluntary disclosure. The first benefit is that this 
approach allows the researcher to design and construct the disclosure items in the 
checklist based on the objective of the study. Healy and Palepu (2001) and Francis, 
Nanda and Olsson (2008) note that there is greater confidence that self-constructed 
disclosure index measures captures what they intend to capture. As this study 
emphasise on the voluntary disclosure, so the disclosure items in the checklist should 
capture the voluntary disclosure items. Another benefit of using the self-constructed 
disclosure index is that this approach can be calculated for any company. Therefore, 
this approach is different from the externally-generated approach which tends to be 





Market liquidity  
 
The key variable of this study is market liquidity. This section reviews the concept of 
market liquidity and its measurement. ‘Liquidity’ in the sense of “market liquidity” 
refers to the ability to transact quickly in capital markets with a small impact on prices 
or without any material effect on prices. Market liquidity is generally perceived as 
desirable because of the multiple benefits. However, there is no single universally 
accepted definition of liquidity, and so it is necessary to consider the ways in which 
the concept is used. 
 
  Liquidity characteristics  
 
According to Sarr and Lybek (2002, p.5), there are five characteristics to market 
liquidity: tightness, immediacy, depth, breadth, and resiliency.  
 
  Tightness refers to low transaction costs, such as the bid-ask spreads, 
the difference between buy price and sell price.  
 
  Immediacy refers to the speed of execution, how quickly trades of a 
given size can be done at a given cost. In it reflects the efficiency of the 
trading, clearing and settlement systems.  
 
  Depth is refers to the number of securities that can be traded at given 
bid and ask prices.  
 
  Breadth means that orders are both numerous and large in volume with 
minimal impacts on prices.  
 
  Resiliency is how fast prices revert to former levels after they changed 
in response to large order flow imbalances initiated by less informed 
investors.   
 
These different dimensions are to some extent overlapping. For example, if the 
traders are patient and can wait longer to trade their securities, they may obtain better 
prices and/or may be able to trade a large amount of their securities at a given prices.  
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In this case tightness and depth depend on immediacy. From the given example it is 
clear that these terms may interact with each other and do not stand independently on 
their own. Consequently, there are varieties of measuring approach employed in the 
literature in attempt to gauge the market liquidity.  
 
 Liquidity  measurement 
 
Sarr and Lybek (2002) propose that liquidity measures can be classified in to four 
categories: transaction cost measures, volume based measures, price based measures, 
and market impact measures. Each liquidity measure will be discussed in details 
below.   
  Transaction cost measures capture the costs of trading financial assets 
and trading frictions in secondary markets (e.g. bid-ask spreads) 
 
  Volume-based measures capture the volume of transactions (e.g. trading 
volume, and trading frequency) 
 
  Price-based measures capture orderly movements towards equilibrium 
prices to mainly measure resiliency  
 
  Market-impact measures attempt to differentiate between price 
movements due the degree of liquidity from other factors, such as 
general market conditions or arrival of new information to measure 
both elements of resiliency and speed of price discovery.   
 
The bid-ask spread is a more commonly used measure for the market liquidity. It 
directly measures the cost of executing a small trade, with the cost typically calculated 
as the difference between the best bid and ask prices. Four factors may influence the 
bid-ask spread: order processing costs, inventory holding costs, asymmetric 
information costs, and oligopolistic market structure costs. One advantage for this 
measure is that the data for this measure are widely available on a real time basis. This 
makes the measure easy and quick to calculate and, as a result, it is commonly used as 
an indicator of the quality of market functioning. Fleming (2003) identifies the bid-
ask spread as one of the most appropriate liquidity indicators due to its high degree of 
correlation with other measures, such as price impact and benchmark/ non-benchmark  
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yield spreads. Similarly, D’Souza, Gaa and Yang (2003) also find evidence that bid-
ask spreads are one of the most appropriate indicators of liquidity, consistently 
exhibiting the expected relationship with price volatility and other liquidity measures. 
Only one drawback for the bid-ask spread is that bid and ask quotes are only good for 
limited quantities and periods of time. Therefore, the bid-ask spread only measures 
the cost of executing a single trade of limited size. Despite its drawbacks, this 
measure remains the most commonly used and most appropriate measure of market 
liquidity.  
 
2.4 The framework of the present study 
 
The disclosure literature suggests that higher levels of information disclosure reduce 
the information asymmetry between informed and uninformed investors (Bushman & 
Smith, 2001) which would otherwise lead to market inefficiencies and the mispricing 
of companies’ stocks (Diamond & Verrecchia, 1991). Reduction in the information 
gap between the informed and less informed investors can restore less informed 
investors’ confidence, which in turn may affect market liquidity. The reduction of 
uncertainty and information asymmetry between informed and uninformed investors, 
and between companies and outside investors, would also tend to reduce the cost of 
capital. Figure 2-4 illustrates the sequence of effects that occur when the listed 


































The theoretical framework link between market liquidity, as measured by the bid-ask 
spread, and disclosure is illustrated in Figure 2-5. The literature points to the 
favourable effect of increased corporate disclosures on information asymmetry, and 
on the stock market liquidity. Prior empirical studies have shown that voluntary 
disclosure is likely to convey material information to the market as reflected in 
significant and high stock market reactions. This could increase the market efficiency, 
and reduce information asymmetries between the managers and outside investors, and 
between the groups of investors. When companies disclose more information 
voluntarily, the information gap between more informed and less informed is reduced, 
and less informed investors will obtain a better understanding about the company. 
Consequently, they will able to make an accurate evaluation of a company’s true 
value.      
 
In addition, increased voluntary disclosure will affect to a company’s transparency. 
When the company discloses more voluntary information, it increases transparency 
and restores the investors’ confidence. It seems like most investors believe that 
transparent companies tend to reveal their true value, which attracts investors who 
willing to pay at the fair price for the companies’ securities.  This may result in 
smaller or narrow bid-ask spreads.  
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Figure 2-5: The theoretical framework between corporate disclosure  
and information asymmetry  
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As indicated in the previous chapter, this study employs the sequential exploratory 
mixed method designs with two main parts, a qualitative study and quantitative study. 
The first part, the qualitative study, aims to explore and obtain a better understand of 
corporate disclosure and the use of information from the perspective of financial 
intermediaries. The results from this qualitative study can be used to develop the 
research instruments, identify new variables, and scope the framework for the 
quantitative study.  
 
The main objective for the second part, the quantitative study, is to examine the effect 
of the level of voluntary disclosure on the liquidity of shares traded on the Stock 
Exchange of Thailand. Following from the existing literature, it is proposed that the 
greater the level of voluntary disclosure by companies, the less the information 
asymmetry among market participants. This leads to the restoration of the investors’ 
confidence and an increase in stock market liquidity. The benchmark test for this 
study aims to investigate the relationship between the level of voluntary information 
disclosure and stock market liquidity for the sample listed on Thai capital market. The 
dependent variable for this study used is the effective relative bid ask spread as a 
proxy for the market liquidity and the level of voluntary information disclosure is the 




The main objective of this chapter was to review the theoretical relations between 
corporate disclosure and information asymmetry which is the benchmark test for this 
study. The discussion begins with the theory of information asymmetry, and corporate 
disclosure. Then, move on to the literature for the key variables of this study which 
including the voluntary disclosure and market liquidity. Following by the conceptual 
framework of this study, which link between the voluntary information disclosure and 
stock market liquidity. The following chapter will provide the context of the research 
which includes the characteristics of the institutional in Thailand; such as the legal 













This study has two main objectives. The first is to gain an understanding of corporate 
disclosure and the use of information by financial intermediaries in Thailand, and the 
second is to examine the relationship between levels of disclosure and the liquidity of 
shares traded on the Stock Exchange of Thailand. As indicated in Chapter 2, there are 
only a few studies of the relationship between the level of information disclosure and 
the stock market liquidity. These studies are set in the US and other major developed 
countries that have developed markets. There is insufficient evidence on how theories 
formulated for companies operating in major developed countries can be applied to 
companies outside these markets, and in countries with different legal environments 
and institutional settings. To put this study into context, it is necessary to have an 
understanding of the characteristics of Thailand. In particular, the legal protection 
offered to investors, the institutional arrangements in Thailand, the structure of Thai 
capital market, and the disclosure requirements of the Stock Exchange of Thailand. 
 
This chapter divided into two main sections. The first section deals with the 
institutional environment in Thailand, which includes the legal of investor protection 44 
 
and the organisation structure. The second section presents the overview of the Thai 
capital market. This section begins with a history of the Stock Exchange of Thailand 
(SET), the market types and the trading protocol in Thailand, and the disclosure 
requirements for Thai listed companies.  
 
3.1 The characteristics of the institutional structures in Thailand 
 
The quality of financial reporting and the level of information disclosure are seen to 
depend on the characteristics of the institutional setting of a country. Ball, Robin and 
Wu (2003) provide empirical evidence at the country level that the quality of 
information disclosure is driven by incentives rather than accounting standards. They 
further argue that incentives are driven by the companies’ institutional setting. They 
also note a number of features of the institutional in Thailand that affect the quality of 
financial reporting. These include the influence of controlling families on the demand 
for public disclosure, political influences on financial reporting, especially in relation 
to the BASP (the Board of Supervision of Auditing Practices), the close link between 
financial reporting and reporting for tax purposes, and weak enforcement of 
regulations.  
 
This section describes the characteristics of the institutional setting in Thailand, 
including the ownership structure, the type of legal rule, the extent to which laws are 
enforceable, and the insider trading laws.  
 
The institutional environment in Thailand 
 
The ownership structure of a company can affect the implications of agency 
relationships. There is evidence to show that companies in the East Asian countries 
are usually owned by a small number of families (Wiwattanakantang, 1999; Claessens 
& Fan 2002). This is associated with better performance. However, the higher level of 
family ownership and shareholder concentration can lead to high expropriation of 
minority shareholders interests.  
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In companies in which there is a high level of family ownership, business is based 
more on informal relationships than on formal legal contracting. Family members will 
have a private network and communicate with other shareholders within the same 
family. This reduces the demand for public disclosure (Ball, Robin & Wu, 2003). In 
this situation, the insiders or the family members will gain benefits from the personal 
network and private information. The minority outside investors, on the other hand, 
will be disadvantaged because they may be kept uninformed and may have to rely 
solely on the public disclosures.  
 
Companies in Thailand, like companies in most East Asian countries, are 
characterised by concentrated ownership by families and/or family groups. The 
existence of more heavily concentrated ownership in Thailand may lead to different 
reporting practices. For example, companies with a high ownership concentration may 
be unwilling to provide voluntary disclosure as the majority of shareholders may have 
alternative ways of obtaining information. Consequently, the level of voluntary 
disclosure in Thailand may not be as high as in the developed countries such as the 
US. This lower level of voluntary disclosure may lead to a different association 
between the level of voluntary disclosure and the stock market liquidity than that 
found in the US and the other major developed countries.  
 
The legal environment in Thailand 
 
According to La Porta et al. (1997), there are four types of legal rules: English, 
French, German and Scandinavian. English legal rules are common law based 
whereas the French, German and Scandinavian laws are codified civil laws. European 
countries exported their legal systems. English style common law is assumed to be 
associated with better developed capital markets. La Porta et al. (1997) point out that 
common law countries seem to provide the best protection for both shareholders and 
creditors against expropriation by insiders. In contrast, French law countries provide 
the least protection, and German law countries and Scandinavian law countries are 
somewhere in the middle. In addition, French law countries have the lowest quality of 
law enforcement. In an earlier study, La Porta et al. (1996), show that countries with 
poor investor protections have more highly concentrated ownership of shares.   
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 As Thailand is viewed by La Porta et al. (1997) as adopting an English style legal 
system it may be expected, that Thailand has a well developed capital market. 
However, Ball, Robin and Wu (2003) show, in relation to new issues, that the East 
Asian countries, and specifically Thailand, have accounting standards that are 
generally viewed as high quality, but have institutional features that give preparers 
incentives to issue low quality financial reports. This argument consistent with La 
Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer (2006) who suggest that although Thailand has 
high disclosure requirements, the laws that would enforce these requirements are 
weak. Deesomsak, Paudyal and Pescetto (2004) indicate that even though Thai law 
originated from English style, it had been influenced by the French style which is as 
associated with the lowest quality of law enforcement among four types of legal rules. 
Following Deesomsak, Paudyal and Pescetto the rule of law in Thailand is seen as 
relatively weak. The level of expropriation of minority stakeholders in Thailand may 
therefore be high and this could imply additional agency problems between inside and 
outside investors. 
 
Leuz, Nanda and Wysocki (2003) take a different approach to grouping legal and 
institutional characteristics. They group countries into: (1) outsider economies with 
large stock markets, dispersed share ownership, strong investor rights and strong legal 
enforcement; (2) insider economies with less developed stock markets, concentrated 
ownership, weak investor rights but strong enforcement; and (3) insider economies 
with weak enforcement. They include Thailand is in this third group. 
 
  Insider trading laws 
 
As discussed above, many Thai companies are majority owned by families and/or 
family groups. These majority owners are effectively insiders, with minority 
shareholders as outsiders. The information gap created between these family insiders 
and outside investors may reduce market liquidity.  Insider trading rules may partially 
alleviate this problem. 
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In Thailand, insider trading is a statutory offense under the Securities and Exchange 
Act of 1992 (B.E. 2535)
4. Section 241 (p.53-54) defines insider trading as:  
 
No person, whether directly or indirectly, shall purchase or sell, offer 
to purchase or sell or invite any other person to purchase, sell or offer 
to purchase or sell securities which are listed in the Securities 
Exchange or traded in an over-the-counter center in such a way as to 
take advantage of other persons by using information material to 
changes in the prices of securities which has not yet been disclosed to 
the public and to which information he has access by virtue of his office 
or position, and whether or not such act is done for his own or another 
person's benefit, or to disclose such information so that he will receive 
consideration from the person who engages in the aforesaid acts.  
 
For the purposes of this Section, the person under the first paragraph 
shall include:  
 
(1) director, manager, person responsible for the operation or 
auditor of a company whose securities are listed in the Securities 
Exchange or traded in an over-the-counter center;  
(2) securities holder of a company whose securities are listed in the 
Securities Exchange or traded in an over-the-counter center, who 
holds securities the par value of which exceeds five percent of the 
registered capital. For the purpose of calculating the value of 
such securities held by such person, the securities held by his 
spouse and minor children shall be counted as his securities;  
(3) state agency personnel, or director, manager, or officer of the 
Securities Exchange or of an over-the-counter center who is in an 
office or position with access to information which is material to 
changes in the price of securities;  
(4) any person involved in securities and/or the trading of securities 
in the Securities Exchange or in an over-the-counter center. 
 
Section 242 (p.54) stipulates that the SEC can investigate any person gaining benefit 
from insider information: 
 
The SEC Office shall have the right to call on such person to deliver the 
benefit which he has gained from such trading of securities or from the 
disclosure of information within a six month period from the date on 
which he gained access to such information.  
 
Section 296 (p.65) contains penalty provisions, stating that the person violating 
insider-trading rules: 
 
                                                 
4 See the Securities and Exchange Commission (2007). Securities and Exchange Act B.E. 2535 
(Translation). 48 
 
Shall be liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding two years or a 
fine not exceeding two times the benefit received or which should have 
been received by such a person as a result of such contravention but 
such fine shall not be less than five hundred thousand baht, or both.  
 
There is, of course, the question of the extent to which the insider trading rules have 
been enforced. As noted earlier, Thailand is characterised as having strong rules but 
weak enforcement.  However, there have been a number of recent insider trading 
investigations
5 in Thailand. 
 
The characteristics of the institutional setting and the legal environment in Thailand, 
which are different to that in the US and other major developed countries, may effect 
on the quality of financial reporting and the level of information disclosure. 
Therefore, even though listed companies in Thailand are required by the SET to 
follow high quality accounting standards in the preparation of their financial reports, 
these institutional factors may limit the effectiveness of the standards in producing 
high quality financial reports and more information disclosure.  
 
 
3.2 The Thai capital market 
 
An organized stock exchange was established in Thailand as limited partnership in 
1962. The following year it became a limited company and changed its name to the 
“Bangkok Stock Exchange Co., Ltd.” (BSE). However, the BSE failed to succeed 
because of a lack of official government support and limited investor understanding of 
equity markets. The BSE finally ceased operations in the early 1970s. A few years 
later, in 1975, the “Securities Exchange of Thailand” was established under the 
Securities Exchange of Thailand Act (B.E. 2517). In 1991, its name was changed to 
the “Stock Exchange of Thailand” (SET). The Stock Exchange of Thailand became a 
regulated entity under the Securities and Exchange Act of 1992 (B.E. 2535) (the 
SEA). 
 
The SEA designates the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) as the regulator 
of the Thai Capital Market. The SEC is responsible for the activities of the Kingdom’s 
                                                 
5 Cases judged as a violation of insider trading rules in Thailand are provided in Appendix H   49
capital market, while the Bank of Thailand (BOT) has a duty to oversee the country’s 
money market. In addition, the SEA requires a clear separation between the primary 
and the secondary markets to facilitate their successful development. Both the primary 
and secondary markets are regulated by SEC.   
 
The Stock Exchange of Thailand’s trading system 
 
 
There are a variety of trading systems that allow agents to trade financial assets, such 
as stocks. In general, stock markets can be classified along two main lines: a quote 
driven market and an order driven market. In a quote driven market, buyers and 
sellers submit their bid and ask offers to designated market-markers, also known as 
dealers or specialists. Based on information in their order books, the market-makers 
will post bid-ask prices at which they will buy or sell, and take the opposite side of 
each trade. Therefore, the quote driven market will display only the bid and ask offers 
of designated market-makers. In order driven markets, on the other hand, traders 
interact directly with each other market participants without the intermediation of 
market makers. In order driven markets, buyers and sellers will submit the quantity 
and prices of the stock at which they are willing to buy or sell. These buy and sell 
orders are displayed and accumulated in a limit-order book, and order execution is 
usually prioritised on the basis of price and time.  
 
The Stock Exchange of Thailand is predominantly based on an order driven system. 
This trading system is called the Automated for the Stock Exchange of Thailand 
(ASSET). The ASSET system consists of two trading possibilities: the main system is 
‘Automatic Order Matching’ (AOM), and the support system is ‘Put-Through’ (PT). 
For the main AOM system, the process begins when the buyer or seller submits their 
order via a broker. These orders will be then electronically submitted from the broker 
to the SET’s computerised order matching system. All orders will be grouped 
according to price, with the best price taking precedence. Within each price group, 
orders are then arranged according to time. Alternatively, orders can be submitted by 
the PT system. Under the PT system, brokers can advertise their buying and selling 
interests on a screen which provided by the ASSET. This system allows brokers to 50 
 
deal privately and directly with each other for their own trades or on behalf of their 
clients.    
 
Disclosure requirements
6 of the Stock Exchange of Thailand 
 
The information that listed companies are required to provide to the SET can be 
classified into periodic, and non-periodic reports. 
 
Periodic reports: There are four types of periodic reports that listed companies are 
required to prepare and submit within a specific period under the Securities and 
Exchange Act (1992), Section 56. These reports are yearly financial statements, 
quarterly financial statements, annual reports, and disclosure reports of additional 
information. Each of the periodic report is discussed in detail below, along with the 
specific period for submitting each type of report.  The requirements are summarised 
in Table 3-1.  
 
   Yearly financial statements 
A listed company is required to prepare financial statements in line with the 
procedures specified in the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and file the 
original reports, along with one copy, with the SEC (voluntary for English version) 
and send a copy of each Thai and English version to the SET within three months 
from the end of accounting period. Such financial statements must also be 
disseminated electronically via the SET disclosure system.  
 
 Quarterly financial statements 
A listed company is required to prepare quarterly financial statements in line with the 
procedures specified in the SEC and file the original reports, along with one copy, 
with the SEC (voluntary for English version) and send a copy of each Thai and 
English version to the SET within 45 days from the end of accounting period. These 
financial statements must also be disseminated electronically via the SET disclosure 
system.  
 
                                                 
6 See the Stock Exchange of Thailand (2007). Disclosure Manual.   51
Table 3-1: Specific period for submitting periodic reports to the SET 
 
    
Filing period after  
the accounting period ends
7 
 
1.1  Audited annual financial statement  





  Audited annual financial statement  





1.2  Reviewed quarterly financial statements  45  days 
1.3  Annual report  11 0  days 







  Annual reports 
A listed company must also prepare and submit its annual report to the SEC and send 
four hard copies of the annual reports including four copies on CD-ROMs to the 
Exchange. The information in the annual report must be in accordance with the 
disclosure report form (Form 56-2) as prescribed by the office of the SEC. The annual 
reports must be filed within 110 days from the end of accounting period together with 
notice of the annual general meeting.  
 
Disclosure reports on additional information (Form 56-1) 
A listed company must also prepare and submit a disclosure report on additional 
information to the Exchange. The information in this report must be in accordance 
with the disclosure report form for additional information of the issuing company 
(Form 56-1) as prescribed by the office of the SEC. A listed company must file the 
original reports, together with one copy, with the SEC and send four copies to the 
SET within 90 days from the end of accounting period. Such reports must also be 
disseminated electronically via SET disclosure system.
 
 
                                                 
7 If the end of such period falls onto holiday, the deadline will be postponed to the following business 
day. Companies with different accounting periods shall consistently follow the same practice. 
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Non-Periodic Reports: There are three types of non-periodic reports that required 
from the SET. These reports are classified into those requiring the immediate public 
disclosure of material information, requiring report within three days, and requiring 
report within 14 days. Each of these reports is discussed below.  
 
The immediate public disclosure of material information 
A listed company must disclose all necessary and relevant information concerning its 
affairs that may affect the rights of shareholders and their investment decisions or may 
lead to a significant change in the price of its securities. A written notice must be 
submitted on the date on which any such incidents occur, at least one hour before each 
securities trading session or at the end of the day’s trading at the Exchange. In cases 
where a listed company fails to submit the required information within the specified 
period, the listed company shall submit it at least one hour before the first trading 
session, or before 9 a.m., on the following trading day.  
 
Report within three days 
Disclosure of information within three days is required when any of the following 
incidents occur: 
(1) There is a change in the composition of a listed company’s Board of 
Directors. In such a case, a listed company must submit the resumes of the 
newly appointed directors to the Exchange. 
(2) There is a change in a listed company’s memorandum of association or 
articles of association except for an amendment to the memorandum of 
association with respect to a matter that requires an immediate report. 
(3) A listed company relocates its head office. 
(4) A listed company, or its subsidiary, changes its auditor. 
(5) A listed company changes its securities’ register or changes the location of 
its securities’ registrar. 
When a change number (1), (2) or (3) has been registered with the Partnerships and 
Companies Registrar, a listed company must furnish evidence of such a registration 
with the Exchange within seven days of the date on which the Partnerships and 
Companies Registrar effects such a registration.  
 
   53
Report within 14 days 
A listed company must provide the SET with the following documents within 14 
days: 
(1) A copy of the list major shareholders or the first ten major shareholders as 
of the date of an ordinary general meeting of shareholders, and as of the 
date of the closing of the share register. 
(2) The minutes of an ordinary general meeting or extraordinary general 
meeting of shareholders. 





By virtue of Section 274 of the Securities and Exchange Act, any listed company that 
fails to comply with Section 56 and Section 57, or delays in the submission of 
financial statements, annual reports and Form 56-1 shall be liable to a fine not 





This chapter reviews the characteristics of the legal environment and the institutional 
setting in Thailand and provides an overview of the Stock Exchange of Thailand, in 















This chapter presents the methodology for the first part of the research, a qualitative 
study. The methodology for the second part of the research will be described on 
Chapter 7. This chapter, which presents with research questions, the research 
methodology, and the strategies employed to collect and analyse the data, is organized 
as follows. The first section describes the research questions. The second section 
presents an alternative research methodology. The third section presents an overview 
of grounded theory methodology, as well as the process in building a grounded 
theory. The fourth section describes the site selection and sample procedure. The 
following section presents the arguments for the choice of the research method and 
techniques employed in collecting data. This is followed by a section dealing with the 




4.1 Research questions 
 
The first part of the study aims to gain an understanding of corporate disclosure and 
the use of information by financial intermediaries in Thailand. The research objective 
is to explore the phenomena of corporate disclosure and the use of information from 
the perspective of Thai analysts and fund managers. The initial tentative research 
questions are about: 
 
a)  Sources of information 
b)  Disclosure and the quality of disclosure  
c)  Voluntary disclosure 
d)  Types of information 
e)  Auditors 
 
These open and tentative research questions are described in detail in the section on 
data collection.  
 
4.2 Research methodology 
 
There are two broad streams of research design in the social sciences: quantitative 
research and qualitative research. Denzin and Lincoln (2008) explain the difference 
between qualitative and quantitative research as: 
 
“The word qualitative implies an emphasis on the qualities of the entities 
and on processes and meaning that are not experimentally examined or 
measured (if measured at all) in terms of quantity, amount, intensity, or 
frequency. Qualitative researchers stress the socially constructed nature of 
reality, the intimate relationship between the researcher and what is 
studied, and the situational constraints that shape inquiry. Such researchers 
emphasize the value-laden nature of inquiry. They seek answers to 
questions that stress how social experience is created and given meaning. 
In contrast, quantitative studies emphasize the measurement and analysis 
of causal relationships between variables, not process. Proponents of such 
studies claim that their work is done from within a value-free framework.” 
(Denzin &Lincoln, 2008, p.14) 
 
The decision of which research stream to use depends on what the researcher wants to 
study and the substance of the research problem (Strauss & Corbin, 1998). For 57 
 
example, if the research is concerned with investigating things related to observation 
and measurement in some way, then the quantitative research method would provide 
the appropriate methodology. Quantitative research is more involved with questions 
about: how much? how many? how often? to what extent? (Hancock, 1998; Sullivan, 
2001).   
 
On the other hand, qualitative research is more focused on how to find the answers to 
questions that begin with: why? how? in what way? (Hancock, 1998). Strauss & 
Corbin provided the following definition of qualitative research as:  
 
“….. any type of research that produces findings not arrived at statistical 
procedures or other means of quantification. It can refer to research about 
persons’ lives, lived experiences, behaviors, emotions, and feeling as well 
as about organizational functioning, social movements, culture 
phenomena, and interactions between nations. Some of the data may be 
quantified as with census or background information about the persons or 
objects studied, but the bulk of the analysis is interpretative.” (Strauss & 
Corbin, 1998, p.10-1). 
 
Other qualitative researchers reveal that if the research is concerned with the opinions 
and attitudes, experiences and feeling of individuals producing subjective data, or 
with understanding an area that little is known about, or developing an explanation of 
social phenomena, then the qualitative methodology would be proper (Creswell, 1998; 
Sullivan, 2001).  
 
The purpose of the first part of the study is to explore the phenomena of corporate 
disclosure and the use of information from perspective of Thai analysts and fund 
managers. A qualitative research method is therefore used in the first part of this study 
in order to get richness of data and deeper insight into the phenomena. The grounded 
theory methodology is also used as strategy when analysing the data. The following 






4.3 Grounded theory 
 
Grounded theory has been described as a ‘…. theory that was derived from data, 
systematically gathered and analyzed through the research process’ (Strauss & 
Corbin, 1998, p.12). The key to grounded theory is to generate in-depth data that can 
illuminate patterns, concepts, categories, properties, and dimensions of the given 
phenomena (Glaser & Strauss, 1967; Strauss & Corbin, 1998). The primary focus of 
grounded theory is the development of theory the analysis of data gained from 
theoretical sampling.  
 
This section examines the definition of terms used in grounded theory. These can be 
divided into two types. First, definitions of terms that relate to analysis - open coding, 
axial coding, and selective coding. Second, definitions of terms that relate to sampling 
- theoretical sampling, and theoretical saturation. This section also provides an 




The initial stage of grounded theory analysis is open coding. Open coding is the 
process of identifying, categorising, labelling, and describing all important 
phenomena observed in the data that results in open categories (Strauss & Cobin, 
1998). Open categories are concepts generated from data that describe phenomena in 





The second stage in grounded theory analysis is axial coding. The purpose of axial 
coding is to reassemble data fractured during open coding to form more precise and 
complete explanations of the observed phenomena and relationships among the 
categories (Strauss & Corbin, 1998). At this stage, the open categories generated 




The final analytical process is selective coding, which builds on open and axial 
coding. This final stage of data analysis involves identification of the core or central 
category, relating it systematically with the other categories, validating those 
relationships, and description of the emergent substantive grounded theory (Strauss & 
Corbin, 1990). The core category is the central phenomenon that connects all the 




Theoretical sampling is concept driven. It allows the researcher to discover the 
concepts that are relevant to the problem and population, and enables the researcher to 
explore and understand the concepts in depth. Strauss and Corbin (1998) indicate that 
theoretical sampling is especially important when studying or exploring new areas 
because it enables the researcher to discover new information. Moreover, it allows the 
researcher to choose samples that can bring about the greatest theoretical return. 
Strauss and Corbin define theoretical sampling as  
 
‘Data gathering driven by concepts derived from the evolving theory and 
based on the concept of “making comparisons,” whose purpose is to go 
places, people, or events that will maximize opportunities to discover 
variations among concepts and to densify categories in terms of their 
properties and dimensions.’ (Strauss & Corbin, 1998, p.201). 
 
  
In contrast with statistical sampling, theoretical sampling cannot be planned. It is not  
possible to make a judgment regarding sample size before embarking on the data 
collection and analysis (Glaser & Strauss, 1967; Strauss & Corbin, 1998). Corbin and 
Strauss (2008) point out that theoretical sampling is different from conventional 
methods of sampling because the researcher does not go out to the site and collect the 
entire set of data before beginning the analysis. An analysis stage begins after the first 
sample of data is collected. Data collection never gets too far ahead of the analysis, 
because the data or the answer that acquired from the interview can lead to additional 
questions for the next interview.  60 
 
Data collection leads to analysis, the analysis leads to concept, and the concepts 
generate more questions. Additional questions lead to more data collection so that the 
researcher might learn more about those concepts. This process continues until the 
study reaches the point of saturation, the point that all the concepts are well defined 
and explained. Thus, the end result of the sample size for grounded theory relies on 
the point of theoretical saturation, the researcher continuous expanding the sample 
size until data collection reveals no new data. (Glaser & Strauss, 1967; Strauss & 
Corbin, 1998; Locke, 2001; Goulding, 2006).  
 
The sample size can be affected by the quality of the data gathering. This is why 
theoretical sampling is recommended when using grounded theory. The theoretical 
sampling procedure dictates that the researcher chooses interviewees who have 
experienced or are experiencing the phenomena under study. By doing so the 
researcher chooses the people who are ‘experts’ in the phenomena and thus able to 
provide the best data available (Glaser & Strauss, 1967; Strauss & Corbin, 1998). By 
using theoretical sampling and targeting the most knowledgeable persons, it is 
possible to increase the quality of the data collected in each interview. ‘There is an 
inverse relationship between the amount of usable data obtained from each participant 
and the number of participants’ (Morse, 2000, p.4). Therefore, theoretical sampling 
provides a sample selection that is more likely to highlight the patterns, concepts, 
categories, properties, and dimensions of the given phenomena (Glaser & Strauss, 




Corbin and Strauss (2008) propose that: ‘Saturation is usually explained in term of 
“when no new data are emerging.” But saturation is more than a matter of no new 
data. It also denotes the development of categories in terms of their properties and 
dimensions, including variation, and if theory building, the delineating of 






Strauss and Corbin (1998) indicate that theoretical saturation occurs when:  
‘(a) no new or relevant data seem to emerge regarding a category,  
 (b) the category is well developed in term of its properties and dimensions 
demonstrating variation, and  
 (c) the relationships among categories are well established and validated.’ 
(p.212) 
 
The research process in building a grounded theory 
 
The research strategy employed to address the research question and to achieve the 
objective of the qualitative part of this study is summarised in the framework as 
shown in figure 4-1. This relates to grounded theory procedures (Strauss & Corbin, 
1990, 1998; Corbin & Strauss, 2008). As indicated previously, the process of building 
a grounded theory begins with a general broad range of research questions that the 
researcher is interested in. Then the target sample is selected using theoretical 
sampling. Data collection begins after finding an appropriate sample, i.e. those most 
knowledgeable and with the best understanding in the area of study. For this stage, 
data collection and data analysis will go hand in hand. The information that is 
acquired from the data collection provides the additional questions to be asked in the 
next interview.  This process and the sampling continues until the study reaches 


























The following section considers the sampling aspect of the study. This includes the 
sampling design, target population and sampling method. 
 
4.4 The site selection and sample procedure  
 
The sampling design defines the target population and the sampling method used this 
study. Sullivan (2001) provides the following definition of population and sample: 
 
‘A sample is drawn from a population, which refers to all possible cases of 
what we are interested in studying. A sample consists of one or more 
 Research question 
 
 Data collection   Data analysis 





Figure 4-1: Research process to build a grounded theory 63 
 
elements or cases selected from some larger grouping or population. The 
manner in which the elements are selected for the sample has enormous 
implications for the scientific utility of the research based on that sample. 
To select a good sample, you need to define clearly the population from 
which the sample is to be drawn. Failure to define the population clearly 
can make generalizing from the sample observations highly ambiguous 
and result in drawing inaccurate conclusions.’ (Sullivan, 2001, p.187)  
 
The theoretical sampling procedure is used in this study. This method is one type of 
the non-probability sampling which is based on selection by non-random means. It is 
a useful method of obtaining information from the interviewees who have 
experienced, or experts in, the phenomena (Glaser & Strauss, 1967; Strauss & Corbin, 
1998). This study uses securities analysts and fund managers as a sampling frame as 
they are both expert users of financial information and their views are likely to impact 





The target population comprises the securities analysts and the fund managers whose 
names were disclosed on the website of the Securities and Exchange Commission 
(SEC) of Thailand as the licensed and approved persons on the 31
st May 2007.  The 
SEC website on that date provided 201 names of licensed and approved securities 
analysts from 42 licensed securities companies, and 154 names of licensed and 
approved fund manager from 29 licensed fund management companies.  
 
Table 4-1: Detail of the target population 
 
 










The sampling method 
 
 
The sampling method used for securities analysts and fund managers is considered 
separately. The criterion for sample selection used in this study is as followed. For the 
securities analysts, the sample was chosen from the largest licensed securities 
companies by size, and one security analyst was selected from each licensed securities 
company. Although, sample size is not defined in advance for the theoretical sampling 
procedure, due to the time constraint, five securities analysts from each of the top five  
securities companies were contacted and appointments arranged in advance by email 
and telephone before the researcher went to collect the data in Thailand. Two analysts 
out of five agreed to participate in the interviews. After conducting the two 
interviews, contact was made with other securities analysts. The other securities 
companies were selected from the group below the top five largest securities 
companies. Interviews were conducted until theoretical saturation was reached. The 
sample consists of four securities analysts from the eight securities companies 
approached.  
 
For the fund managers, the sample was selected using the same criteria as for 
securities analysts. The sample was chosen from the top largest licensed fund 
management companies in Thailand by market capitalization, and non-random 
sampling of one fund manager from each of these companies. Four fund managers 
from the top four largest licensed fund management companies were contacted, and 
three of them agreed to participate in the study. One of the three interviews was 
conducted via telephone, because on the day of the interview there was a problem 
caused by the traffic jams and the interviewee could not come to her office at the time 
of the appointment. The interviewee asked for the telephone interview for her 
convenience. After the interview with the third interviewee, other fund managers were 
identified and contacted, until there no new information was obtained from the 






4.5 Data collection  
 
This section describes on the data collection aspect of the study. This consists of the 
research method, interviews schedule, mechanics of gathering interview material, and 




As the first part of the research aims to explore the preferences of Thai financial 
intermediaries about the sources and channels of information disclosure and their 
views about the quality of disclosure, the interview was chosen as a research method 
for gathering the data. There are several reasons for using the interview as the 
research method. The first is because ‘the interviewing is a more flexible form of data 
collection than questionnaires.  This flexibility makes interviewing suitable for a far 
broader range of research situations’ (Sullivan, 2001, p. 271). The second is that this 
method gives both the interviewer and the interviewee an opportunity to understand 
the questions and answers clearly. For the interviewer, the interview offers an 
opportunity to explain the questions that the interviewees may not clearly understand. 
For the interviewee, the interview can encourage him or her to give more accurate and 
complete information that allows the interviewer to receive in-depth information and 
to clarify answers. Another reason for using the interview is that the interviewer can 
perceive the interviewee’s response during the interview. For example, the 
interviewee’s attitude toward the interview and the emotional reaction of the 
interviewees to questions. This additional information enables the interviewer to 
better evaluate responses given by the interviewee, especially when the subject matter 
is highly personal or arguable. (Gorden, 1987 quoted in Sullivan, 2001, p. 272). 
 
Hancock (1998) indicates that there are basically three types of interviews method: 
structured, semi-structured, and unstructured. The first type of interview method is the 
structured interview. This type of interview consists of a tightly structured set of open 
ended questions carefully worded and arranged in advance. The interviewer asks the 
same questions to each interviewee. Structured interviews allow the interviewer to 
collect detailed data systematically and this allows comparability among all 66 
 
interviewees. The semi-structured interview is the second type of interview method. 
This involves the preparation of an interview schedule that lists a predetermined set of 
questions or issues that are to be explored during an interview. This interview 
schedule serves as an outline during the interview process in order to ensure that 
basically the same information is obtained from all interviewees. The advantage of the 
interview schedule approach is that it makes interviewing more systematic and 
comprehensive by delimiting the issues to be covered in the interview. The final type 
of the interview method is the unstructured interview. It is also called “the informal 
conversational interview” (Patton 2002, p.342). This is the most open-ended method 
of interviewing which is based on questions that are not planned. The interviewer 
goes into the site with the purpose of discussing a limited number of topics. This type 
of interview is appropriate when the interviewer wants to maintain maximum 
flexibility. Under these circumstances, it is not possible to have a predetermined set of 
questions. Data collected from unstructured interview will be different for each person 
interviewed. The advantage of unstructured interview is that the interviewer is flexible 
and highly responsive to individual differences, situational changes and emerging new 
information. 
 
In this study, the research method used  for data collection is the semi-structured 
interview. This type of interview is flexible and provides opportunities for both 
interviewer and interviewee to discuss some topics or subject areas in greater depth. 
This method has the major advantage of allowing the interviewees to express their 
opinions on wide-ranging, predetermined issues, and also in response to 
supplementary questions seeking clarity, consistency and full explanation (Barker, 
1998). The interviewer can predetermine the topics or subject areas to cover, but is 
open and amenable to unexpected additional information from the interviewee. 
Hancock (1998) suggests that ‘….(t)his can be particularly important if a limited time 
is available for each interview and the interviewer wants to be sure that the “key 
issues” will be covered’ (p.10). This type of interview involves the preparation of an 






An interview schedule is a set of outline questions or issues that are to be explored in 
the course of an interview. The schedule is of benefit to researchers who employ the 
interview as a data collection method.  Sullivan (2001) points out that: ‘…. (e)ven 
though interviewers will be familiar with the content of the interview, they still need 
good directions and devices such as contingency questions to ensure that they collect 
all information and do so quickly’ (p.263).  
 
The schedule comprises groups of questions related to the topics, subject areas and the 
research questions of interest, and is designed to allow the interviewees to interpret 
and answer in their own way (Bryman, 1988; Buchanan, 1993; Holland, 2005). 
Nevertheless, the interview schedule is prepared to ensure that the same basic 
information is obtained from each person interviewed. However, ‘….(t)he interviewer 
remains free to build a conversation within a particular subject area, to word questions 
spontaneously, and to establish a conversational style but with the focus on a 
particular subject that has been predetermined’ (Patton, 2002, p.343). Therefore, the 
researcher starts the interview with a few specific questions and develops other 
questions, which might emerge during the interview.  
 
Patton (2002) suggests that the advantage of the interview schedule is to ensure that 
the interviewer has carefully decided how best to use the limited time available in an 
interview situation. Moreover, it helps to ensure that the interview is more systematic 
and comprehensive by predetermining the set of questions and issues to be explored 
in the interview. 
 
In this study, the interview schedule comprised of five groups of questions (see 
Appendix A). The first group of questions are about sources of information. The 
questions aim is to identify the sources of information that analysts and fund 
managers use. There are sub-questions which deal with the sources of information 
which the analysts/fund managers use when they analyse companies, and the channels 
through which the information about the companies are received (public disclosure 
and private disclosure). 
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The second group of questions are about disclosure and the quality of disclosure. Sub-
questions in this group deal with ‘what do the analysts/fund managers understand 
about disclosure’, ‘what is the objective of disclosure’, ‘what do the analysts/fund 
managers understand as being the characteristics of good disclosure’, and ‘does 
disclosure have an effect on pricing’. The purpose of this group of questions is to 
understand what disclosure means to the analysts and fund managers, and their 
perceptions about the characteristic of good disclosure.  
 
The third group of questions are about voluntary disclosure. The sub-questions are 
focused on voluntary disclosure and whether it enhances the value of the annual 
report or not. It aims to investigate the attitude of the analysts and fund managers to 
voluntary disclosure, and the value it adds to the annual report. 
 
The fourth group of questions are about the type of information, and the sections of 
the annual report, which analysts and fund managers use when analysing companies. 
This group of question tries to elicit an understanding of what type of the information, 
and which sections of the annual report, are useful to analysts and fund managers.  
 
The final group of questions are about the auditor and aim to investigate the 
importance of the auditor in enhancing the credibility of financial statements. The 
sub-questions are mainly about the importance of the auditor, whether or not the 
auditor enhances the credibility of financial statements, and the association between 
audit firm/auditor’s reputation and the value of the annual report.  
 
Mechanics of gathering interview data 
 
 The interviews were recorded using an audio recorder. The audio recorder is one of 
the most useful methods of gathering interview data. As Patton stated:  
 
“No matter what style of interviewing you use and no matter how 
carefully you word questions, it all comes to naught if you fail to capture 
the actual words of person being interviewed. The raw data of interviews 
are the actual quotations spoken by interviewees. Nothing can substitute 
for these data: the actual things said by real people. That’s the prize sought 
by the qualitative inquirer. (Patton, 2002, p.380)” 69 
 
The objective of each interview is to record as fully and fairly as possible the 
interviewee’s responses. Therefore, the method of recording the verbatim responses 
from the interviewee is essential. Not only does the audio recorder increase the 
accuracy of data collection, but it also allows the interviewer to be more focused on 
the interviewee. 
 
In addition, notes were taken during the interview. Patton (2002) asserts that the use 
of audio recorder does not eliminate the benefit of taking notes, but does help the 
researcher to concentrate on taking strategic and focused notes, rather than attempting 
verbatim notes. There are several benefits of taking notes. The first is that it allows 
the interviewer to develop new questions as the interview proceeds. It also allows the 
interviewer to recheck something that the interviewee said earlier. The second benefit 
is to provide backup material for the interviewer in event that there are problems with 
the audio file. Moreover, taking notes about what the interviewee said will indicate 
the location of the important quotations from the interview and facilitate later 




For both groups, the securities analysts and fund managers, the interview procedure 
for data collection was identical. An email letter was sent in advance to each 
individual interviewee informing him/her of the purpose of the study and the outlining 
the questions used in the interview. A follow up email and telephone call was made to 
arrange the interview.  
 
A total of nine face-to-face interviews were conducted during July and September 
2007. All interviews were conducted in Thai
8 at the interviewee’s workplace and at a 
mutually convenient time. Before the start of each interview, the purpose of the study 
was fully explained again, and the interviewee was assured that they would be free to 
skip questions or leave the interview at any time.  
                                                 
8 In this study all interviews took place in Thailand with Thai people, thus all the interviews were 
conducted in Thai. These encourage the interviewees feel comfortable to answer and express their 
opinions openly. 70 
 
The interviewee’s permission to use an audio recorder was sought before the 
interview commenced. Shorthand notes were also kept. After each interview, the 
audio recorder was checked immediately to make sure that it was functioning 
properly. Most of the questions were open-ended and interviewees were encouraged 
to raise other matters they considered relevant or of interest. Most of the interviews 
lasted for approximate time for forty-five minutes. There were two exceptions: one 
interview took over an hour and the other lasted for around twenty-five minutes. 
 
4.6 Data analysis  
 
The researcher listened to the entire recording of the interview several times before it 
was transcribed verbatim
9 in Thai written. This was combined with the shorthand 
notes taken during the interview. Halcomb and Davidson (2006) asserted that a 
verbatim record of the interview is beneficial in facilitating data analysis by bringing 
researchers closer to their data. To ensure that the interview transcripts accurately 
reflected the content of the interview, the researcher listened to the audio recordings 
again and compared it with the interview transcripts. Amendments were made until 
the transcripts accurately reflected the interview. Moreover, cross-checking the entire 
interview transcripts with the original audio files were undertaken by another person 
who was not previously involved in the data collection. The interview transcripts were 
then typed in the form of a word processing application before being analysed.    
 
The researcher read through each interview transcript several times before the data 
were analyzed thematically in Thai
10using the NVivo7 software package. This 
package allows the researcher to organize the themes in a concise way. The analysis 
was done in Thai in order to retain the integrity of the information. A grounded theory 
approach (Glaser & Strauss, 1967) was used in the analysis. The analysis involved the 
three analytical processes comprising open, axial and selective coding. Open coding 
produced a set of concepts that were further integrated into a set of sub-categories. 
Axial coding focused more on the relationships between each sub-category in order to 
                                                 
9 Verbatim transcription refers to the word-for-word reproduction of verbal data, where the written 
words are an exact replication of the audio recorded words (Poland, 1995) 
10 the original language 71 
 
produce a set of main categories. Appendix B contains a summary of the coding, 
together with a brief description of categories. The final stage was the process of 
selective coding. This stage requires the selection of the core category, that is, the 
main theme which was systematically related to the main categories that emerged 
from the axial coding stage. 
 
When the analysis was complete, the results were translated from Thai into English 
following the guidelines proposed by Guillemin, Bombardier and Beaton (1993). 
These guidelines are based on methods for cross-cultural adaptation in the fields of 
psychology and sociology. Guillemin, Bombardier and Beaton assert that the 
translations should be undertaken by at least two independent translators. This would 
help in the detection of errors and differing in the interpretations of ambiguous 
phrases in the original. Thus, for accuracy and validity, two translators were asked to 
recheck the translated results of the analysis. The first translator was a senior lecturer 
in Department of Accounting from the University in Thailand who had knowledge 
and experience in this field and was familiar with the concepts involved. The other 
translator was a lecturer in the Faculty of Humanities from the University in Thailand 
who was unaware of the concepts involved but aware of the meaning and the accuracy 
of the sentences. Both of the translators were well educated in English and Thai, and 
were native speakers of Thai. The results of the analysis in both Thai and English 
versions were sent to the two translators via an email, and the translators worked 
independently.     
 
4.7 Summary  
 
This chapter describes the objectives and research methodology for the qualitative 
part of the current research. A grounded theory approach was adopted for sampling 
procedure, data collection and data analysis. The purpose for the first part of this 
research was to gain an understanding of the use of information by financial 
intermediaries in Thailand. The chapter also dealt with an overview of the strategies 
adopted to improve the validity and reliability of the research process. The following 






The qualitative study:  





This chapter presents the results of final analytical process as well as the emergent 
substantive grounded theory. This final stage of data analysis in grounded theory is 
selective coding. Selective coding is the process that builds upon the open and axial 
coding. This stage of data analysis, therefore, involves identification of the central, or 
core, category and description of the emergent substantive grounded theory. The core 
category is the central phenomenon that arises from open categories and connects all 
the main categories in order to represent the essence of the study. Details of all the 
open categories, the main categories and the way such categories relate to each other 






5.1 Research findings 
 
Five broad themes emerge from the analysis of the interviews with securities analysts 
and fund managers. These are: (i) the sources of information they use and the 
channels of communication with the company; (ii) the quality of the disclosures; (iii) 
voluntary disclosure; (iv) the relative importance of different types of information 
within the annual report; and (v) the value added by the audit report. The research 
findings from each theme are discussed below.  
 
Theme I: Sources and channels of information disclosure 
 
The first theme is about the sources and channels of the information. There are two 
subsections of this theme: private disclosure and public disclosure. The outline of this 










































Figure 5-1: Sources and channels of the information   75
Securities analysts and fund managers tended to distinguish between public and 
private channels of disclosure by companies. The two main channels of public 
disclosure are seen to be companies’ annual reports and information disclosure report 
(Form 56-1). Private communication with companies comes through personal 
contacts, such as face-to-face meetings and telephone conversations with senior 
executives, company visits and contact with companies’ Investor Relation (IR) 
departments. Securities analysts and fund managers generally use both channels. For 
example: 
 
Case A: ‘There are two main sources that I use in analyzing a 
company; corporate financial statements, and interviewing the 
company’s top executives. Both sources of information come from the 
credible source, because we get it directly from the company not from 
other people.” (Securities analyst) 
 
Public disclosure  
 
  The securities analysts and fund managers interviewed indicated that they used 
various types of information in their analysis of companies. The main sources of 
direct information from companies are the annual reports, SET Form 56-1s and the 
companies’ websites. Other channels of direct communication from companies are 
their presentations of the preliminary and interim results, preliminary profit 
announcements, and the companies’ AGMs. Interviewees had different views of the 
importance of the AGM as a source of information. For example: 
 
Case I: ‘From the shareholders meeting, we usually get more 
important information because the company’s top managers would 
attend the meeting and have to present the company’s view. 
Sometimes they have to give some additional information. For 
example, when the company’s top management has to gain 
shareholder approval for a bond issue. If we wonder why they have to 
issue the bond, for example, has the company enough working capital, 
the top executive should be able to explain the reason why. If the 
explanation does not sound reasonable, the shareholders will ask more 






On the other hand: 
 
Case F: ‘I rarely use the information from this source (AGM) because 
we did not get adequate information from the Annual General 
Meeting. In the AGM there are many investors attending, thus we 
scarcely get in-depth information. Therefore, we attend the AGM in 
order to protect our rights rather than get some information for 
analysis.’ (Fund manager) 
 
In addition to public disclosures by companies, analysts and fund managers use a 
variety of other sources of public information. These include trade journals, industry 
and government statistics, Datastream and other online databases, industry and 
government statistics, newspapers and other analysts. 
 
Companies’ annual reports are often seen as important sources of information for 
securities analysts and fund managers. However, most interviewees indicated that the 
annual reports are of limited value because of the delay in their publication. Rather, 
they look to other sources of information, in particular Form 56-1, which is available 
online on the SEC’s website and the web-base SET Market Analysis and Reporting 
Tool
11 (SETSMART). For example: 
 
Case F: ‘I seldom use the information from the annual report because 
of its delay in publication and it is not up-to-date. We have to wait for 
the annual report to be prepared for almost three months after the 
closing date, while we can have the financial statements soon after its 
disclosed …. on the Stock Exchange of Thailand website .….. I do not 
mean that the annual reports has no information, but it takes a long 
period of time before we get the annual reports. When we get it, we 
already knew all of the information what they contain in it.’  
(Fund manager) 
 
Securities analysts and fund managers, however, did indicate that they study annual 
reports before making company visits or interviewing senior managers in order to 
identify issues. For example: 
 
                                                 
11 The web-based application from the Stock Exchange of Thailand (SET) that can seamlessly integrate 
comprehensive sources of Thai listed company data such as historical share prices, historical indices, 
listed company profile and historical news. By using SETSMART, the investors will have an 
alternative investment tool to access the same channel of information like those professionals. 
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Case B: ‘Every time I do a company visit, I will study the annual 
report thoroughly ….. The reason is that the questions we ask during 
the company visit are not about the numbers, which we can find from 
the papers. Therefore, we have to prepare ourselves to be ready before 
we meet the companies’ top executives, at least 90 percent, and ask 
them more about the companies’ direction.’ (Securities analyst) 
 
The analysis of the annual report is therefore a precursor to direct contact with the 
senior managers of companies.  
 
Private disclosure  
 
 Interviewees used private disclosure to refer to their personal contacts with 
companies. These would include interviews and telephone conversations with 
companies’ top management, company visits or contacts with the companies’ investor 
relations departments. Most interviewees asserted that private disclosure is their 
preferred channel of receiving information from the company. This is because it is a 
two-way process which allows them to develop a clear understanding of companies. 
For example: 
 
Case A: ‘...to get direct information from the company is very useful 
and is as important as the company information presented in the 
media. That is why the companies always have road shows. Listed 
companies organize the road shows in order to arrange the meeting 
between the investors and the companies’ executives. The companies 
executives take this  opportunity to inform the investors all about what 
they need to know such as, the direction of the company and how the 
company operates under these circumstances, high competition, 
fluctuated currency value, increases in oil price, more competitor from 
abroad and so on.’ (Securities analyst) 
 
Personal contact, such as, company visiting and shareholders meeting, is the channel 
through which the interviewees can receive the information directly from the 
company. Most interviewees preferred this channel because they could acquire more 
in-depth information that they could not find in the papers or the annual report. The 
information is usually provided by the company’s top management. Therefore it is a 
good opportunity for the interviewees to ask questions about strategy or important 
issues which are not answered by the annual report. 
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Personal contact with companies is seen to have advantages over other sources of 
information. Interviewees indicated that it enabled them to develop an understanding 
of company strategy and the future direction of the company. One analyst said that 
from personal contact they get the top executives’ vision, an overall picture of the 
company, the company’s problems and the way in which the company’s management 
plans to solve these problems. A fund manager indicated:  
 
Case F: ‘We can easily acquire general information about a company, 
but that information does not indicate anything about its direction in 
the future. As an investment is based on the future, the personal 
contact will be more useful than the information from the annual 
report.’ (Fund manager) 
 
Another, advantage of the personal contact is that it is two-way communication. 
When the interviewees have any doubt, they can ask the company’s top management 
get the answer right away. Further, they can observe top executives reaction to 
questions. 
 
Although there are several advantages of the personal contact with the company, there 
can be problems. This is particularly the case for someone who has no experience, 
since they may not catch important information which affects company risk. For 
example: 
 
Case I: ‘….. if the  audiences (analysts) have no experience, they 
would not catch any important information. …  the company’s top 
management would announce only the good news about the company 
… sometimes we will meet the analysts who try to find out from the 
company’s executive where the numbers come from; meanwhile the 
company’s top management could not answer those questions. It 
seems like we did not get any information from the company visit.’ 
(Fund manager) 
 
The value of meetings therefore is seen to depend on the abilities of both the analysts 
and fund managers, and on the company’s top management.  
 
Most interviewees indicated that IR departments are important sources of information, 
especially in specialist industries that have complicated products or services. 
However, because setting up an IR department is costly, only a few Thai listed 
companies have an IR department. Interviewees expressed a preference for using IR   79
departments because they can acquire in-depth information about the company from 
this channel. Moreover, they indicated that this channel of information would be very 
useful for the individual investors.  
 
Case F: ‘The information that the investor relation departments 
provide is quite in-depth, especially in an industry with quite 
complicated products such as petrochemical or whatever they are 
specialist. Therefore, the IR department is of great benefit for us …. If 
we talk about general companies, where their products or services are 
not too complicated, their IR department might be very useful for 
individual investors but not for me because I am the institutional 
investor with lots of data and able to access from many sources of 
information. In contrast, the companies where their products are 
complicated, the IR department would be very useful and dependable 
(for me and every one) since the analysts can hardly understand them.’ 
(Fund manager) 
 
The private disclosure channel is the preferred channel for analysts and fund 
managers when they need additional information from the company. They have the 
opportunity to contact companies’ top managements in person and ask for the 
additional information. Analysts and fund managers frequently develop close 
relationships with top management. This could mean that these analysts and fund 
managers would receive more information than others. However: 
 
Case A: ‘An individual familiarity would be possible. However, it 
depends on the top managers of the listed companies, they should 
know how much they can disclose and they should have professional 
ethics. From my view point, of course the analysts who have been 
working in this career for a long period of time have more opportunity 
to have contact with many top managers than analysts who just start 
their career. Therefore, top managers should be aware of how much 
the information should be disclosed.’ (Securities analyst) 
 
Case D: ‘Uhmm… it is partly possible. Actually, there are SET laws 
which have already coped this problem. Although some of the 
analysts get more information than the others, I do not think that they 
can use or get benefit from that insider information.’  
(Securities analyst) 
 
Some interviewees suggested that the problem of differential amounts of information 
was partly resolved through company visits in which all analysts and fund managers 
were given the same fact sheets and/or information books and attended the same 
presentations. 80 
 
Theme II: Reasons for disclosure and the quality of disclosure 
 
The second theme is about disclosure and the quality of disclosure. In this theme, 






















Interviewees indicated that companies disclose information publicly for a variety of 
reasons. Some information must be disclosed in order to meet SET requirements. 
Other reasons for disclosure include a desire on the part of managements to present a 
good image of the company with a view to increasing its business value and its 
market value. There is therefore a belief that company disclosures may create or 
increase a stock premium. Overall, transparency is seen as important, as reflected in 
the following: 
 
Case A: ‘For the transparency of the company itself. It is very 
important, if the investors believe that the company has transparency, 
is honest and discloses adequate information for the public to be able 
to analyze it with no doubt. ……. This will restore company 
credibility and provide an understanding of the company’s direction.  
Since it is not possible for the company to meet investors or analysts 
at all times, the transparent public disclosure will take part in 
answering the questions, at least 80%-90%, and enable them to 
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Figure 5-2: Disclosure and the quality of disclosure   81
The interviewees indicated that there are several characteristics of good disclosure. 
First, there is the quality of the information itself. Most interviews stated that good 
information should be clear, accurate, reliable and truthful. Second, the information 
should be relevant and adequate. Too much information was seen to present problems. 
For example: 
 
Case A: ‘Companies should disclose adequate and relevant 
information to investors. Full disclose may be harmful to the 
company. For example, if companies disclose their customer name list 
or their export market share, the companies may lose. Thus, they 
should disclose the information in an appropriate level.’  
(Securities analyst) 
 
Third, interviewees indicated that companies should disclose information regularly 
and in a timely way, and that they should report both good and bad news. Finally, 
interviewees indicated that good disclosure practice is to treat all investors equally, 
and not offer advantages to certain groups. 
 
As well as expressing views about the quality of the information being disclosed, 
securities analysts and fund managers expressed views about the quality of the 
systems for communicating with investors. They suggested that companies should 
provide convenient and easy channels of access to information for all investors, such 
as companies’ websites containing financial statements and annual reports for current 
and previous years. For example: 
 
Case F: ‘Uhmm… companies should have obvious channels for their 
disclosure. It means that if something happens to the company the 
investors will know which channels they can follow up and check the 
companies’ news besides the channels that the companies practice 
under the SET mandatory.  Examples are the IR department or the 
companies’ website for the investors to follow up the news. The 
obvious channels of disclosure will be very helpful for the investors 
especially for those who did not invest in that company or have not 
followed the companies’ news for a long time. Supposing that these 
investors want to reinvest in that company, they should be able to 
know the company’s disclosure system, the way the company 
considers disclosing the information. After that, is the disclosure 
method which the companies used such as their disclosure channels 




Case I: ‘……  If it is an ideal company with good disclosure 
characteristic, I think the company should assign the company’s 
speaker which has similar characteristic to the IR department. From 
this speaker, we would get the reliable information which comes from 
the same source of information from the company. That is what we 
want. ……’ (Fund manager) 
 
The quality of company disclosures was seen by interviewees to be related to two 
factors: the regulator and the company itself. Most interviewees indicated that the 
more regulators examine listed companies, the higher the disclosure quality. 
Consequently, the listed companies will have the same standard.  However, some 
companies have no regulatory control, but they also provide good quality of 
disclosure. 
 
Case A: ‘…. some companies have no regulatory control like ABC 
Public Company Listed, or XYZ Public Company Listed but they do 
have the higher level disclosure. This results in the public being 
happy, they feel that the disclosed information is fully detailed and 
transparent.  Meanwhile, some other companies try to hide from the 
analysts and it is interesting to know that many of them have faced 
financial crises. Their financial statement announcements concentrate 
on the amount of numbers rather than explanation.  Based on this kind 
of information, the public users do not understand what has happened 
to these companies and come up with many questions. If the 
companies do not disclosure the information, the analysts will not 
have the accurate information to analyse.’ (Securities analyst) 
 
Listed companies vary is the level and quality of the information they choose to 
disclose. Thai listed companies can be divided into two groups: (i) large listed 
companies; and (ii) medium and small listed companies. For large listed companies, 
the market mechanism has more influence. When these companies increase their 
disclosures, there will be an increase their stock premium. Therefore, the companies 
in this group usually disclose the information in excess of the requirements of the 
SET. On the other hand, most of the medium and small listed companies usually 
disclose their information at the minimum requirement of the SET.  
 
There may be differences in the amount and quality of information disclosed by 
companies. This may arise from the type of relationship between the analyst or fund 
manager and the company’s management. It may also arise from the capability the 
managers in disclosing information. For example:   83
Case F: ‘… Uhmm…in small listed companies, some top executives 
do not know nor clearly understand the policy of how properly to 
disclose information, and this may lead to information asymmetry. For 
instance, when some small groups of investors make an appointment 
with the (small) companies’ top executives, sometimes these top 
executives are not careful with the information they disclose. They 
forget that that information should be disclosed to public at the same 
time. Sometimes top executives in small listed companies announce 
the information in these small meeting. Consequently, those small 
groups of investors who attend that meeting will get the benefit. I 
think this problem should be corrected. However, the big listed 
companies have better disclosure systems.’ (Fund manager)    
 
A distinction was also drawn between institutional and individual investors. This is 
reflected in the following example: 
 
Case G: ‘May I divide the investors into two groups, institutional 
investors and individual investors. It is the duty of institutional 
investors to follow up the information; if they missed some part of the 
information that means they are deficient in their responsibility. On 
the other hand it would be difficult for individual investors to access 
the information. Almost ninety percent of them are unable to obtain 
the information in time because it is not their job to follow up the 
information. Even though there is good disclosure in the capital 
market, the information asymmetry problems still happens. Therefore, 
the other possible alternative for them to invest is mutual funds 
instead of stock.’ (Fund manager) 
 
Disclosure quality is seen to have an impact on share prices. For example: 
 
Case B: ‘Good disclosure increases the stock premium.  Good 
disclosure means that the companies disclose both positive and 
negative information. The companies should disclose relevant 
information with accuracy, so increasing their transparency. For 
instance, in the past AA stock did not reach a higher premium when 
they traded because the investors wondered about the accuracy of their 
information and did not trust in the company’s disclosures. Compared 
with the BB stock and the CC stock which traded at higher premiums 
because of their transparent disclosures.’ (Securities analyst) 
 
Case A: ‘Transparent disclosure should effect on pricing. Companies 
with transparent discloses are more likely to have higher share prices 
than companies without transparent discloses. For example, both 
companies may have an equal profit, but the P/E of the company 
which discloses unclear information would not be as high as the P/E 
of the transparent company. Some studies indicate that the transparent 
company’s stock premium is about 20-25 percent higher than the 84 
 
share price of the companies without transparency.’(Securities 
analyst) 
 
Theme III: Voluntary disclosure 
 
The third theme is about voluntary disclosure. In this theme, there are three 















Security analysts and fund managers identified several reasons to explain why a 
company may disclose information voluntarily. First, management discloses 
information because they would like to advertise the company to the investors, to 
provide a better understanding of the company and so persuade investors to invest. In 
particular, the additional information may assist investors in valuing the company. 
Second, management may assume that greater disclosure increases the perceived 
quality of the company. Third, management may provide additional disclosures in 
order to restore investor confidence. This is seen to be particularly the case following 
the financial crisis experienced as Thailand. Fourth, companies that engage in 
voluntary disclosure do so because they want investors to pay attention to their stock 
and increase the stock premium. Finally, most interviewees indicated that voluntary 
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Figure 5-3: Voluntary disclosure 
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Most of the interviewees indicated that additional information is good and of benefit 
to investors, especially sophisticated investors who are able to understand the 
information clearly and are able to analyse it.  However, if companies disclose too 
much information, it could confuse unsophisticated investors and so might not be 
beneficial to them. For example: 
 
Case B: ‘Additional disclosure is good, but if the companies disclose 
too much information, I do not think it would be benefit; too much 
information would make investors confused. Not all investors are 
sophisticated in this field; only some groups of investors could 
interpret and understand the annual report clearly. Therefore, if the 
companies give too much information, it would make the investors 
confused and so be misleading. However, some sophisticated 
investors who prefer more information maybe dispute this idea, and 
ask the companies to make voluntary disclosures.’ (Securities analyst) 
 
Therefore, the interviewees suggested that the companies should form their IR 
department to provide more information for the investors. 
 
Case B: ‘Some companies form an IR department to provide more 
information to the analysts and investors because some complex 























Theme IV: The annual report 
 
The fourth theme is about the type of information and the usefulness of specific 
sections in the annual report. In this theme, there are three following subsections as 















It is common to distinguish between two types of information disclosed by the 
companies in their annual reports: quantitative and qualitative information. 
Quantitative information is considered as information in numerical form or involves a 
measurement of some kind. Qualitative information is usually contained in the 
narrative sections of the annual report. Different preferences were found amongst the 
analysts and fund managers interviewed. Some indicated a preference for quantitative 
information. For example: 
 
Case F: ‘…..Actually, I use both types of data and focus more on the 
quantitative data because we can look for all ratios from that.  These 
ratios present the performance of the company and at the same time 
we use it as a double check tool for us; whether the top executives can 
deliver on their commitments in the past through the financial 
statement or not. Therefore, the quantitative data is very useful for us 




Most preferred section in the 
annual report 
Additional information that should 
published in the annual report 
Type of information 
Quantitative 
Qualitative 
Figure 5-4: Type of information and sections of the annual report 
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While other interviewees indicated that they preferred qualitative information to 
quantitative information. For example: 
 
Case B: ‘…..I think qualitative is more important than quantitative. 
Actually, most analysts prefer knowledge based information than 
indicative information. For example, if some companies announce 
their strength and good news, in fact I do not think they should do like 
that, instead of doing thing like that, it would be better if they could 
inform us with their important quantitative and qualitative information 
for analysis and allow us to raise any questions. The companies should 
provide the fundamental information, for example, give some 
information about what happens with this year sales and briefly 
explain or forecast the future, but do not express their own idea, 
otherwise it will be too much judgement.’ (Securities analyst) 
 
However, other interviewees stated that qualitative information, for example, 
companies’ competitive situations, problems, and competitors, is also important when 
they making decisions. For example:  
 
Case F: ‘…..The qualitative data is also important too.  As we already 
know that the quantitative data is the historical data, but to forecast the 
future we need the qualitative data to plug in. For example, if we want 
to forecast how much the sales will increase, what the margin will be, 
how much the bottom line is, how much dividend should be paid, etc. 
All of these need qualitative data such as industry trend, top executive 
forecast, product price or their competence to plug in with all those 
numerical data in order to make a forecast.’ (Fund manager) 
 
Although, there are two views on type of information, most of the interviewees stated 
that they pay attention in both types of information equally. The quantitative 
information will be used in analysing the trend in order to forecast the future, while 
the qualitative information will add up some other important factors that are not in 
numbers, such as competition condition etc. Therefore, without both types of 
information, the analyses will not be complete.  
 
Most interviewees indicated that the most useful parts in the annual report are those 
sections containing qualitative information, rather than quantitative information.  For 
example: 
 
Case F: ‘Uhmm…  It does not mean that we did not pay any attention 
to the annual report but because we can obtain most information 
before we have the annual report. Therefore, I just look at… Uhmm… 88 
 
the section on corporate governance, the audit committee report, the 
nominating committee report, and the risk management committee 
report. I pay attention on these sections in the annual report. If you 
asked about the important information in the annual report, I would 
say that all of the financial data are very important.  Since we already 
have these facts before the annual report is published and we couldn’t 
wait that long, so most of the time we obtained the financial data from 
the website not directly from the annual report. For example, in some 
situations if we have to wait for the information in the annual report 
until the following April, at that time the overall situation or figure 
might be changed already.’ (Fund manager) 
 
The interviewees prefer the qualitative sections because these sections informed them 
of the executives’ visions and the company’s future direction. Moreover, they pay 
attention in the companies’ historical information, because this information shows the 
companies’ performance and development. They asserted that the more the companies 
disclose historical information, the more benefit they get. 
 
Theme V: The auditor and the annual report 
 
The fifth theme is about the auditor and the audit report. In this theme, there are two 
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The securities analysts and fund managers generally indicated that the audit is 
important. In particular, they suggested that, as the auditors verify the accuracy of the 
financial statements, they are increasing the credibility of the financial report. 
However, the reputation of the auditor is seen as important to the credibility of the 
annual report. It seems from the interviews that big audit firms, or the international 
firms, are perceived as more credible than smaller or local audit firms. For example: 
 
Case A: ‘The reputation of the audit firm has an important role. An 
international audit firm or the audit firm with much experience would 
be more credible than a local audit firm. However, some listed 
companies have limited budgets; thus, they cannot hire an 
international audit firm because they cannot afford the audit fee. 
Therefore, if the audit firm licensed and approved by the Securities 
and Exchange Commission, that firm would have more credible and 
reliable.’ (Securities analyst) 
 
Most interviewees have confidence on the statements audited by big audit firms.   
They do not doubt in an accuracy of the financial statements which have been audited 
by big audit firms because they believe that those statements are examined well by 
audit team. The big audit firms are better known than small audit firms. A big audit 
firm’s reputation could be harmed if there are any problems with in the financial 
statements that it audited. Therefore, they are quite sure that the big audit firms do not 
want to discredit their firm by making any mistakes and risk their reputations; they 
would have try their best to examine the financial statements. Moreover, big audit 
firms usually have more money to invest in their audit teams and audit tools which 
effect on the audit process. 
 
Some of the interviewees stated that the reputation of audit firm enhances the 
credibility of the annual report. They perceive that financial statements which audited 
by the big audit firms, when compared with the ones audited by small audit firms, to 
be more reliable and more confident. For example: 
 
Case E: ‘Uhmmm….. Reputation?…….if you are talking about 
reputation, there are some difference among audit firms, something 
related to credibility. We usually give more credit to big audit firms 
than small audit firms. We have to pay more attention to the 
statements that audited by small audit firms.’ ‘ ..... some audit firms 
that meet the requirements and are approved by the Securities and 
Exchange Commission of Thailand (SEC) also provided us with odd 90 
 
statements, and most of the odd statements come from small audit 
firms. Consequently, the images of small audit firms are on the 
negative side, but I did not mean all of the small audit firms. There are 
some good small audit firms too. Therefore, we should be careful 
when looking at the financial statements.’ (Fund manager) 
 
Case F: ‘For psychological reasons there are differences.  At present, 
the Securities and Exchange Commission of Thailand (SEC) declared 
the list of auditors who are qualified to audit listed companies and I 
am not supposed to indicate whether their audit quality is different, we 
assume that there is no difference.  In fact, if they are Big Four, we 
will be more confident as their teams have more quality and are well 
prepared. For example, some listed companies may choose some audit 
firm on SEC list because the audit fee is cheaper, or because they can 
influence on audit firm, or can endorse some accounting transaction.  
If they choose a Big Four instead, we assume that they have internal 
audit and will not allow their auditors or staff to act against the 
regulations.  I admit that I have some bias. If the report was audited 
and certified by a Big Four audit firm, I am sure that I can rely on 
those figures. If not, I can hardly rely on the financial statements and 
have to investigate the details carefully. I believe that there are 
differences in the result.....’ (Fund manager) 
 
Moreover, the interviewees indicated that when they use the financial statements 
audited by big audit firms, it seems that they do not doubt about the accuracy of the 
statements.  
 
However, some of the interviewees argued that even though the audit is very 
important and increases the credibility of the financial statements, they did not put too 
much weight on the reputation of audit firms. They only attend to what is highlighted 
in the audit report. For example: 
 
Case B: ‘…For me, the reputation of the audit firm does not enhance 
the creditability of the annual report. The thing that I am concerned 
about the company itself, and the company’s share price depends on 
its performance, not the audit firm. If the companies show good 
performance, it means that they are successful, but if not, it means that 
they failed. Even though the unsuccessful company hired the Big Four 
audit firm, it could not turn from unsuccessful result to be a successful 
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Furthermore, they asserted that the reputation of the audit firm does not effect on the 
stock premium. 
 
In case F: ‘… I do not think it (the reputation of the auditor) matters. 
Uhmm… for example, assume that there are two financial statements. 
The first statement verified by Big Four, while another statement 
verified by audit firm ABC which is approved by the Securities and 
Exchange Commission of Thailand (SEC). If you asking whether the 
share price of these companies are different or not, I do not think it is 
different. The reason is that they have met the minimum requirements 
of the SEC which means that they must be approved ….., therefore it 




The information used by securities’ analysts and fund managers comes from both 
public and private disclosures by companies. Companies are required to disclose some 
of the information, but companies may also disclose additional information 
voluntarily. The information itself may be quantitative or qualitative, and some of the 
information is audited. 
 
Thai securities analysts and fund managers interviewed in this study used both public 
and private disclosures, with a tendency to prefer private disclosures. Public 
disclosures, particularly in the annual report, often formed the background to private 
contact with company management. An analyst or fund manager who is not familiar 
with the company will analyse its annual reports in order to develop a preliminary 
understanding of the company before meeting its management. Analysts and fund 
managers with some knowledge of the company will use the information contained in 
the annual report and other disclosures in order to identify issues to be explored with 
management. 
 
Securities analysts and fund managers used both quantitative and qualitative 
information, with some having preferences for one type over the other. Quantitative 
information is perceived to be more about the past, whereas qualitative information 
may provide a guide to the future direction of the company. Although the annual 
report contains both quantitative and qualitative information, much of the quantitative 92 
 
information is available from other sources prior to the publication of the annual 
report. Securities analysts and fund managers therefore tend to focus more on the 
qualitative information within the annual report. This not only provides background 
for private contact with the company, it also provides a context for interpreting the 
quantitative information. So predictions about future financial performance may be 
based on past tends and the narrative disclosures about the future direction of the 
company. Some company disclosures are mandatory whereas other disclosures are 
made voluntarily. Companies are seen to make voluntary disclosures to increase 
transparency and enhance their share prices. Companies are perceived to increase 
voluntary disclosures after problems. 
 
The financial statements of Thai listed companies are audited. Generally, the value of 
the audit report is seen to depend on the reputation of the auditor. Most of those 
interviewed perceived greater value in the audit report of one of the Big Four 
international firms, although others indicated that all auditors licensed for listed 
companies should provide good standard reports. The good reputation of the auditor is 
seen both to enhance the value of the disclosures and to increase investor confidence 
in the company which would be reflected in its share price. 
 
The securities analysts and fund managers interviewed perceived a link between the 
amount and quality of company disclosure and the behaviour of the company stock in 
the market. In particular, securities analysts and fund managers suggested that the 
amount and quality disclosure is associated with a stock premium. The asymmetry of 
information between company managers and outsiders is reduced through disclosures 
by the company. It is not only the amount and timing of the disclosures that seem to 
be important, it is also their quality and, in respect of audited financial information, 
the reputation of the auditor. This is consistent with the findings in the existing 
literature (Healy & Palepu, 2001; Mitton, 2002; Zhou, 2007) 
 
What emerges from the interviews here is that the degree of transparency in both the 
public and private sources of information is important. There is the possibility that 
securities analysts and fund managers compensate for weak public disclosures by 
greater reliance on private information from the company’s management. If this is the 
case, then broader measures of disclosure, such as those provided by the Association   93
of Investment Management and Research (AIMR) ratings, provide a better indication 
of transparency than measures focusing on the analysis of the content of public 
statements, such as annual reports. Ideally, studies of the impact of the effect of 
disclosures on capital market behaviour and stock pricing should include measures of 
both public and private disclosures. 
 
The findings from the first part bring to the study in the second part of the study. The 
following chapter explains the conceptual framework and the research hypotheses 












The quantitative study: The conceptual 





The conceptual framework and the research hypotheses for the second part of the 
research, the quantitative study, are developed in this chapter. The main research 
objective for this second part of the study is to examine the relationship between the 
level of voluntary information disclosure and stock market liquidity. The chapter is 
divided into three main sections. The first section develops the conceptual framework 
for the quantitative part of the study, linking voluntary disclosure, information 
intermediaries and stock market liquidity. The second section contains a summary of 
the literature related to the conceptual framework of this study. This is divided into 
four sub-sections looking at evidence on: (i) the relationship between the level of 
voluntary information disclosure and stock market liquidity: (ii) corporate disclosure 
and auditor firm size; (iii) auditor reputation and information asymmetry; and (iv) 
corporate disclosure and the size of analysts following for the company. The research 
hypotheses to be tested in this study are developed in the third section. The final 
section presents a brief summary of the chapter. 96 
 
6.1 The conceptual framework.  
 
The framework linking corporate disclosure and stock market liquidity developed in 
Chapter 2 (section 2.4) is developed further in this chapter in order to incorporate 
findings from the qualitative part of this study. Specifically, the qualitative part of the 
study identifies two factors important for understanding disclosure and stock market 
liquidity: (i) auditor reputation and (ii) the number of financial analysts following a 
company. In capital markets, auditors and analysts are important specialised 
information intermediaries. Auditors enhance the credibility of the information that 
companies disclose, while analysts convey private information from company 
managers to outside investors. This helps mitigate investor uncertainty about the 
inequality of information between managers and outside investors, and between 




Reliable information is important to the functioning of capital markets. Auditors play 
an important role by attesting to the quality of a company’s financial statements, 
providing investors with independent assurance that the statements conform to 
requirements. Some previous studies (e.g. Korthari, 2001) suggest that investors 
generally regard accounting information as credible. Healy and Palepu (2001) provide 
a conceptual framework linking the role of auditors to accounting information 
disclosure in the context of information asymmetry. They emphasise that auditors can 
help companies improve the quality of accounting information disclosure, thus 
reducing the information gap between market participants. This reduction in 
information asymmetry reduces a company’s cost of capital and enhances market 
liquidity. Amihud and Mendelson (1988), consistent with Healy and Palepu (2001), 
assert that companies can reduce the cost of capital and enhance market value by 
increasing liquidity through more transparent disclosure.  
 
However, Healy and Palepu (2001) note that research directly examining whether 
auditors significantly enhance the quality and credibility of financial statements is 
limited. Therefore, the size of the audit firm was added to the conceptual framework  
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of this study to examine whether size, as a proxy for audit quality and auditor 
reputation, is associated with: (i) the level of voluntary information disclosure and (ii) 
stock market liquidity.    
 
b.) Information intermediaries 
 
Financial analysts act as information intermediaries in capital markets. They collect 
information about companies they follow from different sources, through both public 
and private channels, and evaluate current performance in order to forecast future 
earnings, cash flows and prospects. They then convey this information – accompanied 
by buy, hold or sell recommendations – to investors (Healy and Palepu, 2001). Prior 
literature shows that analysts’ earnings forecasts and stock recommendations are 
broadly distributed, and significantly affect stock market reactions.  
 
Research supports the view that analysts convey information and improve information 
efficiency in capital markets (e.g. Francis & Soffer, 1997; Barth & Hutton, 2000). By 
producing and conveying valuable information to uninformed investors/outsiders, 
analysts reduce the information gap between informed investors/insiders and 
uninformed investors/outsiders. Therefore, better-informed information intermediaries 
should affect market liquidity and enhance market efficiency, although their 
effectiveness depends on the quality of the information they acquire.  
 
Company insiders are likely “informed investors” with access to quality information 
about a firm’s prospects at no cost. To mitigate this information asymmetry between 
informed and uninformed investors, financial analysts, as information intermediaries, 
provide competition to informed investors, reducing their trading advantage. Brennan 
and Subrahmanyam (1995) suggest that financial analysts, by rapidly disseminating 
information to the public, create a more level-playing field for traders and generate a 
positive impact on liquidity. Better-informed financial analysts can play a beneficial 
role in capital markets by reducing the information advantage of company 
insiders/informed investors. 
 
However, little research exists on the relationship between corporate disclosure and 
the number of financial analysts following a company/stock. The number of analysts 98 
 
following a company was incorporated into the current conceptual framework in order 
to investigate whether the number of analysts is associated with: (i) the level of 
voluntary information disclosure and (ii) stock market liquidity. 
 
The conceptual framework of this study links voluntary disclosure, audit quality, 
financial intermediaries, and stock market liquidity together. This framework is 
depicted in Figure 6-1. Previous evidence related to voluntary disclosure, stock 
market liquidity, and information intermediaries is discussed in the following section, 




























Figure 6-1: The conceptual framework linking voluntary disclosure, stock market 




















6.2 Previous research  
 
This section considers the literature on: (i) level of voluntary information disclosure 
and stock market liquidity; (ii) auditor characteristics and information asymmetry; 
(iii) auditor characteristics and level of corporate disclosure; and (iv) level of 
corporate disclosure and analysts following.  
 
Evidence on voluntary disclosure and stock market liquidity   
 
The capital market consequences of voluntary disclosure are discussed in Section 2.3. 
Companies may disclose more information voluntarily in response to the perceived 
illiquidity of their shares in the market. Disclosure of additional information 
consequently aims to improve stock market liquidity. It is important to signal that the 
measurement of market liquidity is complex and often subject to measurement 
problems. The disclosure literature has shown that high levels of voluntary disclosure 
and high quality of public disclosures (such as annual reports, press releases, and SEC 
filings) mitigate information problems among market participants, and consequently 
increase stock market liquidity. Most of the finance and accounting literatures in this 
field; which considers both the theoretical and empirical relationship between the 
level of disclosure and information asymmetry, has been conducted using samples of 
US companies. 
 
Welker (1995) investigates the relationship between the stock market liquidity and 
corporate disclosure policy. Using the Association for Investment and Management 
Research (AIMR) disclosure score and the bid-ask spread as a proxy for liquidity, his 
study covers the years 1983 to 1990. He finds a negative relationship between 
disclosure policy and bid-ask spreads. His findings suggest that the greater of the 
information disclosures, the lower the bid-ask spreads. This is due to the decrease in 
perceived information asymmetry between market participants. Healy, Hutton and 
Palepu (1999) also examine the effect of substantial increases in disclosure levels. 
They use the AIMR disclosure score and bid-ask spread for the years 1980 to 1990. 
They find that companies that increase their disclosures ratings experience an increase 
in the liquidity of their shares and in the price of their shares. In other words, 100 
 
companies making sustained increases in disclosure quality experience higher stock 
market liquidity through narrower relative bid-ask spreads.  
 
Heflin, Shaw and Wild (2001) also investigate the relationship between disclosure 
quality and market liquidity. They acknowledge that information quality is important 
for market liquidity. Quality accounting disclosures are considered as means of 
reducing information asymmetries across traders and increasing the ability of equity 
traders to effectively execute stock trades when needed and at reasonable costs. They 
use 211 American companies from 1988 to 1989 and find that company with higher 
quality disclosures have lower bid-ask spreads, which imply that high quality 
disclosures enhance market liquidity by reducing effective spreads.   
 
While only a few studies examine using the sample from non-Us market. Leuz and 
Verrecchia (2000) use a sample of 102 German companies included on the DAX 100 
in 1998 to study bid-ask spreads. They analyze companies that report under the 
International Accounting Standards or US-GAAP. Their findings shown that these 
companies have lower bid-ask spreads than companies that report under the German 
Accounting Standards. Petersen and Plenborg (2006) investigate the relationship 
between the level of voluntary disclosure and the information asymmetry for 36 
industrial companies listed on the Copenhagen Stock Exchange during the period 
1997-2000. They constructed a disclosure checklist in attempt to measure the level of 
voluntary disclosure, used the bid-ask spread and the turnover ratio as their proxies 
for information asymmetry. The results from this study indicated that voluntary 
disclosure is negatively associated with proxies for information asymmetry and so 
reduces information asymmetry.  
 
Previous studies, therefore, suggest that there are relationships between the level of 
voluntary information disclosure and information asymmetry and market liquidity. 
This is summarised in Figure 6-1. The relationship between the level of voluntary 
information disclosure and the stock market liquidity forms the basis for the first, 





Evidence on corporate disclosure and audit quality  
 
The relationship between audit firm size and audit quality is well established in the 
literature. Francis (2004) argues that there is evidence to support the argument that the 
financial statements of companies audited by large audit firms are of higher quality. 
One of the reasons put forward for to explain this is that, because large audit firms 
have established brand names and reputations, they have incentives to protect their 
reputation by providing high-quality audits. Auditors’ reputations may be at risk if 
they are associated with companies whose reporting practices are perceived as being 
of lower quality (DeAngleo, 1981). Therefore, large audit firms may encourage their 
clients to disclose more information in their published financial reports than is 
required by regulations in attempt to preserve their reputations (Craswell, Francis & 
Taylor, 1995).  On the other hand, small audit firms do not possess the power to 
influence the disclosure practice of their clients. Rather, they attempt to meet the 
needs of their clients in order to retain them (Wallace & Naser, 1995).  
 
The results of studies connecting the level of disclosure to the size of audit firms 
contain mixed results. Some studies report a significant relationship between audit 
firm size and the level of disclosure (Singhvi & Desai 1971; Craswell & Taylor 1992; 
Wallace & Naser 1995), while other studies do not find such a relationship (Wallace, 
Naser & Mora 1994). It is also expected that companies audited by the large audit 
firms will have a higher level of internal control and to follow the guidelines and audit 
methodology of the international audit firms. It is therefore expected that the level of 
information disclosure by companies audited by the large audit firms will be higher 
than by companies audited by local audit firms. 
 
The above discussion suggests a positive relationship between audit quality and the 
level of voluntary disclosure as summarised in Figure 6-1. This relationship be the 





Evidence on audit firm size and information asymmetry  
 
Prior research suggests companies can enhance their value by increasing voluntary 
disclosures (Diamond & Verrecchia, 1991). Similarly, agency cost theory from Jensen 
and Meckling (1976) suggests that managers earn benefits from the reputation of a 
high quality auditor in the sense of increase the credibility of the information that they 
disclose. Companies therefore have incentives to increase additional information 
disclosure and employ high quality auditors as complements to mitigate information 
asymmetry and enhance the companies’ valuations.     
 
There are only few studies that have directly investigated whether audit quality 
enhances disclosure quality and reduces information asymmetry. One of the studies is 
by Schauer (2003) who uses a US sample. He investigates the relationship between 
bid-ask spreads and auditor-type: Big-Six audit firms, national audit firms, and other 
audit firms. With this three-tier classification of audit firms, he finds that the 
companies audited by Big-Six audit firms have lower bid-ask spreads than those 
audited by third tier audit firms, and that companies audited by national audit firms 
also exhibit lower spreads than those audited by third tier audit firms. However, he 
finds no difference in bid-ask spreads between the companies audited by Big-Six and 
those audited by national firms.  
 
Another study by Zhou (2007) examines the association between information 
asymmetry, measured by bid-ask spread, and the level of accounting information 
following the adoption of new auditing standards in China. The results indicate that 
the sample experienced significant reductions in their bid-ask spreads following the 
adoption of the new auditing standards. However, no significant result change is 
found for companies in the control group whose financial statements were prepared in 
accordance with international accounting standards and were audited with 
international auditing standards.    
 
The foregoing literature suggests a negative relationship between audit firm size and 
information asymmetry, which in turn implies a positive relationship between the 
audit firm size and market liquidity as depicted in Figure 6-1. The relationship  
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between the audit firm size and market liquidity will form the basis of the fifth 
research hypothesis of the quantitative part of this study.    
 
Evidence on corporate disclosure, analysts following and information asymmetry  
 
As analysts have an important role in conveying information from the listed 
companies to the investors, the information-related activities of analysts are likely to 
influence the trading activity of investors. Previous studies show that the extensive 
voluntary disclosure can help reduce information asymmetry between informed and 
uninformed investors, and this information also provides financial intermediaries with 
a better picture of companies’ financial performance and capacity (Bhushan, 1989; 
Lang & Lundholm, 1996). When the companies disclose more information, the 
additional information will enable the analysts to deliver higher quality services. 
Therefore, it is possible that the companies that disclose more information are more 
likely to attract a large number of analysts following than other companies which 
disclose less information. Thus, if the higher analyst following is associated with an 
increasing information disclosure, it is be possible to conjecture that increasing in the 
number of analyst following mitigates the information asymmetry and leads to an 
improvement of investors confidence and enhances stock market liquidity. 
Alternatively, it may be that the higher the number of analyst following a company 
the greater pressure for the companies to disclosure more information. This will also 
help mitigate the information asymmetry and increase stock market liquidity. These 
arguments are supported by the study of Roulstone (2003), who investigated the 
relationship between analysts coverage and market liquidity and found that increased 
analysts following leads to greater liquidity. 
 
The foregoing literature suggests a positive relationship between the number of 
analyst following and market liquidity as depicted in Figure 6-1.  
 
However, the literature shows a complex relationship between financial analysts and 
the amount of disclosure by companies. It is not clear that whether financial analysts 
prefer to follow companies that disclose more, rather than less, information. Some 
studies (see, for example, Bhushan, 1989; Lang & Lundholm, 1996) point out that 104 
 
extensive voluntary disclosure can help reduce information asymmetry between 
informed and uninformed investors, and provides financial intermediaries with a 
better picture of companies’ financial performance and capacity. This enables them to 
deliver higher quality, and more reliable, forecasts.  Similarly, Healy and Palepu 
(2001) indicate that increasing information disclosure potentially enables financial 
analysts to create valuable new information. In addition, increased disclosure by 
companies can lead to increased accuracy of analyst forecasts and recommendations 
(Bushman & Smith 2001). This would imply that increased disclosure increases the 
demand for analyst services.  
 
On the other hand, higher level of information disclosure could pre-empt analysts' 
ability to deliver managers' private information to investors, leading to a decline in 
demand (Healy & Palepu 2001). However, although there are only a few studies 
examining the relationship between voluntary disclosure and analysts following, the 
limited prior research in this area has found evidence consistent with analyst 
following being positively related to the level of information disclosure.  
 
Bhushan (1989) finds that financial analysts’ coverage depends on the demand and 
supply of analysts’ services. Bhushan’s model predicts that financial analyst following 
is determined by company characteristics, including corporate disclosures. He 
documents that these two variables could be either complementary or substitutes. The 
relationship is complex and depends on the role of financial analyst in the market. 
Lang and Lundholm (1996) examine the association between the number of analysts 
following a company and voluntary disclosure in the U.S market. They use data from 
the Financial Analysts Federation Corporate Information Committee Report (FAF). 
The authors find the evidence that companies with higher level of policy disclosure 
have a larger analyst following. This positive relationship between analyst following 
and voluntary disclosures enhances the understanding of the role of financial analysts 
in capital market.  
 
Hope (2003) also tests the relationship between voluntary disclosure and analysts 
following, using the international sample. The findings show that voluntary disclosure 
is helpful for financial analysts at an international level. Moreover, the results also 
indicate some interesting points in that not all forms of information disclosure are  
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equally important to financial analysts. Hope reports that analyst following is more 
strongly associated with the extent of note disclosure rather than the 
comprehensiveness of the basic financial statements.   
 
Therefore, the literature here could suggest a positive relationship between the level of 
voluntary disclosure and the analysts following as portrayed in Figure 6-1. This 
relation will form the basis of the sixth research hypothesis of the quantitative part of 
this study.    
 
6.3 Research hypotheses development  
 
The previous literature on corporate disclosure suggests that information quality, the 
level of information disclosure, is important for market liquidity. Most researchers 
argue that increasing accounting disclosure should reduce information asymmetry not 
only between companies and stockholders but also among investors. Prior research 
shows that the lower information asymmetry, as a result from the provision of 
extensive accounting disclosure, tends to lead to higher market liquidity.  
 
According to Heflin, Shaw and Wild (2001), the quality of corporate disclosure can 
mitigate information asymmetry and enhance stock market liquidity, because 
accounting disclosures are considered as means of increasing the ability of equity 
traders to effectively execute stock trades when desired and at a reasonable cost. 
Welker (1995) and Healy Hutton and Palepu (1999) find the relationship between the 
level of corporate disclosure and relative bid-ask spreads are negatively. These results 
are consistent with Heflin, Shaw and Wild (2001) who report that companies with 
higher quality disclosure have lower effective relative bid-ask spreads. This evidence 
suggests that disclosure quality and spreads are negatively related. This may be 
explained in term of the perceived reduction in information asymmetry between 
market participants.   
 
According to Leuz and Verrecchia (2000) and Heflin, Shaw and Wild (2001), there is 
little direct evidence on the relationship between corporate disclosure quality and 106 
 
stock market liquidity. Moreover, most empirical results on the link between 
information disclosure and information asymmetry are based on samples of US 
companies.  
 
The above discussion motivates the main purpose for the second part of this study. 
That is to provide evidence on the relationship between the level of disclosure, 
information asymmetry, and stock market liquidity based on samples of Thai listed 
companies. Therefore, the main research question for this part of the study starts with 
the question:  
 
How does the level of voluntary information disclosure effect the liquidity 
of shares traded on the Stock Exchange of Thailand? 
 
Hypothesis 1: Market liquidity and information disclosure 
 
The previous disclosure literature shows  evidence that there is a positive relation 
between the levels of information disclosure and the market liquidity. By using AIMR 
disclosure ratings and based on the samples of companies from the US, Heflin, Shaw 
and Wild (2001) hypothesised and found evidence that higher quality of disclosures 
enhances a company’s market liquidity. For comparison purposes, the first test of this 
study intends to investigate that whether Heflin, Shaw and Wild (2001) finding also 
holds in the sample of companies from Thailand.  
 
As stated earlier, this study intends to investigate the relationship between stock 
market liquidity and the level of voluntary information disclosure. In measuring stock 
market liquidity, Welker (1995), Bushee and Noe (2000), and Leuz and Verrecchia 
(2000) acknowledge that it could be measured using both trade-based and order-based 
measurements, for instance transaction volumes and bid-ask spreads. Following 
Heflin, Shaw and Wild (2001), this study uses the effective relative bid-ask spread as 
the measure of stock market liquidity. The effective relative bid-ask spread is likely to 
be better spread-based measure for market liquidity than either raw or relative 
spreads. In Thailand, the ask price is the best price associated with selling, while bid 
(offer) price is the best price associated with buying. In measuring the level of  
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voluntary information disclosure, in contrast with previous research, this study 
employs two different approaches. These are the construction of a disclosure index 
and an analyst rating score. Finding evidence in favour of this hypothesis would lend 
further support to the results of Heflin, Shaw and Wild (2001). Thus, it would also 
motivate the research questions that follow: 
 
Benchmark test: Market liquidity is positively related to corporate disclosure levels. 
 
Two research instruments are developed in order to measure the level of voluntary 
information disclosure. The first research instrument, the disclosure index, is based 
upon the information disclosed in companies’ annual reports. The reason of using the 
corporate annual report as a source of information is because the company’s annual 
report is generally perceived as the main disclosure vehicle for company (Marston & 
Shirives, 1991). As noted by Knutson (1992), even though the corporate annual report 
is not the only source or means of information disclosure by listed companies, it is 
generally perceived as the most important source of information for analysts. 
Moreover, Lang and Lundholm (1993) indicate a high positive correlation between 
annual report disclosure and disclosure in other sources, such as press releases or 
regulatory filings. Furthermore, the findings from the qualitative part also indicated 
that the company’s annual reports are often seen as important sources of information 
for Thai financial intermediaries. Most of the interviewees argued that even though 
the annual report is of limited value because of the delay in disclosure, it is a 
precursor to direct contact with the senior manager of company. Analysts and fund 
managers who are not familiar with the company will study its annual reports in order 
to develop preliminary understanding of the company before meeting its management.  
 
Moreover, Thai financial intermediaries also indicated that most listed companies are 
seen to make voluntary disclosures, or disclose more additional information, in order 
to increase their transparency and the perceived quality of the companies. 
Consequently,  these additional information disclosures (which increase the 
companies’ transparency) will restore investor confidence, and enhance the market 
liquidity and their share prices. This finding is consistent with many previous studies 
(Welker, 1995; Healy, Hutton & Palepu, 1999; Heflin, Shaw & Wild, 2001) which 
show the level of disclosure decreases the information asymmetry. Consequently, 108 
 
increase investor confidence effects on the market liquidity. Therefore, the first 
research instrument is focused on the information that the companies disclose 
publicly, with a specific focus on the company’s annual report and emphasis on the 
voluntary information disclosure. The procedure of how to develop the research 
instruments will discuss in detail in the following chapter.     
 
As indicated above, unlike most prior studies, this study employs two approaches to 
measure the level of disclosure. The first approach is self-constructed disclosure index 
and the other approach is an analyst rating score. Following on these two research 
instruments, and the findings from the qualitative part which indicated that not only 
the public disclosures (in particular the annual report) that Thai securities analysts and 
fund managers generally used when making decisions, but they also tended to prefer 
private disclosures.  Therefore, the above benchmark test can be divided into four 
following hypotheses. 
 
Self-constructed disclosure index approach: 
 
H1a: Market liquidity is positively related to the overall disclosure score. 
 
H1b: Market liquidity is positively related to the disclosure score from 
annual report. 
 
Analyst rating score approach: 
 
H1c: Market liquidity is positively related to the analyst rating score for 
public disclosure channel. 
 
H1d: Market liquidity is positively related to the analyst rating score for 
private disclosure channel. 
 
The findings from the qualitative part and the above research question lead to the 
other research questions and hypotheses.   
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Hypothesis 2: Market liquidity and categories of information disclosure 
 
Following Dye (1998), the most important questions to accountants are about what 
information concerning companies’ conditions should be released, and where the 
information should be released. Bushman and Smith (2001) recommend accounting 
researchers should test hypotheses and thinking about the different types of disclosure 
and the differential economic benefits. Likewise, the results from Hope (2003) which 
indicate that not all forms of information disclosure are equally important to financial 
analysts. Hope documents that analysts following is more strongly associated with the 
extent of note disclosure rather than the comprehensiveness of the basic financial 
statements. The qualitative part of this study found that interviewees asserted that they 
tend to focus more on the qualitative, than the quantitative, information in annual 
reports. They pay more attention to the qualitative information because this kind of 
information provides background for private contact with companies, and it also 
provides a context for interpreting the quantitative information.  
 
Following on Dye (1998), Bushman and Smith (2001), Hope (2003) and based on the 
findings from Thai financial intermediaries’ perceptions, it can be inferred that not all 
types of information disclosure are of equal value to market participants such as 
securities analysts, fund managers, and general investors. Each type of information 
disclosure may have a different effect on the stock market liquidity. The finding from 
the first part of the study also indicated Thai securities analysts and fund managers 
tend to prefer qualitative to quantitative information. This finding would motivate to 
another research question, which is whether the four categories are equally related to 
stock market liquidity.  This suggests the following hypothesis: 
 
H2a: The relationship between market liquidity and the disclosure score 
varies among the detailed sub-categories of the self-constructed disclosure 
index. 
 
This leads to another research question, which is whether each type of information 
disclosure affects market liquidity, and, if so, in what direction. This question is 
examined by testing whether the four categories from the self-constructed disclosure 110 
 
index (strategic information, non-financial information, financial information, and 
channels of information and investor relations) have an impact on the market 
liquidity.  The specific hypotheses tests are that: 
 
H2b: Market liquidity is positively related to the disclosure score from 
strategy information section of the annual report. 
 
H2c: Market liquidity is positively related to the disclosure score from 
non- financial information section of the annual report. 
 
H2d: Market liquidity is positively related to the disclosure score from 
financial information section of the annual report. 
 
H2e: Market liquidity is positively related to the disclosure score from 
channels of information and investor relations section. 
 
Hypothesis 3: Market liquidity and the channels of information disclosure 
 
The qualitative part of this study found evidence that Thai securities analysts and fund 
managers tend to prefer private disclosure to public disclosure. The significance of 
private disclosure channels to analysts and financial institutions has been identified by 
academics and recognised by UK policy makers (Holland, 1998). However, Heflin, 
Shaw and Wild (2001) found that higher public disclosure quality, rather than 
communications with analysts, is the most effective in reducing the information 
asymmetry. From the previous literature on corporate disclosure, there is limited 
evidence on the relationship between the market liquidity and the quality of private 
and public disclosure. This motivates to another research question, which is whether 
public disclosure, or rather private disclosure, is most related to increase market 
liquidity. In order to have a better understanding whether the level of public 
disclosure or private disclosure, or both, impacts the market liquidity, the third 
hypotheses are as follows: 
  
H3a: The relationship between market liquidity and the analyst rating 




H3b: The private disclosure channel is more likely to have greater effect 
on market liquidity than the public disclosure channel. 
 
Hypothesis 4: The size of audit firm and information disclosure 
 
The literature considers the relationship between audit firm size and audit quality. The 
auditor plays an important role in controlling the quality of information disclosed by 
their clients. Large audit firms (the so-called “Big Four” international audit firms) are 
perceived to be associated with high quality reporting. It is also assumed that the 
companies audited by these large international audit firms will have higher levels of 
internal control while following the guidelines and audit methodology of these audit 
firms. It is therefore expected that the level of information disclosure by companies 
audited by these large audit firms will be higher than by companies audited by local 
audit firms.  
 
Evidence from previous studies supports this argument. Teoh and Wang (1993) 
examined the association between auditor size and auditor quality by testing whether 
the earnings response coefficient (ERC) differs between Big Eight
12 and non-Big 
Eight audit firms. They found that the ERCs of companies audited by the Big Eight 
audit firms are statistically significantly higher than for companies audited by non-Big 
Eight audit firms. Francis (2004) argues that the financial statements of companies 
audited by large audit firms are of higher quality. One of the reasons put forward to 
explain this is that, because large audit firms have established brand names and 
reputations, they have incentives to protect their reputation by providing high-quality 
audits. Thus, the large audit firms may be more likely to ensure transparency, report 
misstatements and non-compliance with mandatory reporting requirements, and 
eliminate mistakes in a company’s financial statements because they have a greater 
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The reputations of large audit firms may be diminished if they are associated with 
companies (their clients) whose reporting practices are perceived as being of lower 
quality or if they negligently certify the annual reports of their clients (DeAngleo, 
1981). Therefore, large audit firms may encourage their clients to disclose more 
information in their published financial reports than is required by regulation in an 
attempt to preserve their reputation (Craswell, Francis & Taylor, 1995), influencing 
the quality of their clients information disclosure. Additionally, even in cases where 
actual disclosure quality is not higher, the Big Four auditors may offer higher 
perceived disclosure quality and allay investors’ fears because of their prominence 
and reputation. On the other hand, small audit firms do not possess the power to 
influence the disclosure practice of their clients. Rather, they attempt to meet the 
needs of their clients in order to retain them (Wallace & Naser, 1995).  
 
The results of empirical studies connecting the level of disclosure to the size of audit 
firms are inconclusive. Some studies report a significant positive relationship between 
the audit firm size and the level of information disclosure (Singhvi & Desai 1971; 
Craswell & Taylor 1992; Wallace & Naser 1995), while other studies report no 
statistically significant association (Wallace, Naser & Mora 1994). This leads to the 
research question of whether companies engaging one of the Big Four audit firms are 
more likely to disclose more information than companies engaging other audit firms. 
The fourth hypothesis is therefore as follows: 
 
H4: The level of a company’s information disclosure is positively related 
to the size of its audit firm. 
 
Hypothesis 5: Market liquidity and the size of audit firm 
 
Consistent with the foregoing studies (e.g. Singhvi & Desai, 1971; Wallace & Naser, 
1995), the findings from the qualitative part of this study shown that Thai securities 
analysts and fund managers perceive the reputation of the auditor as being important 
to the credibility of the annual report. It seems from the interviews that larger audit 
firms, or international audit firms, are perceived as more credible than smaller or local 
audit firms. These findings suggest that big audit firms with good reputations are seen  
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both to enhance the value of the disclosure and to increase investor confidence in the 
company which should be reflected in the market liquidity and in its share price. 
However, there are few studies which directly investigate whether audit quality 
enhances disclosure quality by reducing information asymmetry (Schauer, 2003). This 
motivates another research question which is whether the size of the audit firm 
improves disclosure quality and enhances stock market liquidity. From this follows 
the fifth hypothesis: 
 
H5a: Companies audited by Big Four audit firms are more likely to have 
higher market liquidity than companies audited by other audit firms. 
 
H5b: Market liquidity is positively related to audit firm size. 
 
Hypothesis 6: Analysts following and information disclosure 
 
Prior studies (e.g., Bhushan, 1989; Lang & Lundholm, 1996; Hope, 2003) suggest that 
there is a positive relationship between analysts following and voluntary disclosure. 
Lang and Lundholm (1996) find evidence that analysts are attracted to companies that 
disclosure more information. Moreover, Hope (2003) indicates that disclosing more 
information is helpful for financial analysts, but not all forms of disclosures are 
important to financial intermediaries. Miller and Piotroski (2000) test the relationship 
between analysts following and voluntary disclosure and found the evidence that 
managers are motivated to disclose more additional information in order to satisfy the 
analysts’ need. They suggest that analyst coverage is one of the major determinants of 
disclosures. Therefore, it can be expected that companies with higher number of 
analysts following are more likely to disclose more information than other companies 
with smaller number of analysts following. The sixth hypothesis is then as follows: 
 
H6a: There is a positive relationship between financial analysts following 







This chapter describes the conceptual framework for the quantitative part of the study 
and considers evidence from the previous literature in the development of the research 
hypotheses. The following chapter will present the research instruments used in this 















This chapter describes the methodology used in the quantitative part of the study. It is 
divided into six main sections. The first section explains the specific research 
instruments and approaches employed to test the hypotheses. The second section 
describes the measurement of each variable; dependent variables, independent 
variables, including control variables. The data collection is described in the third 
section. This section also describes the sample selection procedures for this part of the 
research. Statistical techniques, including regression analysis, and several tests of 
significance are detailed in the fourth section of this chapter, and followed by an 
explanation of the strategies that were employed to enhance the validity and reliability 






7.1 Research Instrument  
 
As stated earlier, the main objective for the second part of this study is to investigate 
the relationship between the level of information disclosure and market liquidity 
based on a sample of Thai listed companies. An appropriate approach to the 
measurement of the level of information disclosure is therefore important. Following 
Beattie, McInnes and Fearnley (2004), there are two principal approaches, subjective 
ratings and disclosure index (more detail see Chapter 2, Section 2.3), that have been 
employed in the previous studies of corporate disclosure. The benefits and the 
limitations of each approach should therefore be considered in order to select the most 
appropriate research instrument. The benefits and the limitations of each approach 
have already been discussed in detail in literature review chapter. 
 
In Thailand, there is no subjective analyst rating such as the AIMR. However, there is 
an externally-generated disclosure score that is constructed by the Stock Exchange of 
Thailand (SET) and the Thai Institute of Directors Association (IOD) called “The 
Corporate Governance Report of Thai Listed Companies (CGR)”. This disclosure 
score was launched by SET and IOD in order to study the development of corporate 
governance practices of Thai listed companies. It is also used as preliminary screening 
criteria to select companies for the Stock Exchange of Thailand’s SET Awards and 
the Thai IOD’s Board of Year Awards. The main purpose of the CGR score is to 
gauge the level of corporate transparency by analysing annual reports, regulatory 
fillings via the Internet, and the company websites. In order to access the corporate 
transparency and disclosure practices of Thai listed companies, CGR identifies 
disclosure items in its evaluation criteria. There are 123 disclosure items in total. 
These items are grouped into the following five categories derived from the 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) Principles of 
Corporate Governance: (1) rights of shareholders; (2) equitable treatment of 
shareholders; (3) role of stakeholders; (4) disclosure and transparency; and (5) board 
responsibilities.  
 
This CGR score seems similar to CIFAR index and S&P scores which are based upon 
samples from many countries and used in previous studies. However, there are some  
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limitations. The first is that the CGR rating mainly focuses on the development of 
corporate governance practices, while the main purpose of this study is to examine the 
impact of the voluntary information disclosure. Another limitation of this rating is the 
way that the SET and IOD disclose the CGR scores to the public. The scores for each 
listed company are classified into six groups on a scale, which will be labelled by 
number of the National Corporate Governance Committee’s logo. Thus, even though 
there is a sub-category related to disclosure and transparency (which intend to use as 
the disclosure proxy for this study) the researcher could not access the result of that 
part because the score result is published as an overall score. Most importantly, SET 
and IOD, because of confidentiality, refused to provide either the raw overall score or 
the scores for disclosure and transparency for each listed company.  
 
As there are several limitations of the CGR score, a self-constructed disclosure index 
was developed as the main instrument for this study. In addition to the self-
constructed disclosure index, a second research instrument was also developed. The 
results from the first part of the study indicated that Thai securities analysts and fund 
managers tend to prefer the private disclosures. This finding leads to the research 
question as to whether the level disclosure through the public or private disclosure 
channel, or both, impact on market liquidity. However, the evaluation of the private 
information disclosure is difficult to observe and measure directly. Therefore, in order 
to measure the level of private information disclosure, an analyst rating score was 
developed as the second research instrument for this study.  
     
The following section describes two research instruments that used to measure the 
level of the company’s disclosure. These research instruments are the disclosure index 
and the questionnaire survey of the views of Thai financial intermediaries on the level 
of the company disclosure.  
 
Self-constructed disclosure index  
 
The self constructed disclosure index is a direct measure with emphasis on the 
voluntary disclosure. The purpose of this index is to sufficiently capture the cross 118 
 
sectional variation of voluntary disclosure level over the sample. The procedure for 
measuring the extent of disclosure is summarised as follows: 
 
  Construction of a disclosure checklist 
  Scoring the disclosure index 
  Reliability and validity of disclosure score 
 
Construction of a disclosure checklist 
 
A specific voluntary disclosure index was developed for this study in order to capture 
the voluntary disclosure of information disclosed in company’s annual report.  A 
major task in constructing a disclosure scoring checklist is the selection of items 
expected to be voluntarily disclosed in company annual reports. Following Cooke 
(1989), the selection of disclosure items is not limited to the financial information 
from the financial report but includes the entire content of the annual report.  
 
In this study, the construction process of the disclosure checklist follows Cooke 
(1989, 1991), Meek, Roberts and Gray (1995), Botosan (1997), Ferguson, Lam and 
Lee (2002), Francis, Nanda and Olsson (2008), and Petersen and Plenborg (2006). 
The disclosure checklist procedure began by identifying and generating a preliminary 
list of the disclosure index items from the list developed by Meek, Roberts and Gray 
(1995). Following Meek, Roberts and Gray (1995), the first disclosure checklist for 
this study divided into three categories, namely strategic, non-financial, and financial 
information. The reason for adopting Meek, Roberts and Gray (1995) checklist is the 
researcher intends to develop the current disclosure checklist to be consistent with the 
previous studies. Moreover, Meek, Roberts and Gray (1995) checklist has the 
measurement categories that most closely reflect voluntary disclosure behaviour for 
the sample companies of this study.  
 
In the second stage of construction the checklist, the first disclosure checklist (which 
based on Meek, Roberts & Gray (1995)) was enhanced by adding other items which 
are considered to be relevant items to this study and also included in other similar  
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studies (Botosan, 1997; Ferguson, Lam & Lee, 2002; Francis, Nanda & Olsson, 2008; 
Petersen & Plenborg, 2006). 
 
For the third stage of the construction of the checklist, a fourth category of the 
disclosure checklist was added to the disclosure checklist. This category is developed 
from the findings of the qualitative part of this study and referred to as “the channel of 
information and investor relations” category. There are therefore four categories used 
in this study: strategic information, other non-financial information, financial 
information, and channel of information and investor relations. 
 
A pilot study was conducted using two annual reports from each of the seven industry 
groups. Some minor modifications were then made to the initial disclosure checklist. 
 
Before the disclosure checklist was employed, the disclosure index items were 
examined by two auditors from a Big Four audit firm in Thailand, who specialise in 
Thai accounting practices and disclosure issues, in order to refine the list and to 
ensure that mandatory disclosure items were excluded from the disclosure checklist. 
This also confirmed the appropriateness of the items as voluntary in so far as the 
country is concerned.  This led to the final version of the disclosure checklist 
 
The final checklist consists of 108 items of disclosed information (see Appendix D). 
For the first three categories, all the information is from the company’s annual report, 
only the fourth category used the information disclosed on the company’s website.  
 
Therefore, this checklist is based on the following four major categories of 










Number of items  %    
(A) Strategic information:  
 
1) General corporate information     2    2 
2)  Corporate  strategy       12   11 
3)  Production      8   7 
4) Research and development     5    5 
5)  Market  strategy       7   6 
6) Competition and outlook      12    11 
7)  Future  prospects     9  55 9  51 
 
 (B) Non financial information:  
 
8) Information about directors    4    4 
9)  Employee  information    8   7 
10) Social policy and  
      value added information      7  19 6  17 
 
(C) Financial information 
 
11)  Financial  review     6   6 
12) Management discussion and analysis  12  18 11 17 
 
(D) Channels of information and investor relations:  
 
13) Company offer multiple channels  
      of access to information      3    3 
14)  Company’s  web-site    11   10 
15) Investor relations department    2  16 2  15 
         108   100 
 
Scoring the disclosure index 
 
Two main issues need to be resolved in respect of the scoring of the disclosure index. 
These are whether there should be weightings attached to the items in the index and 
the other is the scale for scoring each item. These are considered in turn.  
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i.)  Weighting the disclosure index scores 
 
There are different methods weighting disclosure index scores. One of the most 
commonly used method from prior studies is an unweighted scoring method (see, for 
example, Cooke 1989, 1991; Meek, Roberts & Gray, 1995; Francis, Nanda & Olsson 
2008; Petersen & Plenborg, 2006). The unweighted scoring method is considered as 
the most appropriate method for a study that is not focusing on the information needs 
of any specific user groups (Cooke, 1989; Hossain, Perera & Rahman 1995). This 
method is based on the assumption that each item of information disclosure is equally 
important in the corporate information users’ decision making process. Some 
corporate disclosure studies have applied weights based on analysts’ opinions (Buzby, 
1975; Malone, Fries & Jones, 1993). This method brings about a certain degree of 
subjectivity and reflects the importance of certain types of information to the specific 
groups of information users (Firth, 1979). This may not properly reflect the 
preferences of all users of information in the annual report. However, Chow and 
Wong-Boren (1987) report that weighted and unweighted disclosure indices produce 
similar results. 
 
As the purpose of this study is to measure the level of the information disclosure, 
rather than users’ perceptions of the usefulness of the information disclosed, this study 
uses an unweighted index.  
 
ii.) The level of disclosure index measurement 
 
Most of the studies in the empirical disclosure literature (see, for example, Cooke, 
1989, 1991; Meek, Roberts & Gray, 1995; Hossain, Tan & Adams, 1994; Ferguson, 
Lam & Lee, 2002; Haniffa & Cooke, 2002; Francis, Nanda & Olsson, 2008) use a 
dichotomous coding scheme. By this method, the researcher will value the disclosure 
index in terms of the presence of absence of each item. Other studies employ ordinal 
measures, usually scoring their disclosure items according to the quality of the 
information.  
 
A dichotomous procedure was employed in this study. With this measurement 
method, the contents of the company’s annual report are checked against the items on 122 
 
the disclosure checklist and awarded as one (for disclosed item) zero (for not 
disclosed item) and N/A (if not applicable). To overcome the problem of incorrectly 
penalising the company for not disclosing an item that is not applicable, an 
information disclosure item was awarded as N/A only after having investigated and 
ensuring that no similar information could be found in any part of the annual report. 
In other words, the whole content of the annual report must be read before a decision 
was made in order to avoid penalising company for non-disclosure of irrelevant items. 
This approach has been used in previous studies (e.g., Cooke, 1989; Leventis & 
Weetman, 2004).  
 
Therefore, in this study companies received a score of one if an item included in the 
disclosure checklist is disclosed and 0 if it is not disclosed. Since there are four 
categories of information from the checklist, the level of the information disclosed is 
measured as the sum of the total disclosure index  ij DI  across all categories. The total 
disclosure index   ij DI  for each category is then calculated as the ratio of the total 
disclosure for each category   ij D  to the maximum possible items score   ij M  for each 
category for a company to represent the level of disclosure. By doing so, the 
companies are not penalised for not disclosing the information that is not relevant to 
them. The total disclosure score   ij D  for category   i  for company  j  is derived from 
the following formula: 
 












   d   = 1 if the item  k d  is disclosed 
      = 0 if the item  k d  is not disclosed  
m   = actual number of relevant disclosure items   n m    
i  = for category 
   j   = for company 
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As stated above, disclosure items are classified into the following four categories: 
strategic information, non financial information, financial information, and channels 
of information and investor relations. According to Meek, Roberts and Gray (1995), 
the different categories of information reflect the proposition that different types of 
information are disclosed for different reasons. Thus, scores for each individual 
company   j  are awarded for specific disclosure items within each category i . The 
maximum disclosure score for each category is: 
 
 (1) Strategic information:           55  points 
 
 (2) Non financial information:         19  points 
 
  (3)  Financial  information:      18  points 
 
 (4) Channels of information and investor relations:    16  points 
 
Therefore, the maximum possible disclosure score   ij M  for category  i  for 
company j  can earn varies: 
 












  d   = expected item of disclosure 
n   = the number of items which the company is  
               expected to disclose, i.e.,     
                55 1  category n ,    19 2  category n ,     
                18 3  category n ,    16 4  category n  
 
The total disclosure index  ij DI  for disclosure for a given category  i  for 












DI   
 
where: 
  ij DI   =   Total disclosure index 
  ij D   =  Total disclosure score 
  ij M   =  Maximum disclosure score for each company  
 
In short, the level of disclosure  j DIS is measured as the total number of scores 
awarded to company j across all categories ( 4 , 3 , 2 , 1  i ). The level of disclosure is 







ij j DI DIS  
 
Since one point is awarded for each item disclosed in the annual report, in this study 
the scoring procedure differs from Botosan (1997). Botosan (1997) awards each item 
of quantitative information for two points and each item of qualitative information 
one point. She argues that quantitative information may be more precise, that is, more 
reliable, whereas qualitative measures may be more relevant. Arguably, qualitative 
information may in some cases provide investors with a better understanding of those 
company characteristics that determines the future earnings potential. Therefore, this 
study assigns an equal score to each of the two type of information, with only one 
point is given for each item of information disclosed, even if this item appears more 
than once in the annual report. 
 
In order to ensure consistency of scoring, all annual reports were read through twice. 
After reading, analysing, and scoring all annual reports in the first round, a second 
round of scoring was conducted. The reason of doing this, rather than start the second 
round after each annual report, is to reduce the chances of the first scoring influencing 
the second scoring, and also to allow consistency in scoring all the annual reports. In a 
few cases where differences exist between the first and the second scoring, the annual 
reports were subjected to the third final assessment.  
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Reliability and Validity of disclosure score 
  
Marston and Shrives (1991) assert that it is necessary to consider the reliability and 
the validity of the disclosure index. According to Hail (2002), corporate financial 
reporting is not easily evaluated because the development and application of a 
disclosure score relies heavily on a person’s subjective perception. As with other 
studies, this study relies on the subjective judgement of the researcher in the 
development and application of the disclosure index. It is necessary to assess the 
validity and the reliability of the disclosure measure before applying this instrument in 
the study.  
 
Reliability of disclosure score 
 
Reliability refers to the consistency and dependability of the research measurement. In 
the context of disclosure score checklist, a reliable measuring instrument will always 
give the same result on different occasions assuming that what is being measured has 
not changed during the intervening period.  
 
A variety of approaches are employed to assess the reliability of the research 
instrument. The first approach is look at inter-rater reliability by calculating Pearson 
correlation coefficients between disclosure score from the researcher and that from an 
independent rater. This correlation coefficient ranges from -1 to 1. A value of 1 
implies that the two raters give the same scores, and -1 that there is an inverse 
relationship. A value of 0 implies that there is no relationship between the scores of 
the two raters. 
 
Another approach to inter-rater reliability is the calculation of the Cohen’s Kappa 
statistic. According to Donner and Klar (1996), the statistic “Kappa” is widely used as 
a chance-corrected measure of nominal agreement in a variety of application areas. 
The Kappa coefficient can range from 0 to with all values between 0 and 1 also being 
possible. Landis and Koch (1977) have proposed the following as standards for 




    the Kappa coefficient  0      poor 
     the Kappa coefficient .01 - .20    slight, 
     the Kappa coefficient .21 - .40    fair,  
the Kappa coefficient .41 - .60    moderate,  
the Kappa coefficient .61 - .80    substantial 
the Kappa coefficient .81 – 1     almost perfect.          
 
The second approach to reliability is to look at internal consistency through use of 
Cronbach’s alpha coefficient. Cronbach’s alpha is a measurement of internal 
consistency that uses the various categories of the disclosure index to assess the 
degree to which correlations among the measurements are attenuated due to random 
error. The Cronbach’s alpha coefficient can range from 0 (if no variance is consistent) 
to 1 (if all variance is consistent) with all values between 0 and 1 also being possible. 
The maximum value of alpha is one, when the correlation between each pair of 
variables is perfect. There exists no statistical rule to decide if the alpha is significant. 
However, George and Mallery (2003) provide the following rules of thumb for the 
Cronbach’s alpha coefficient:  
 
   the Cronbach’s alpha coefficient >.9   Excellent 
   the Cronbach’s alpha coefficient >.8   Good 
   the Cronbach’s alpha coefficient >.7    Acceptable 
      the Cronbach’s alpha coefficient >.6  Questionable 
      the Cronbach’s alpha coefficient >.5   Poor 
      the Cronbach’s alpha coefficient <.5   Unacceptable 
 
Validity of disclosure score 
 
Validity is concerned with the degree to which a study accurately reflects the specific 
concept that the research instrument attempts to measure. In the context of disclosure 
index, the validity of disclosure score refers to whether the research instrument 
measures the actual level of financial disclosure. 
 
Two approaches were employed in order to assess the validity of disclosure score of 
the research instrument. The first approach is the Pearson correlation coefficients  
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among disclosure scores, and another approach is the Cronbach’s alpha coefficient 
among disclosure items. 
 
Analyst rating score 
 
There is no disclosure rating similar to the one by AIMR available in Thailand. 
Further, private disclosure is difficult to observe and measure directly. Therefore, this 
study measures the level of both private and public disclosure using an analyst rating 
score. These rating scores were obtained by using data from the questionnaire survey 
mailed to Thai securities analysts and fund managers, and requesting them to rate the 
level of the company’s disclosure for those companies that they were currently 
following. The process for the analysts rating score via the questionnaire survey is 
summarised as follows: 
 
  Questionnaire procedure 




The questionnaire survey was distributed to Thai securities analysts and fund 
managers whose names were disclosed on the website of the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) of Thailand as the licensed and approved persons, during the 
period of October 9
th 2008 to December 15
th 2008. Recipients were asked to return the 
questionnaire by post.  
 
The questionnaire requested Thai securities analysts and fund managers to rate the 
level of the company’s disclosure for those companies that they were currently 
following. A five-point Likert scale was used where one refers to the lowest level of 
disclosure and five refers to the highest level of disclosure.  
 
The questionnaire is divided into two parts. For the first part, the securities analysts 
and fund managers were asked to rate the level of the company’s disclosure for the 128 
 
private disclosure channel, which include the communication between the respondents 
and the listed company’s top executives or investor relations department, and on 
company visits. While the second part, the respondents were asked to rate the level of 
the company’s disclosure for public disclosure channel, for example, the company’s 
annual report, quarterly and other published information (see Appendix E).  
 
The results from the survey questionnaire, therefore, contain two scores for each 
company. The first type of score is for private disclosure channel, and this score will 
be used to answer the research question that whether the level of public disclosure 
channel or private disclosure channel, or both, impacts the market liquidity. While, 
the second type of score is the score for public disclosure channel, which will be used 
as another instrument to assess the validity of the main research instrument, the self-
constructed disclosure index instrument.    
 
Following Sekaran (2000), the questionnaire survey developed for this study was sent 
along with a covering letter and a prepaid reply envelop. The covering letter was 
addressed to each securities analysts/fund managers of each company. To follow up, a 
reminder letter along with the questionnaire survey and a prepaid reply envelop was 
despatched approximately two months after the first round of the questionnaire 
survey.  
 
Validity of the questionnaire 
 
In order to assess the validity of the questionnaire, the questionnaire was reviewed by 
two Thai accounting academics who are experts in the area of disclosure, and by two 
Thai auditors from one of the Big Four audit firms. This procedure confirmed that the 
time required to complete the questionnaire was reasonable and that the questions 
were suitable for the intended audience. Some minor modifications to satisfy the 
expert academics’ comments were made before the questionnaire was sent to the 
sample.   
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7.2 Variable Measurement  
 
Nine variables are used in this study. These are described below together with the 




The literature of accounting, finance, and economics provides various proxies for 
information asymmetry. These include the bid-ask spread, trading volume in a 
company’s shares, and share price volatility. According to Leuz and Verrecchia 
(2000), the bid-ask spread is commonly thought to measure information asymmetry 
explicitly because it reflects the adverse selection problem that arises from transacting 
in company shares in the presence of asymmetrically informed investors. Less 
information asymmetry implies less adverse selection, which, in turn, implies a 
smaller bid-ask spread.  
 
The effective relative bid-ask spreads 
 
Prior literature cites different liquidity measures, including the quoted spread, relative 
bid-ask spread, and the effective relative bid-ask spread. Consistent with Lin, Sanger, 
and Booth (1995) and Heflin, Shaw, and Wild (2001), this study employed the 
effective relative bid-ask spread as a proxy for stock market liquidity. Heflin et al. 
(2001) acknowledge that the effective relative bid-ask spread is likely to be a better 
spread-based measure for market liquidity than other spreads because the effective 
spread is a better measure of true trading cost, which reflect actual transaction prices, 
than either raw or relative spreads
13.  
 
                                                 
13 The quoted spread is defined as the difference between the bid and the ask price, while the 
relative bid-ask spread is defined as the ask price minus the bid price, divided by the midpoint 
(the average of the bid ask prices). Both the quoted and relative bid-ask spread were not chosen 
as the dependent variable for the main study because Lee and Ready (1991) point out a problem 
when using the relative spread. They argued that the relative bid-ask spread is an inaccurate 
measure of liquidity because many trades occur at prices between the bid and ask price. 
However, these alternative measures of market liquidity were used as the dependent variable in 
the sensitivity analysis tests (Case I).  130 
 
The effective relative bid-ask spread is equal to twice the absolute value of the 
difference between a transaction price and the midpoint of the bid and ask prices 
scaled by the midpoint. In an order-driven market, the ask is the best price associated 












where:    price n transactio price      
       2 ask bid t midpoin    
 
To estimate the market liquidity of the sample companies, the data are collected on 
daily basis. The daily averages of bid, ask, and transaction price for each listed 
company were collected manually from the SETSMART
14 database. After that, the 
daily effective relative bid-ask spreads for each listed company were calculated, and 
then, the average across each listed company’s daily effective relative bid-ask spreads 
to yield one observation per company. The period in this study covers the 100 trading 
days from 21
st of April 2008 to 15
th of September 2008. This is the period after the 
deadline for listed companies to submit their annual reports
15 to the Stock Exchange 
of Thailand.  
 
Because the residual plots of the original data, the normality tests which based on 
Jarque and Bera (1980), and the tests of the heteroscedasticity which based on 
Breusch and Pagan (1979), and Cook and Weisberg (1983), reveal that there are 
violation assumptions in particular non-normality and the heteroscedasticity problems 
occur when running the raw (untransformed) data. To deal with the violation 
                                                 
14 SETSMART or abbreviated from ‘SET Market Analysis and Reporting Tool’ is the wed-based 
application from the Stock Exchange of Thailand that seamlessly integrates comprehensive sources 
about Thai listed companies. These include: company and securities details of all Thai listed 
companies, real-time and historical share prices and indices, securities and indices’ statistics, real-time 
and historical news of listed companies, financial statements (including balance sheet, profit & loss 
statement, cash flow statements and notes to the statements), and major shareholders.. By using 
SETSMART, investors will have an alternative investment tool to access the same channel of 
information as Professionals. 
15 The Stock Exchange of Thailand has a legal obligation that all listed companies submit that their 
annual report to the SET within 110 days of the end the accounting period. This is the same deadline as 
sending the notification to shareholders of the Annual General Meeting (AGM).  
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assumptions of regressions, this study used the transformation of the dependent 
variable to remedy non-normality and the heteroscedasticity problem (Hair et al., 
2006, p. 88). The results for the robust standard errors for all estimation models (with 
untransformed data) also provided in Appendix G and reported based on White’s 
(1980) adjusted t-statistics.   
 
Therefore the effective relative bid ask spread was transformed into reciprocal form. 
By doing so, the predicted value for each independent variable will change into an 



















e x b b y    1 0 1  
 






The second column shows the specific transformation applied to dependent variable. 
The third column presents the regression equation which used in the multiple linear 
regression analysis. The fourth column shows the “back transformation” equation 
used to restore the dependent variable to its original value; non-transformed 
measurement scale. 
 
The Key Variables 
 
There are three key variables applied in this study. These are measures of disclosure, 
audit firm size, and analysts following. The list of symbol and the expected sign for 
these variables is summarised in the Table 7-1. 
 
Measures of disclosure 
 
The measures of disclosure are constructed from two different sources: the company’s 
annual report and the views of financial intermediaries. The level of information 
disclosure score for each method is calculated as follows. 132 
 
i.)  The level of disclosure: the construction of the disclosure index  
 
As discussed in more detail above in section 7.1, the level of disclosure  j DIS is 
calculated as the sum of the total disclosure index  ij DI  across all four categories. 
While the total disclosure index   ij DI  for each category is a ratio computed by 
dividing the total actual score for the category   ij D  by the total maximum score  ij M  
for that category that the particular company is expected to achieve. The level of 







ij j DI DIS  
 
ii.)  The level of disclosure: the questionnaire survey 
 
As indicated in section 7.1, the disclosure score from the questionnaire survey can be 
calculated as the average of the rating level for each company’s disclosure as rated by 
the financial intermediaries.  
 
Auditor firm size 
 
Audit firm size has not been used in prior research on the determinants of market 
liquidity. The reasons for including this as an explanatory variable follow from the 
findings from the first part of this study. Thai securities analysts and fund managers 
generally indicated the importance of the audit. They suggested that the auditors 
verify the accuracy of the financial statements, thereby increasing the credibility of 
the financial report. Moreover, the reputation of the auditor is considered as important 
to the credibility of the annual report. It seems from the interviews that big, or 
international, audit firms are perceived as being more credible than smaller, or local, 
audit firms. Most of the interviewees stated that they have confidence in the financial 
statements audited by large audit firms. In line with previous studies, the size of the 
auditor is  measured as an indicator variable that takes the value of one if the company 
is audited by one of the Big Four, and zero otherwise. The Big Four auditors are 





Analyst following is measured as the number of analysts following a listed company. 
The number of analysts following a company is obtained from two sources; the first 
source is from the Securities Analysts Association’s web site (www.saa-thai.org) and 
the other source is from the questionnaire survey. The number of the analysts 
following a company as shown on the Securities Analysts Association’s web site is 
employed for the main model, while the number of the analysts following from the 




Following the prior research (Hanley, Kumar & Seguin, 1993; Welker, 1995; 
Brockman & Chung, 1999; Heflin & Shaw, 2000; Sarin, Shastri & Shastri, 2000; 
Heflin, Shaw & Wild, 2001), a set of control variables that have been found to be 
correlated with the market liquidity and corporate disclosure are included in this 
study. These variables are: share price, share price volatility, trading activity, and 
company size. This section discusses each of the control variables. Data are manually 
collected from SETSMART database in order to compute the measures of all these 




According to Blume and Husic (1973), the share price is an indication for the risk of 
the stock. A higher stock price implies lower risk of the stock. This variable, 
therefore, included in the analysis and expect that share price should have a negative 
association with the bid-ask spreads. The study uses the daily averages of bid and ask 
price as a proxy for share price. This is computed for each company over the period of 
100 trading days from 21
st of April 2008 to 15
th of September 2008. Based on prior 
research, this control variable is expected to have a negative relationship with the 






Prior studies have confirmed the idea with evidence of a positive relationship between 
spreads and volatility (Tinic, 1972; Stoll, 1978; and Ho & Stoll, 1981). Ho and Stoll 
(1981) demonstrate that the more volatile the stock price, the more uncertain of the 
cost of holding the stock and consequently the wider the bid-ask spread. Hence, there 
should be a positive correlation between return volatility and the spread. Return 
volatility is incorporated into the analysis and computed as the standard deviation of 
daily share price. The period covers 100 trading days from 21
st of April 2008 to 15
th 
of September 2008. This control variable is predicted to have a positive relationship 




Easley and O’Hara (1987) note that ‘trade size introduces an adverse selection 
problem into security trading because, given that they wish to trade, informed 
investors prefer to trade large amounts at any given price’. This argument suggests 
that large trades tend to convey more information to the market and move quoted 
prices more than small trades which, in turn, increase the spreads (Lin, Sanger & 
Booth, 1995). Trade size is included to this analysis as one of the proxies for trading 
activity used in this study. It is computed as the daily average trade volume over the 
period of 100 trading days from 21
st of April 2008 to 15
th of September 2008. Based 
on the prior research, the relationship between this control variable and the effective 




Trade frequency is also incorporated in the analysis as a proxy for trading activity. 
Copeland and Galai (1983) assert that less frequent trading usually means lower 
trading volume, therefore, the bid ask spread is likely to be inversely related to 
measures of market activity. In this study, trade frequency is measured as the average 
number of transaction trades per day cover the period of 100 trading days from 21
st of 
April 2008 to 15
th of September 2008. Trade frequency is predicted to have a negative 




Prior studies usually used the company size as a proxy for the amount of information 
available regarding a company, because larger companies generally release more 
information than smaller companies. The release of information would mitigate the 
information asymmetry among the investors, thus, company size should be negatively 
correlated with the spreads (Chiang and Venkatesh, 1988). However, larger 
companies generally have a more complex capital, organisational, and business 
structure. These complexities could be an obstacle for the investors when they 
analyses the information about a company. Consequently, the investors may respond 
to these complexities by increasing their bid-ask spreads (Schauer, 2003). Company 
size is included in the analysis as control variable and measured as the market 
capitalisation of common equity at the end of the company’s fiscal period, 31
st of 
December 2007. The relationship between the company size and the effective relative 




Table 7-1: List of symbol and the expected sign of the variables 
 




Key Variables          
  Market Liquidity  The Effective Relative Bid Ask Spread  SPREAD  Ratio Scale   
  Disclosure level  The level of disclosure: checklist instrument  DS  Ratio Scale  - 
     Overall  disclosure  (overall)     
     Annual  report  (annual)     
     Strategic  information    (str)     
     Financial  information  (non)     
     Non-financial  information  (fin)     
      Channels of information and investor relations  (other)     
    The level of disclosure: questionnaire survey instrument       
     Public  disclosure  DPUB  Ordinal Scale  - 
     Private  disclosure  DPRI  Ordinal Scale  - 
  Auditor  1 if the company is audited by "Big Four" audit firm, 0 if other  AUD  Nominal Scale  N/A 
  Analysts Following  The number of analysts following the listed companies  ANA  Ratio Scale  N/A 
Control Variables      
  Share Price  the daily averages of bid ask prices  PR  Ratio Scale  - 
  Return Volatility  the standard deviation of daily share price  PRVOL  Ratio Scale  + 
  Trade Size  the daily averages trade volume  TSZ  Ratio Scale  + 
  Trade Frequency  the average number of transaction trade per day  TF  Ratio Scale  - 
  Company Size  the market value of common equity  SIZE  Ratio Scale  N/A 
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7.3 Sample procedure and data source 
 
The current study is an empirical investigation the relationship between the levels of 
information disclosure and the market liquidity based on a sample of Thai listed 
companies. This section will discuss the sample procedure, which includes the 
selection of the sample, the reasons behind the selection, the choice of the period 
covered, sample size, and the data source for each measure.   
 
i.)  Sample for the self-constructed disclosure index instrument 
(checklist approach) 
 
The first main purpose of this study is to examine the relationship between the levels 
of information disclosure and the market liquidity of companies listed on the Stock 
Exchange of Thailand in 2007. Data for this study were collected mainly from the 
company’s annual report, the company’s web site, and the SETSMART database. 
Data related to the level of information disclosure were collected for the whole 
sample, and these data have been located and hand collected in the companies’ annual 
reports and the companies’ web sites. While financial data related to share prices, 
trading volumes, and bid and ask prices were retrieved from the SETSMART 
database.  
 
There are three criteria for sample selection in this study. 
  
  The first criterion is that the company should be included in the list 
of shares in the SET 100’s index
16 during the period from July 1
st 
2008 to December 31
st 2008.  
 
  The second criterion is that there is a useable copy of each listed 
company’s annual report for the 2007 year-end. Most Thai listed 
companies use the calendar year as their accounting year.  
                                                 
16 SET 100’s index is calculated using the same method as the SET index. This index is market 
capitalisation-weighted price indexes which compare the current market value of all listed common 
stocks with its market value on the base date. (see more information about the calculation methodology 
and the selection criteria for companies to be in the SET 100’s index in Appendix F) 138 
 
  The third criterion is that all financial data; such as share prices, 
trading volumes and bid and ask prices, should be available in the 
SETSMART database cover the period of 100 days; from 21
st of 
April 2008 to 15
th of September 2008.   
 
The sample includes all listed companies in the SET 100’s index. Seven industry 
groups are included in the index: Argro and Food Industry, Financials, Industrials, 
Property and Construction, Resources, Services, and Technology.  
 
Company annual reports, which were used to measure the level of information 
disclosed, were collected mainly from company websites and the SET website 
(www.set.or.th). Eighty-four companies’ annual reports were downloaded from the 
companies’ websites. However, there were some difficulties in obtaining the annual 
reports for the remaining 16 companies either because the report was not available on 
the website or because parts of the report were missing.  Annual reports for the 
remaining 16 companies, particularly those companies without information on their 
website, were collected directly from the library of the Stock Exchange of Thailand: 
the Maruey Knowledge and Resource Centre.  
 
One hundred useable annual reports were obtained, representing all the companies 
included in the SET 100’s index. The total value of market capitalisation of the 
companies in the SET 100’s index as the end of the December 2007 was 5.25 trillion 
baht, while the total value of market capitalisation of all 538 listed companies in the 
SET was 6.64 trillion baht. Thus, this sample represents 79.1% of the market 
capitalisation of all listed companies in the SET. Table 7-2, shows the summary of the 











Table 7-2: Summary of sampled companies according to their industry group 
 
 
Industry groups  Number of listed companies 
 
-  Agro and Food Industry 
 
5 
-  Financials  19 
-  Industrials  9 
-  Property and Construction  27 
-  Resources   11 
-  Services  18 





The literature shows that previous studies had suffered because of the heterogeneous 
nature of the sample companies. Difficulties occurred because the financial industry 
group, such as banking, finance and securities companies, have specific accounting 
rules (and in some cases are subject to particular disclosure requirements not relevant 
for other industry groups). This could cause statistical problems, such as high 
variation in the range level of disclosure by companies from different industry groups. 
Therefore, the financials industry group, 19 banking, finance and securities 
companies, was excluded from the sample used in the robustness test. Eighty-one 
listed companies are therefore left for sensitivity analysis tests. 
 
ii.)  Sample for the analyst rating score instrument (questionnaire 
survey approach) 
 
The analyst rating scores from the questionnaire survey instrument are used to check 
the validity of the two research instruments. For this instrument, the level of private 
disclosure was obtained by despatching the questionnaire survey to Thai securities 
analysts and fund managers. The target population for the questionnaire survey 
comprised the securities analysts and the fund managers whose names were disclosed 140 
 
on the website of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) of Thailand as the 
licensed and approved persons on the 31
st May 2007. This date has been chosen in 
order to use the same population as used in the qualitative part. As on the 31
st May 
2007, the SEC website provided 201 names of the licensed and approved securities 
analysts from 42 licensed securities companies, and 154 names of the licensed and 
approved fund manager from 29 licensed fund management companies.  
 
A total of 355 sets of questionnaire survey, along with the covering letters, were sent 
to the Thai securities analysts and fund managers on October 9
th 2008.  Each of the 
securities analysts/fund managers was asked to rate the level of the company’s 
disclosure for only those companies that they are currently following. Eighty-six sets 
of questionnaire survey returned. The response rate for the first round was 24 per cent. 
Then, the second round of the questionnaire survey along with a reminder letter was 
despatched in December 15
th 2008 to the remaining sample who did not response for 
the questionnaire in the first round. For this round, there were 26 further responses 
which brought the total response rate to 31.5 per cent.  
 



















Table 7-3: List of type of measurement and data source for each variable 
 
 
           
  
Variables Data  source 
Dependent Variable   
  Market Liquidity  SETSMART database 
Independemt Variables   
  Disclosure level   
          The level of disclosure: checklist instrument   
    Overall disclosure  Company's annual report 
   Annual  report  Company's annual report 
    Strategic information   Company's annual report 
    Financial information  Company's annual report 
    Non-financial information  Company's annual report 
    Channels of information and investor relations  Company's website 
          The level of disclosure: questionnaire survey instrument   
    Public disclosure  Questionnaire survey 
    Private disclosure  Questionnaire survey 
  Auditor   Company's  annual  report 
  Analysts Following  The Securities Analysts  
     Association's  website 
Control Variables   
  Share Price  SETSMART database 
  Return Volatility  SETSMART database 
  Trade Size   SETSMART  database 
  Trade Frequency  SETSMART database 
  Company Size   SETSMART  database 
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7.4 Statistical Analysis and Empirical Implement  
 
This study uses linear multiple regression analysis to estimate the relationship 
between the dependent variable of the market liquidity and the independent variable 
of the level of disclosure. The main reason for using multiple regression analysis in 
this study is because the technique allows the researcher to make predictions of the 
dependent variable based on several independent and control variables in the model. 
In this study, the dependent variable is the market liquidity and the independent 
variable is the level of disclosure. In addition to the level of disclosure, an auditor firm 
size and analysts following were included in the model as an additional independent 
variable. Moreover, a number of control variables are also included in the model. As 
previously indicated, these control variables have frequently been used in prior 
disclosure research studies (Heflin, Shaw & Wild 2001). The analysis of the 
association between the market liquidity and the level of disclosure is based on 
Heflin, Shaw and Wild (2001) using the following multiple regression model:  
 
                SIZE TF TSZ PRVOL PR DQ LIQ
6 5 4 3 2 1 0  
where 
 
LIQ    =  Either effective spread, adverse selection spread, or depths 
DQ   =  The total disclosure quality score 
PR   =  Average share price 
PRVOL  =  The standard deviation of daily price  
TSZ   =  Average trade size 
TF   =  Average daily number of trade 
SIZE    =  The natural logarithm of company size 
 








Model for benchmark test: 
 
                PRVOL PR SIZE TSZ TF DS SPREAD 6 5 4 3 2 1 0  
where 
SPREAD  =  The reciprocal of the effective relative bid ask spread 
DS   =  The total disclosure score 
PR   =  The daily averages of bid and ask prices           
PRVOL   =  The standard deviation of daily share price  
TSZ   =  The average trade volume per day 
TF   =  The average number of transaction trades per day    
SIZE    =  The market value of common equity at  
                                     the end of the company’s fiscal period 
    =  Error  term 
 
Other models for additional tests are discussed later in the following Chapter.           
Table 7-4, presents a summary of hypotheses and statistical techniques used for this 
study. As can be seen in Table 7-4, all hypotheses, except hypothesis number H5a, are 









Table 7-4: Summary of Hypotheses and Statistical Analysis 
 
 
Hypothesis Variables  Statistical  Test 
H1a: Market liquidity is positively related to the overall disclosure score.   IV  = Total disclosure score 
DV = Reciprocal effective spread 
Multiple Regression 
Analysis 
H1b: Market liquidity is positively related to the disclosure score from annual 
report. 
IV  = Annual report score 
DV = Reciprocal effective spread 
Multiple Regression 
Analysis 
H1c: Market liquidity is positively related to the analyst rating score for public 
disclosure channel. 
IV  = Public disclosure score 
DV = Reciprocal effective spread 
Multiple Regression 
Analysis 
H1d: Market liquidity is positively related to the analyst rating score for private 
disclosure channel. 
IV  = Private disclosure score 
DV = Reciprocal effective spread 
Multiple Regression 
Analysis 
H2a: The relationship between market liquidity and the disclosure 
score varies among the detailed sub-categories of the self-
constructed disclosure index. 
 
 
IV  = Strategic information score, 
Non-financial information 
score, Financial information 
score, and Other channels of 
information 
DV = Reciprocal effective spread  
Multiple Regression 
Analysis 
H2b: Market liquidity is positively related to the disclosure score from 
strategy information section of the annual report. 
IV  = Strategic information score 








Table 7.4: Continued 
 
Hypothesis Variables  Statistical  Test 
H2c: Market liquidity is positively related to the disclosure score from non 
financial information section of the annual report. 
IV  = Non-financial information score 
DV = Reciprocal effective spread 
Multiple Regression 
Analysis 
H2d: Market liquidity is positively related to the disclosure score from 
financial information section of the annual report. 
IV  = Financial information score 
DV = Reciprocal effective spread  
Multiple Regression 
Analysis 
H2e: Market liquidity is positively related to the disclosure score from 
channels of information and investor relations section. 
IV  = Other channels of information 
DV = Reciprocal effective spread  
Multiple Regression 
Analysis 
H3a: The relationship between market liquidity and the analyst rating score 
varies between the channels of disclosure. 
H3b: The private disclosure channel is more likely to have greater effect on 
market liquidity than the public disclosure channel. 
IV  = Private disclosure score, and 
Public disclosure score 
DV = Reciprocal effective spread 
Multiple Regression 
Analysis 
H4: The level of companies’ disclosure is positively related to the size of the 
audit firm. 
IV  = Audit firm size 
DV = Disclosure score 
Multiple Regression 
Analysis 
H5a: Companies audited by Big Four audit firms are more likely to have higher 
market liquidity than companies audited by other audit firms. 
  Mann-Whitney Test 
H5b: Market liquidity is positively related to audit firm size.  IV  = Audit firm size 
DV = Reciprocal effective spread 
Multiple Regression 
Analysis 
H6:  There is a positive relationship between financial analysts following 
and the level of disclosure. 
IV  = Disclosure score 





7.5 Sensitivity Analysis 
 
Sensitivity analysis is a technique used to determine how “sensitive” a model is to 
change in the value of the parameters of the model: the dependent variable and the 
independent variables, and to change in the structure of the model under a given set of 
assumptions. There are several purposes of sensitivity analysis. The first is to help 
identify the key variables in the model. Another is to investigate the consequences of 
likely changes in these key variables. Moreover, this analysis allows researchers to 
assess whether the model is likely to be affected by such changes, and to identify 
actions that could mitigate possible adverse effects on the model.  
 
Sensitivity analysis is usually performed as a series of tests in which the researcher 
sets different variable values to see how change in one variable will impact the other 
variable. By showing how the model behaviour responds to changes in variable 
values, sensitivity analysis is a useful tool in model building as well as in model 
evaluation. There are several ways to approach sensitivity analysis. The most common 
approach is to change the initial data and solve the model again to see what the results 
are stable. 
 
In this study six additional sensitivity analysis tests are applied in order to check the 
robustness of the regression models. These additional tests involve changing 
dependent variable (market liquidity), changing the disclosure score variable, 
changing the measure of the analysts following, deleting variables where there are 
problems of multicollinearity, excluding outliers, and removing some of the sample 
from the model estimation. 
 
7.6 Summary  
 
This chapter describes the development of the research instruments used to measure 
the level of disclosure. Two approaches are taken: one is the construction of the 
disclosure index; the other is a questionnaire survey to obtain the opinions of 
securities analysts and fund managers on the quality of disclosures by the companies  
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they follow. A linear multiple regression analysis is proposed to estimate the 
association between the measures of disclosures and the market liquidity of listed 
companies in the SET 100 Index. In addition, the chapter provided an overview of the 





















The quantitative study:  





This chapter presents the empirical analysis for the quantitative part of the study. The 
objective of this study is to examine the relationship between the level of information 
disclosure and the stock market liquidity, using the effective relative bid ask spread as 
a proxy for stock market liquidity. This relationship is examined in two different 
ways. First, in a univariate analysis, the correlation coefficients between the effective 
relative bid ask spread and the disclosure scores are estimated. Second, a multivariate 
analysis is performed where the effective relative bid ask spread is regressed on the 
level of disclosure as well as other control variables.  
 
This chapter divided into four main sections. The first section begins with the 
descriptive statistics for the unadjusted dependent and independent variables, 
including the control variables. The second section presents the reliability and the 
validity tests on the key variables, in particular the disclosure score. The following  
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section presents the empirical analysis of this study, which divided, into two parts. 
The first part presents the results for the Pearson correlation coefficients between the 
regression variables of this study and the second presents the multivariate results 
obtained using SPSS programme. The next section presents the results from 
sensitivity analysis tests. A summary of this chapter is contained in the final section.  
   
8.1 Descriptive statistics 
 
Descriptive statistics, the means, standard deviations, and the minimum and 
maximum values, for dependent variable and the key variable are presented in Tables 
8-1 and 8-2 respectively. The sample size is the 100 listed companies in the SET 100 
index.  
 
Table 8-1: Summary statistics of dependent variable 
 
                          
        Percentile   
 Dependent  Variable  Mean  Std.  Min 25% 50% 75% Max 
                          
  Effective spread  0.0199 0.0246  0.01  0.0114 0.0136 0.0173  0.17 
                          
 
Table 8-1 presents descriptive statistics for dependent variable. Effective spreads is 
equal to twice the absolute value of the difference between a transaction price and the 
midpoint of the bid and ask prices scaled by the midpoint, where the midpoint is the 
average of bid and ask prices. The Effective spreads has a mean of 0.0199, a median 
of 0.0136, and ranges from 0.01 to 0.17.  
 
Table 8-2 contains a summary descriptive statistics for each of the key variables, 
disclosure score and its categories, for the 100 sample companies. The overall 
disclosure score is a percentage measure of an equal weighted average of the four 
major categories of information types, the strategic information score, non-financial 
information score, financial information score, and the other channels of information 
(on a scale from 0.00 to 1.00 with a larger number indicating more information  
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disclosure). The annual report score is a percentage measure of an equal weighted 
average of the three major categories of information types, the strategic information 
score, non-financial information score, and financial information score. The public 
disclosure score and the private disclosure score are the level of disclosure scores 
from the questionnaire survey that are calculated as the average of the ratings for each 
company’s disclosure as evaluated by the security analysts and the fund managers. 
This ratings range from 1 to 5, with higher values indicting more information 
disclosure. The disclosure scores from strategy information, non-financial information 
section, financial information, and channels of information and investor relations 
categories are calculated by reference to the total of disclosure index of each category 
of information divided by the total maximum score of each category of information 
for that company. 
 
The overall disclosure score ranges from 0.17 to 0.80 with a mean score of 0.60 and a 
median score of 0.62.  The annual report score ranging from 0.21 to 0.75 with a mean 
score of 0.54 and a median score of 0.54.  
 
The range of the public disclosure score awarded to the sample companies ranges 
from 2.09 to 4.24 with a mean score of 3.45 and a median score of 3.51. The level of 
private disclosure score is slightly lower. This score ranges from 1.95 to 4.24 with a 
mean score of 3.21 and a median score of 3.29.  
 
The strategic information score ranges from 0.15 to 0.62 with a median score of 0.38. 
The non-financial information score ranges from 0.16 to 1.00 with a median score of 
0.61. The financial information score ranges from 0.17 to 0.94 with a median score of 
0.67. The other channels of information ranges from 0.06 to 1.00, with a median score 
of 0.88. Of the four major categories of information types, other channels of 
information has the highest mean score, followed by the financial information score, 
the non-financial information score, and the strategic information score respectively 
(0.79, 0.65, 0.59, and 0.39). 







Table 8-2: Summary statistics of disclosure score 
 
                             
           Percentile  
  Variable  n  Mean Std.  Min 25% 50% 75% Max 
                             
             
  Overall disclosure score  100  0.60 0.10 0.17 0.55 0.62 0.68 0.80 
  Annual report score  100  0.54 0.11 0.21 0.49 0.54 0.61 0.75 
  Public disclosure score  100  3.45 0.58 2.09 3.08 3.51 3.88 4.61 
  Private disclosure score  100  3.21 0.55 1.95 2.86 3.29 3.57 4.24 
             
Four major categories of information:           
 
 
 Strategic information score  100  0.39 0.10 0.15 0.33 0.38 0.47 0.62 
  Non-financial information score  100  0.59 0.17 0.16 0.47 0.61 0.68 1.00 
  Financial information score   100  0.65 0.16 0.17 0.56 0.67 0.78 0.94 
  Other channels of information  100  0.79 0.22 0.06 0.69 0.88 0.94 1.00 
                             
             
N o t e s :                
 
a    Overall disclosure score = weighted averaged of the four major categories of information types (25%, 25%, 25% and 25% respectively) 
 
b    Annual report score = weighted averaged of the Strategic information score, Non-financial information score and Financial information score (equal 
weight) 
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Summary descriptive statistics for the other unadjusted key variables and for the control 
variables for the sample companies are shown in Tables 8-3, 8-4, and 8-5.  
 
 
Table 8-3: Summary statistics of key variable: audit firm size 
 






Auditor = 1 (Big Four)  79  
  
 




    
      
 
Table 8-3 presents the summary statistics of the auditor variable for the total sample of 
100 companies in the SET 100’s index. The auditor is measured as an indicator variable 
that takes the value of one if the company is audited by one of the Big Four audit firms, 
and zero otherwise. The Big Four audit firms are PricewaterhouseCoopers, Deloitte 
Touche Tohmatsu, Ernst and Young, and KPMG. The result from the table 8-3 show 
that there are 79 companies that were audited by a Big Four audit firm, the remaining 21 
companies were audited by a Non-Big Four audit firm.  
 
These results show a clear difference between the developed countries, such as UK and 
US, and the developing countries, such as Thailand. In developed countries, almost all 
the top listed companies tend to be audited by a Big Four audit firm. For example, 
Botosan (1997), who examines the effect of disclosure level on the cost of equity capital 
for the US data set, does not include the audit firm size in her study because only two of 
her sample companies (from the whole sample of 122 manufacturing companies) are 
audited by Non-Big Six firms, which means that more than ninety-eight percent of the 
whole sample audited by Big Six firm. Moreover, for UK example, Oxera (2006) stated 
that the Big Four audit firms audit all but one of the FTSE 100 companies, and represent 
99 percent of audit fees in the FTSE 350.  
 
While in Thailand the results show that only seventy-nine percent of the whole sample 
are audited by a Big Four audit firm. Therefore, it is a compelling reason for the 
developing country as Thailand to incorporate an auditor as one of the independent  
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variables into the framework of this study in order to find out that whether or not this 
variable effect on the liquidity of the stock.  
 




                      
         Percentile   
 Variable  Mean Std.  Min  25% 50% 75% Max 
                          
 
 
Number of analysts following  
from SAA's website  14.07 7.30  0.00 11.00 15.00 20.00 26.00 
                          
             
 
Table 8-4 reports the summary statistics for analyst following. The number of analysts 
following a company is derived from the Securities Analysts Association’s web site 
(www.saa-thai.org). Number of analysts following the sample companies measured from 
SAA’s website ranges from 0 to 26 with a mean score of 14 and a median score of 15. 
 
Table 8-5 shows the summary statistics of control variables. Trade frequency is average 
number of trades per days, measured as the average number of transaction trades per day 
over a period of 100 days from 21
st of April 2008 to 15
th of September 2008. Trade size 
is average trade size, computed as the daily average trade volume over a period of 100 
days from 21
st of April 2008 to 15
th of September 2008. Company size (Market value in 
million Baht) is the market capitalisation of common equity at the end of the company’s 
fiscal period, 31
st of December 2007. Share price is the daily averages of bid and ask 
prices, which is computed for each company over a period of 100 days from 21
st of 
April 2008 to 15
th of September 2008. Return volatility is the standard deviation of daily 
share price over a period of 100 days from 21
st of April 2008 to 15







Table 8-5: Summary statistics of control variables: trade frequency, trade size, 
company size, share price, and return volatility 
           
 
              
         Percentile   
 Variable  Mean  Std.  Min  25% 50% 75%  Max 




(per day)  647.01 740.34 28.70  168.92  374.70 805.19 4,019.92 
 
 
Trade size  








(Baht)  31.61 62.40 0.41 3.86 11.68 24.75 439.28 
 
 
Return volatility  3.83  7.71 0.05 0.47 1.54 3.34  54.52 
                          
             
 
Trade frequency ranges from 28 transaction trades per day to 4,019 trades, with a mean 
of 647 and a median of 374 trades per day. Trade size ranges from 33,480 shares to 
362.94 million shares with a mean score of 16.95 million shares and a median s of 2.66 
million shares. The data also indicate a wide range of company size with the market 
capitalisation of common equity ranging from 299.23 million Baht to 494.2 billion Baht. 
The mean market value of common equity is 28.18 billion Baht which was four times 
the median of market value (6.47 billion Baht). Share price ranges from 0.41 to 439.28 
Baht with a mean of 31.61 Baht and a median of 11.68 Baht. Return volatility is the 
standard deviation of daily share price ranges from 0.05 to 54.52. The mean for the 
return volatility is 3.83 with the median score of 1.54. 
 
The results from table 8-5 clearly show that there is a wide range between the minimum 
value and the maximum value of each control variable. The results also show that all 
control variables are highly skewed. Further, the Skewness & Kurtosis normality test, 
the Kolmogorov-Smirnov Z test, and histograms for each of the control variable indicate  
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that the distributions are not normal. In order to normalise the distributions, all the 
control variables were transformed into logarithm.  
 
8.2 Reliability and validity of the disclosure variables  
 
The objective of this section is to measure the reliability and validity for the disclosure 
scores used in this study. As outlined in the methodology chapter, when using the 
disclosure index as a research instrument there are two important issues, reliability and 
validity.  
 
Reliability of the disclosure score 
 
This section reports three different approaches to measuring the inter-rater reliability and 
the internal consistency of disclosure score. These are:  
 
  The Pearson correlation coefficient between the disclosure scores from the 
researcher and the the second rater. 
  The Cronbach’s alpha reliability coefficient between the disclosure scores from 
the researcher and the second rater. 
  The Cohen’s Kappa statistic which measures the agreement between the 
disclosure scores from the researcher and the second rater. 
 
The results and the interpretation of these reliability tests are shown in Table 8-6, 8-7, 











Table 8-6: Correlation between the ratings of the researcher and the second rater. 
 
 
  Rater B 
 
Rater A     Pearson Correlation 
                   Sig. (2-tailed) 






   14 
 
 
                                    ** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed) 
 
 
Table 8-6 reports the Pearson correlation coefficients between two raters, where Rater A 
is the researcher, and Rater B is the other rater.  The result shows that the correlations 
coefficient between rater A and rater B are high with a statistically significance at a p-








Variables  Cronbach’s Alpha  N of Items 
 








Table 8-7 reports the Cronbach’s alpha reliability coefficient between the disclosure 
scores of the two raters, Rater A being the researcher and RaterB the other independent 
rater. The result indicates that the Cronbach’s alpha coefficient between Rater A and 





The following table, Table 8-8, reports the measurement of agreement for the researcher 
and the independent rater using the Cohen’s Kappa statistic. The sample for this 
additional reliability test was chosen from the total sample used in this study. Two listed 
companies were randomly selected from each industry group, giving a sample used of 
14 listed companies drawn from seven industry groups. Ratings were on a nominal scale 
(ie, “disclose”/ “no disclose”) for 108 objects (disclosure items) by two raters: the 
research and the independent rater. The results from Table 8-8 show that the listed 
companies (F4 and F7) from financial industry group (F group) receive the highest Kappa 
coefficients which are 0.809 and 0.715 respectively. These results imply that the 
strength of agreement between the researcher and the independent rater for this industry 
group is substantial and almost perfect. In contrast, one of the listed company (S17) from 
service industry group (S group) receive the lowest Kappa coefficient which is 0.534 
and another listed company (I8) from industrials industry group (I group) obtained the 
Kappa coefficient 0.538, which can interpret that the strength of agreement between two 
raters for these two listed companies is moderate. For the remainder of listed companies 
from agro and food, resources, property and construction, and technology industry 
groups (A, R, P, and T group) the Kappa coefficients show the substantial level of 
agreement. Therefore, overall the strength of agreement between the researcher and the 
independent inter rater for this additional reliability test is at the substantial level, and 





























N of Valid 
cases 
F4  .809 .060 8.504  .000  108 
F7  .715 .069 7.589  .000  108 
A3  .636 .071 6.832  .000  108 
A1  .605 .078 6.370  .000  108 
 
R7  .666 .073 6.985  .000  108 
R4  .657 .068 7.171  .000  108 
 
I8  .538 .084 5.647  .000  108 
I2  .604 .077 6.462  .000  108 
 
P20  .675 .070 7.244  .000  108 
P14  .644 .073 6.756  .000  108 
 
T2  .593 .077 6.521  .000  108 
T5  .638 .075 6.658  .000  108 
 
S7  .576 .074 6.307  .000  108 
S17  .534 .072 6.145  .000  108 
 
Note: 
a.  Not assuming the null hypothesis. 
b.  Using the asymptotic standard error assuming the null hypothesis. 
c.  “ F ”   represents the sample from financials industry group. 
“ A ”   represents the sample from agro and food industry group. 
  “ R ”   represents the sample from resources industry group. 
“ I ”   represents the sample from industrials industry group. 
“ P ”   represents the sample from property and construction industry group. 
“ T ”  represents the sample from technology industry group. 





Validity of the disclosure scores 
 
This section presents two different approaches to measuring the validity of the 
disclosure scores used in this study. These are: 
 
  The Pearson correlation coefficient between disclosure scores. 
  The Cronbach’s alpha reliability coefficient between disclosure items. 
 
The results and the interpretation of the validity tests are shown in Table 8-9, 8-10 and 
8-11 as follow.  
 
The Pearson correlation coefficients between the disclosure scores as measured by two 
different research instruments, i.e. the disclosure score from disclosure index and the 
disclosure score from the ratings of disclosure by analysts and fund managers. In this 
study, each disclosure score is measured in a different way. The measures have different 
scaling properties. The disclosure score from the disclosure index is measured on a scale 
from 0.00 to 1.00 with a larger number indicating more information disclosure; this 
variable is classified as continuous variable. While the second research instrument is the 
disclosure scores from the analysts rating which is measured on a Likert scale from 1 to 
5 with a larger number indicating more information disclosure. This variable is likely to 
be classified as interval scale
17 because it is measured on the Likert scale ratings of a 
number of raters. Because of the measurement problem, the disclosure scores are needed 
to convert their scales into a common measurement scale so that these disclosure score 
variables can be compared. 
 
According to de Vaus (2009) there are two possible solutions to the problem of 
comparing scores on different variables: (i) standardising the variables and expressed the 
scores as standard deviation units (Z-scores), and (ii) converting each scale into the same 
lower and upper levels. 
 
                                                 
17 According to Carifio and Perla (2008, p.1151) Likert scales should be analysed as the interval 
data. Thus, as the intervalists contend, it is perfectly appropriate to summarise the rating measured 
from Likert scales using means and standard deviations. Moreover, it is appropriate to use 
parametric statistic techniques when analyse rating from Likert scale.    
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For the first solution, standardise variables in terms of standard deviation (Z-score), is 
appropriate for the interval and continuous variables. As stated above, the disclosure 
scores from both two research instruments are classified as continuous variable. 
Therefore, to achieve the problem of comparing different variables, the disclosure scores 
from two different research instruments were transformed into Z-scores
18.  
 






 Analysts rating instrument 
  
     Public (Z-score)  Private (Z-score)  
Annual (Z-score)  .403
**   Disclosure 
index 
instrument 
Other (Z-score)   .378
** 
  
                                    ** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level  
Notes:    
a    Significance levels quoted above are for a two-tail test of statistical significance. 
b   The number of observations used in the correlation analysis is 100. 
 
 
Table 8-9 reports the Pearson correlation coefficients between the disclosure scores as 
measured by the disclosure index and the ratings of disclosure by analysts and fund 
managers, which were transformed into Z-scores. The result of the validity test for the 
disclosure score was divided into two sets. The first set was computed with the 
standardise data for the annual report disclosure score (Z-score annual), and the public 
disclosure score (Z-score public), while the second set was computed with the 
standardise data for the other channels of information disclosure score (Z-score web), 
and the private disclosure score (Z-score). The results indicate the positive correlation 
between these two research instrument with the correlations coefficient values r=0.403 
and r=0.378 respectively.   
                                                 
18 To convert variables in terms of the number of standard deviation, a score on variable is 
standardised ( i Z ) by subtracting the mean for (
__
X ) the variable from an individual’s score on the 














 A standardised variable will always have a mean of 0 and a standard deviation of 
1.   
162 
 





 Analysts rating instrument 
  
     Public   Private  
Annual (Adjusted-score)  .467
**   Disclosure 
index 
instrument 
Other (Adjusted-score)   .378
** 
  
                                    ** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level  
Notes:    
a    Significance levels quoted above are for a two-tail test of statistical significance. 
b   The number of observations used in the correlation analysis is 100. 
 
The disclosure scores were also converted each scale into the same lower and upper 
level
19, which range of 1 to 5. Table 8-10 reports the result of the Pearson correlation for 
the converting of the disclosure scores, which also divided into two sets. The first set 
was computed with the adjusted data for the annual report disclosure score (from 
disclosure index instrument), and the public disclosure score (from analysts rating 
instrument), while the second set was computed with the adjusted data for the other 
channels of information disclosure score (from disclosure index instrument), and the 
private disclosure score (from analysts rating instrument). The results indicate the 
positive correlation between these two research instrument with the correlations 
coefficient values r=0.467 and r=0.378 respectively. 
 
Table 8-11: Cronbach’s alpha coefficient between disclosure items 
 
 
Variables  Cronbach’s 
Alpha  N of Items 
 
Disclosure index instrument 
 
.745 4 
                                                 
19 To convert variables to have the same lower and upper limits, the conversion is using the 













min    where Y  is the adjusted variable,  X is the original variable, 
min X  is the minimum observed value on the original variable and 
range X  is the difference 
between the maximum observed score and the minimum observed score on the original 
variable and n is the upper limit of the rescaled variable.  
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Table 8-11 reports the test for validity of the disclosure score by using the Cronbach’s 
alpha coefficient between the disclosure scores. The results indicate that the Cronbach’s 
alpha coefficient for the four sections of disclosure items turns out to be high at the 
value of .745.  
 
 
8.3 Empirical analysis 
 
The empirical analysis designed to answer the hypotheses posited in Chapter 6. The 




  Correlations between disclosure score variables and control variables 
 
  Correlations between the effective relative bid ask spread and the 




  Hypothesis 1: Market liquidity and information disclosure 
 
  Hypothesis 2: Market liquidity and categories of information 
disclosure 
 
  Hypothesis 3: Market liquidity and channels of information 
disclosure 
 
  Hypothesis 4: The size of audit firm and information disclosure 
 
  Hypothesis 5: Market liquidity and the size of audit firm 
 
  Hypothesis 6: Analysts following and information disclosure 
 








Correlations between disclosure score variables and control variables 
 
Table 8-12 shows the Pearson correlations coefficients among the disclosure variables 
and control variables used in the regression estimations. For disclosure variables, the 
eight disclosure categories are positively correlated with each other, and correlation 
coefficients, ranging from r = 0.237 to r = 0.970, are statistical significant at the 5 
percent level or better. The highest correlation among disclosure categories variables is 
between the public and the private disclosure scores from the analyst ratings (r = 0.970). 
The overall disclosure score shows high correlations with the annual report score, the 
disclosure score from strategy information section, and the disclosure score from non 
financial information section (r = 0.839, 0.684, and 0.658 respectively). The annual 
report score also is highly correlated with the disclosure scores from non financial 
information section, the strategy information section, and the financial information 
section (r = 0.768, 0.716, and 0.697 respectively). Lang and Lundholm (1996) suggest 
that different categories may capture different aspects of disclosure when disclosure 
categories have correlations that are considerably less than one.  
 
The correlation coefficients among the control variables range from 0.076 to 0.923, and 
are significant at the 5 percent level or better. Share price and return volatility show the 
highest correlation among the control variables (r = 0.923). Trade frequency is also 
highly correlated with trade size (r = 0.748). To address the problem of 
multicollinearity, various combinations of control variables were tested so that highly 
correlated variables were not included in the same model. The models using variables 
with the highest explanatory power are reported in sensitivity analysis section.  
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Table 8-12: Correlations between disclosure score variables and control variables 
 
                                              
  Diclosure variables 




























































































































































































































     Disclosure variables:              
 
       
Annual report score  .839
**                        
Public disclosure score  .403
** .267
**                      
Private disclosure score  .390
** .237
* .970
**                    




**                  





**                
Financial information  .521
** .697
** -.089  -.099  .304
** .162               
Other channels of information  .640
** .120  .358
** .378
** .238
* .116 -.034             
     Control Variables:              
 
       
Trade frequency  -.004  .043  .141  .134  .015  .106  -.037  -.067           
Trade size  -.193  -.087  -.303
** -.269
** -.113 -.087 -.009 -.230
*    .748
**          






** -.156  .164    .389
** -.030         







**    .076 -.559
** .658
**      









**    




* .125 .171 -.022    -.136 -.125 .104  .059 -.059   












                                              
                      





Table 8-13: Correlations between the dependent effective spread variable and 
independent variables and control variables 
 
     
  Dependent variable 
   Reciprocal effective 
relative bid ask spread 
     Panel A: Disclosure variables:   
Overall disclosure score  .325
** 
Annual report score  .279
** 
Public disclosure score  .445
** 
Private disclosure score  .382
** 
Strategic information  .310
** 
Non-financial information  .277
** 
Financial information  .061 
Other channels of information  .199
* 
     Panel B: Control variables:   
Trade frequency  -.284
** 
Trade size  -.525
** 
Company size  .403
** 
Share price  .438
** 




No. of analysts following   .447
** 
     
  
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level,  and                                  
 
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level 
   
 
 
Correlations between the effective relative bid ask spread and disclosure 
score variables and control variables 
 
Table 8-13 presents the Pearson correlations coefficients among the dependent variable, 
independent variables, and control variables. Panel A shows the correlations of primary 
interest in this study, the relations between the market liquidity and the disclosure 
variables. The associations are consistent across almost all disclosure categories. Seven 
of the eight correlation coefficients of disclosure categories are significant at 0.05 level 
or better. The public disclosure score has the strongest relationship with the reciprocal 
effective relative bid ask spread (r=0.445). The private disclosure score and overall  
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disclosure score are also indicate highly correlated with the dependent variable (r=0.382, 
and 0.325 respectively).  This implies that the more the company discloses information, 
the smaller the different between bid and ask prices. Based on these results, the 
correlation coefficients provide preliminary evidence in support the research hypothesis. 
 
Table 8-13, Panel B shows the correlation coefficients between the dependent variable 
and the control variables. The reciprocal effective relative bid ask spread is most closely 
associated with trade size (r=-0.525). As expected, of the size of the analysts following, 
company size, and audit firm size are positively, and significantly, correlated with the 
dependent variable (r= 0.447, 0.403, and 0.210 respectively). Somewhat surprisingly, 
there are significant negative correlated between trade size, trade frequency and the 
dependent variable (r=-0.525, and -0.284 respectively). Moreover, the correlation 
between the dependent variable and share price, return volatility also reveal inversely 
predicted sign (r=0.438, and 0.230 respectively). However, the unexpected sign for these 
correlations may be due to the high correlations, multicollinearity problem, among the 




The hypotheses were tested using multivariate regression analysis. The results for each 
of the hypotheses are presented in this section. 
 
Hypothesis 1: Market liquidity and information disclosures 
 
The first hypothesis concerns the impact of the level of information disclosure on the 
liquidity of shares traded on the Stock Exchange of Thailand. This hypothesis was 









H1a:  Market liquidity is positively related to the overall disclosure score. 
 
H1b: Market liquidity is positively related to the disclosure score from 
annual report. 
 
H1c: Market liquidity is positively related to the analyst rating score for 
the public disclosure channel. 
 
H1d: Market liquidity is positively related to the analyst rating score for 
the private disclosure channel. 
 
The above hypotheses are tested using the following model. 
 
                PRVOL PR SIZE TSZ TF DS SPREAD 6 5 4 3 2 1 0   Eq. (1) 
 
where SPREAD is the reciprocal of the effective relative bid-ask spread, DS is variously 
the overall disclosure score, the annual report score, public disclosure score, or private 
disclosure score,  TF is the average number of transaction trades per day, TSZ is the 
daily average trade volume, SIZE is the market value of common equity, PR is the daily 
averages of bid and ask prices,  and PRVOL is the standard deviation of daily share 
price.  
 
The relation between the level of disclosure and the market liquidity, as measured by the 
effective relative bid ask spread, and the level of disclosure score is predicted to be 
negative. This is consistent with prior research (Lang & Lundholm, 1993, 1996; Welker, 
1995; Heflin, Shaw & Wild, 2001). In the same way, the average number of transaction 
trades per day, and share price are also expected to be negative in their effect on the 
effective relative bid-ask spread. While, the daily average trade size, and the standard 
deviation of daily share price are expected to have a positive effect in the effective 
relative bid-ask spread. As the effective relative bid ask spread was transformed into the 
reciprocal form, the predicted signs for all independent variables were estimated to be 
the reverse from that described above. Most important, coefficient for the level of 
disclosure score is predicted to be positive in the reciprocal effective relative bid-ask 
spread regression.  
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Table 8-14 presents the results of estimating equation (1), Models (1), (2), (3), and (4), 
for the first hypothesis where the reciprocal of effective relative bid ask spread is the 
dependent variable and the independent variable is the overall disclosure score, the 
annual report score, public disclosure score, or private disclosure score respectively.   
 
The regression results of models (1) - (4) show a good fit for the model. The adjusted R 
squared (Adj R
2) range from 31.40 to 36.99 percent, which suggest that the effective 
relative bid ask spread variation is explained by the disclosure scores and control 
variables. Four out of five coefficients of the control variables are significant with p-
values less than 0.1. The coefficients for trade frequency and share price are positive 
and significant. Also, consistent with expectations, return volatility has a negative 
coefficient which is significant. The trade size coefficient is negative and significant, 
while company size coefficient is positive but not significant.  
 
The coefficients for the disclosure scores, which are, as expected, positive, in models 
(1), and (2), (0.265 and 0.212) with a t-statistics of 3.05 and 2.49, and significant at the 5 
percent level. This findings support the hypothesis H1a, and, H1b that the market liquidity 
is positively related to the overall disclosure score, in particular the disclosure score 
from the annual report. Similar to the results from the disclosure index instruments, the 
results from models (3), and (4) show that the coefficients of the level of public 
disclosure channel and the private disclosure channel are, as expected, positive (0.402 
and 0.316 respectively) with a t-statistics of 3.87 and 3.15, and significant at the 1 
percent level. This finding also indicates the evidence to support hypotheses H1c and 
H1d, i.e. that the market liquidity is positively related to both the public disclosure 










 Table 8-14: Regression of the reciprocal effective relative bid-ask spread on 
disclosure score and control variables 
 
                PRVOL PR SIZE TSZ TF DS SPREAD 6 5 4 3 2 1 0   Eq. (1) 
                 
Variable  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4 
   (Overall)  (Annual)  (Public)  (Private) 
                 
          
 Disclosure  score  .265  .212  .402  .316 
   3.05**  2.49**  3.87***  3.15*** 
          
 Trade  frequency  .320  .322  .386  .376 
   2.63**  2.60**  3.23***  3.07*** 
          
 Trade  size  -.176  -.200  -.074  -.114 
   -1.85*  -2.09**  -.76  -1.16 
          
 Company  size  .066  .113  .042  .687 
   .52  .88  .34  .54 
          
 Share  price  1.104  1.096  .780  .919 
   2.90***  2.83***  2.03**  2.37** 
          
 Return  volatility  -.959  -.961  -.707  -.822 
   -2.56**  -2.52**  -1.89*  -2.17** 
          
 N  100  100  100  100 
 Adjusted  R
2 0.3352  0.314  0.3699  0.3389 
  F  18.21*** 8.56*** 22.50*** 9.46*** 
 Breusch-Pacan  0.51 0.34  3.04* 2.74* 
 Jarque-Bera    5.099  4.760  10.15
† 7.867 
          
                 
          
 
  *, ** and ***  indicate significance at p < .1,  p < .05, and p < .01 respectively  
† indicate JB value higher than 9.21 and reject the null hypothesis of normality at 1  % 
   
Notes:  1. Coefficient is shown in the upper line (bold line), and the lower line (italic line) shows White’s (1980) 
adjusted t-statistics. 
2. Jarque-Bera statistic, the critical value for the null hypothesis of normality distribution is 5.99 at the 5 




SPREAD is the reciprocal of the effective relative bid-ask spread, DS is variously the disclosure score; overall, 
annual, public, and private disclosure score, TF is the average number of transaction trades per day, TSZ is the 
daily average trade volume, SIZE is the market value of common equity, PR is the daily averages of bid and ask 




Hypothesis 2: Market liquidity and categories of information disclosures 
 
The second hypothesis relates to the affect of the level of information disclosure on the 
liquidity of shares traded on the Stock Exchange of Thailand. This hypothesis relates to 
the different section of the annual report and thus is divided into five sub-hypotheses as 
following, 
 
H2a: The relationship between market liquidity and the disclosure score 
varies among the detailed sub-categories of the self-constructed disclosure 
index. 
 
H2b: Market liquidity is positively related to the disclosure score from 
strategy information section of the annual report. 
 
H2c: Market liquidity is positively related to the disclosure score from non 
financial information section of the annual report. 
 
H2d: Market liquidity is positively related to the disclosure score from 
financial information section of the annual report. 
 
H2e: Market liquidity is positively related to the disclosure score from 
channels of information and investor relations section. 
 
The above hypotheses H2a, H2b, H2c, H2d, and H2e are examined by regressing the 
previous equation (Eq.1), where DS is either disclosure score from all the information 
sections, from the strategy information section, the non financial information section, the 
financial information section, or the channels of information and investor relations 
section respectively. The sign predicted for each independent variable and control 
variable are as stated above. 
 
Table 8-15 presents the results from multivariate regression analysis for the second 
hypothesis where the reciprocal of the effective relative bid ask spread is the dependent 
variable and the independent variable is variously the disclosure score from all the  
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information sections, the disclosure score from the strategy information section, the 
disclosure score from the non-financial information section, the disclosure score from 
the financial information section, or the disclosure score from the channels of 
information and investor relations section respectively.  
 
Similar to models (1) – (4), models (5) – (9) show a good fit for the model. The adjusted 
R squares (Adj R
2) range from 27.55 to 31.36 percent and four of the five coefficients of 
the control variables are significant with p-values less than 0.1 and are consistent with 
the results in Table 8-14. The result from model (5) reports that two of the four 
coefficients on the independent variables, the strategy and the financial sections, are 
statistical significance at 10 percent level or better with, as predicted a positive sign. The 
other two coefficient on the independent variables, the non financial and channels of 
information and the investor relations sections, are positive but not significant at the 10 
percent level. This finding supports the hypothesis H2a that the relation between the 
market liquidity and the disclosure score among the detailed categories for each 
information section varies.  
 
Consistent with the results from model (5), the coefficients on the level of disclosure 
score from the strategy information section and from the financial information section, 
from models (6) and (8), are 0.231 and 0.193. The coefficients for the disclosure scores 
from these two sections, which are, as predicted and positive, with t-statistics of 2.69 
and 2.18, and significant at less than the 5 percent level. Based on these findings, 
hypothesis H2b and H2d, i.e. that the market liquidity is positively related to the level of 
disclosure scores from the strategy information section and from the financial 
information section, can be accepted. However, the results for models (7) and (9) 
indicate that the coefficients for the disclosure scores, although positive, are not 
significant. These findings do not support the hypothesis H2c and H2e, that there is a 
relationship between the reciprocal of effective relative bid ask spread and the disclosure 
scores from non financial information section and from channels of information and 





Table 8-15: Regression of the reciprocal effective relative bid-ask spread on 
categories of information disclosure score and control variables  
 
                PRVOL PR SIZE TSZ TF DS SPREAD 6 5 4 3 2 1 0    Eq. (1) 
                    
Variable  Model 5  Model 6  Model 7  Model 8  Model 9 
   (All  Part)  (Str)  (Non)  (Fin)  (Other) 
         
 Strategic    .171  .231       
   1.69**  2.69***       
         
  Non-financial  .062  .082    
    .069  .095    
         
  Financial .121      .193   
    1.25*     2.18**   
         
  Other  channels  .001      .100 
    .01      1.11 
         
  Trade  frequency  .311 .311 .321 .327 .323 
    2.51** 2.53** 2.57** 2.57** 2.55** 
         
  Trade  size  -.173 -.198 -.191 -.212 -.181 
    -1.74**  -2.08** -1.98* -2.16** -1.79* 
         
  Company  size  .050 .74 .088  .149  .112 
    .38 .57 .68  1.12  .85 
         
 Share  price  1.075  1.08  1.114  1.177  1.207 
    2.76**  2.82*** 2.86*** 2.97*** 3.05*** 
         
  Return  volatility  -.927 -.927 -.973 -1.02  -1.044 
    -2.42** -2.44** -2.53**  -2.62***  -2.68*** 
         
  N  100 100 100 100 100 
  Adjusted R
2 0.3136  0.321  0.3042  0.2755  0.278 
  F  6.03*** 8.81*** 8.21*** 7.28*** 7.35*** 
  Breusch-Pacan 0.96  1.31 0.26 0.58 0.65 
  Jarque-Bera    2.47 4.649 4.15 2.588  3.109 
         
 
  *, ** and ***  indicate significance at p < .1,  p < .05, and p < .01 respectively  
† indicate JB value higher than 9.21 and reject the null hypothesis of normality at 1  % 
   
Notes:  1. Coefficient is shown in the upper line (bold line), and the lower line (italic line) shows White’s (1980) 
adjusted t-statistics. 
2. Jarque-Bera statistic, the critical value for the null hypothesis of normality distribution is 5.99 at the 5 
percent significance level, and 9.21 at the 1 percent significant level. 
 
 
SPREAD is the reciprocal of the effective relative bid-ask spread, DS is variously the disclosure score; 
strategic, non-financial, financial, and other disclosure score, TF is the average number of transaction trades 
per day, TSZ is the daily average trade volume, SIZE is the market value of common equity, PR is the daily 




Hypothesis 3: Market liquidity and channels of information disclosure 
 
The third hypothesis concerns the impact of the analysts rating score on the liquidity of 
shares traded on the Stock Exchange of Thailand. This hypothesis is divided into two 
sub-hypotheses as follows: 
 
H3a: The relationship between market liquidity and the analyst rating score 
varies between the channels of disclosure. 
 
H3b: The private disclosure channel is more likely to have greater effect on 
market liquidity than the public disclosure channel. 
 
The above hypothesis H3a is examined by regressing equation (1) where DS is either 
public disclosure, or private disclosure respectively. The hypothesis H3b is added two 
more variables (public disclosure and private disclosure) to equation (1) instead of DS, 
while the dependent variable and control variables are the same as the previous equation. 
The second regression equation is as follows:  
 
                  PRVOL PR SIZE TSZ TF DPRI DPUB SPREAD 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0              Eq. (2) 
 
where dependent variable and control variables are as previously defined. DPUB is 
disclosure score of the listed company via the public channel as evaluated by the 
financial intermediaries who are following that company, and DPRI is disclosure 
score of the listed company via the private channel.  
 
Table 8-16 presents the results from multivariate regression analysis for the third 
hypothesis when the independent variable is either public disclosure score, or private 
disclosure score respectively.  Model (10) presents the results of estimating equation (2) 
when both the public disclosure score and private disclosure score are included in the 
same model. The adjusted R
2 for the regression is 38.25 percent. Two of the five 
coefficients on control variables are significant with p-values less than 0.1. The 
coefficients on trade frequency and share price are positive, and significant. The trade 
size and return volatility have negatively coefficient, while the company size has 
positively coefficient but insignificant.   
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Table 8-16: Regression of the reciprocal effective relative bid-ask spread on 
public, private disclosure score and control variables 
 
                  PRVOL PR SIZE TSZ TF DPRI DPUB SPREAD 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0      Eq. (2) 
        
Variable Model  10 
    (Public & Private) 
        
    
 Public  dis.  score  .988 
   2.75*** 
    
  Private dis. score  -.578 
   -1.70* 
    
 Trade  frequency  .381 
   3.22*** 
    
 Trade  size  -.051 
   -.52 
    
 Company  size  .027 
   .22 
    
 Share  price  .678 
   1.76* 
    
 Return  volatility  -.616 
   -1.65 
    
  N 100 
  Adjusted R
2 0.3825 
  F 22.27*** 
  Breusch-Pacan 2.02 
  Jarque-Bera   12.372
† 
        
    
 
  *, ** and ***  indicate significance at p < .1,  p < .05, and p < .01 respectively  
† indicate JB value higher than 9.21 and reject the null hypothesis of normality at 1  % 
 
 
Notes:  1. Coefficient is shown in the upper line (bold line), and the lower line (italic 
line) shows White’s (1980) adjusted t-statistics. 
2. Jarque-Bera statistic, the critical value for the null hypothesis of normality 




SPREAD is the reciprocal of the effective relative bid-ask spread, PUB is public 
disclosure score, PRI is private disclosure score, TF is the average number of transaction 
trades per day, TSZ is the daily average trade volume, SIZE is the market value of 
common equity, PR is the daily averages of bid and ask prices, and PRVOL is the 





The result from model (10) shows that both of the coefficients on public disclosure score 
and private disclosure score are statistically significance at the 10 percent level and 
better. The coefficient on each independent variable in this model and its level of 
significant can be interpreted as follows. First there is the coefficient for the public 
disclosure score. Here the coefficient is positive (0.988) with a t-statistic of 2.75 and 
significant with a p-value of less than 0.01, which is as expected. This result implies that 
when a company discloses more information via the public disclosure channels, the 
market liquidity of that company’s shares increases. Second there is the coefficient for 
the private disclosure score. This coefficient is negative (-0.578) with a t-statistic of 1.70 
and significant with a p-value of less than 0.1. This implies that the more the company 
discloses information via the private disclosure channels, the wider bid and ask spread of 
that company shares and hence the lower the market liquidity.  
 
As can be seen from Table 8-12, there is a multicollinearity problem between 
independent variables; public disclosure score and private disclosure score. Even though 
the assumptions of multiple regression analysis indicate that independent variables 
should not be highly inter-correlated (the assumption of the absence of 
multicollinearity), the intention of the third hypothesis of this study is to compare the 
effect of public disclosure and private disclosure channels on the stock market liquidity. 
In order to achieve the third hypothesis, therefore, both public disclosure and private 
disclosure channels were included in the same model. Nevertheless, it should be noted 
that an unexpected sign may be caused from this high correlation between these 
independent variables. However, when one of the independent variables is excluded 
from the model (as show in Table 8-14, models (3) and (4)), the coefficient for both the 
public and private disclosure score are as expected, and significant with p-values less 
than 0.01. 
 
Overall, the findings from models (3), (4), and (10) support the alternative hypothesis 
H3a that the relationship between the market liquidity and the analysts rating of 
disclosure varies between the channels of disclosure. However, hypothesis H3b cannot 
be accepted as the coefficient on the public disclosure (coefficient = 0.988) is higher 
than the coefficient on the private disclosure (coefficient = -0.578) which means that in 
model (10) the public disclosure has more effect on the dependent variable than private  
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disclosure. In other words, for these data, public disclosure channel is more likely to 
have higher effect on market liquidity than private disclosure channel.  
 
Hypothesis 4: The size of audit firm and information disclosures 
 
The fourth hypothesis concerns the association between the level of company disclosure 
and the size of the audit firm. 
 
H4: The level of companies’ disclosure is positively related to the size of the 
audit firm. 
 
The above hypothesis H4 is examined by estimating a regression model where the 
disclosure score is the dependent variable, a proxy for the size of audit firm is 
independent variable, and the logarithms of the average number of transaction trades per 
day, the daily average trade volume, the market value of common equity the daily 
averages of bid and ask prices, and the standard deviation of daily share price are control 
variables. Thus, the third regression equation is as follows:  
 
                PRVOL PR SIZE TSZ TF AUD DS 6 5 4 3 2 1 0      Eq. (3) 
 
where  DS is various by the overall disclosure score, the annual report score, the 
disclosure score from strategy information section, the disclosure score from non 
financial information section, the disclosure score from financial information section, 
the disclosure score from channels of information and investor relations section, public 
disclosure score, or private disclosure score respectively. All control variables are as 
defined previously, and AUD denotes the auditor firm size.  
 
The relationship between the level and the size of audit firm is predicted to be positive. 
This is consistent with the previous research (Singhvi & Desai, 1971; Welker, 1995; 
Wallace, Naser & Mora, 1994; Wallace & Naser, 1995). The expected sign predicted for 




Table 8-17 presents the results from multivariate regression analysis for the fourth 
hypothesis when the dependent variable is the disclosure score, and independent variable 
is the audit firm size. In models (11), (12), (13), (15), (17), and (18),  the independent 
variable is audit firm size and the dependent variable is variously the disclosure score 
from the overall, the annual report, the disclosure score from strategy information 
section, the disclosure score from financial information section, the public disclosure 
score, or the private disclosure score respectively.  
 
The adjusted R
2 for each regression model are low except the public disclosure score and 
the private disclosure score models. The adjusted R
2 for the public disclosure score is 
42.90 percent and for the private disclosure score is 38.30 percent. These suggest that 
42.90 percent (38.30 percent) of the public disclosure score (the private disclosure score) 
is explained by the audit firm size and control variables. Consistent with expectations, 
the audit firm size from models (11), (12), (13), (15), (17), and (18), indicate positively 
coefficient and statistically significant with p-values less that 0.1 on the level of 
disclosure regressions model. Model (11), where the overall disclosure score is 
dependent variable, shows that the coefficient on the audit firm size is 0.188 with a t-
statistic of 1.84. Model (12), the disclosure score from the annual report, reports that the 
coefficient on the audit firm size is 0.243 with a t-statistic of 2.32. The coefficient on the 
audit firm size for model (13) is 0.250 and model (15) is 0.182 with a t-statistic of 2.44 
and 1.70 respectively. The results from the public disclosure score model (model 17) 
and the private disclosure score model (model 18) show that the coefficient on the audit 
firm size is 0.245 and 0.302 (with a t-statistic of 3.04 and 3.6 respectively).  
 
Models (14), and (16) present the results of estimating equation (3) where the 
independent variable is the audit firm size and the dependent variable is variously the 
disclosure score from non financial information section, and the disclosure score from 
channels of information and investor relations section respectively. The adjusted R
2 for 
each regression model are very low. The results from models (11) and (14) indicate the 
positive, but not significant, relationship between the level of disclosure and the audit 
firm size. The coefficient on the audit firm size for model (14) is 0.151, and model (16) 




Overall, the results are as expected. On the basis of these findings from models (14) and 
(16), which show there is no evidence support the hypothesis that audit firm size has an 
effect on the disclosure score from non financial information section and the disclosure 
score from the channels of information and investor relations section. However, the 
results from models (11), (12), (13), (15), (17) and (18) indicate significant relationship 
between the audit firm size and the level of the overall disclosure score,  the disclosure 
score from annual report, the disclosure score from strategy information section, the 
disclosure score from financial information section, the public disclosure score, and the 
private disclosure score. These results suggest that the audit firm size has an effect on 
the level of the company’s disclosure. In particular, audit firm size is related to 
information disclosure in the annual report, strategy section, financial section, public 
and private channels. This implies that companies audited by one of the large audit 
firms have greater voluntary disclosure in certain areas than companies audited by 
smaller audit firms.   
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Table 8-17: Regression of disclosure score on audit firm size and control variables 
 
                PRVOL PR SIZE TSZ TF AUD DS 6 5 4 3 2 1 0                                            Eq. (3) 
                             
Variable  Model 11  Model 12  Model 13  Model 14  Model 15  Model 16  Model 17  Model 18 
   (Overall)  (Annual)  (Str)  (Non)  (Fin)  (Other)  (Public)  (Private) 
                             
            
  Trade  frequency  -.014 -.011 -.055 -.022 .031 -.010 .154 .165 
    -.10 -.08 -.39 -.16 .21 -.07 1.37 1.41 
            
  Trade  size  -.177 -.034 -.041 -.086 .043 -.274 -.329 -.292 
   -1.59  -.31 -.37  -.78 .38  -2.44**  -3.77***  -3.22*** 
            
  Company  size  .217 .150 .314 .260 -.179 .183 .287 .279 
   1.43 .98  2.07**  1.71*  -1.13  1.19  2.41**  2.25** 
            
  Share  price  .021 .133 .128 .202 -.023  -.149 .704 .467 
   .05 .28 .28 .43 -.05  -.32  1.92*  1.22 
            
 Return  volatility  .050  -.040 -.149 -.115 .121  .149 -.514 -.301 
   .11  -.09 -.33 -.25 .25  .32 -1.43  .081 
            
  Auditor  .188 .243 .250 .151 .182 .001 .245 .302 
    1.84*  2.32**  2.44** 1.47  1.7*  .01 3.04***  3.60*** 





Table 8.17: continued 
                             
Variable  Model 11  Model 12  Model 13  Model 14  Model 15  Model 16  Model 17  Model 18 
   (Overall)  (Annual)  (Str)  (Non)  (Fin)  (Other)  (Public)  (Private) 
                             
            
  N  100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
  Adjusted R
2  0.054 0.043 0.076 0.072 0.011 0.056 0.429 0.383 
  F  2.40** 1.73 2.36**  2.29** 0.81 1.98**  13.41***  11.25*** 
  Breusch-Pacan 0.75  0.01 3.16 0.07 0.48 2.81* 2.05 3.32* 
  Jarque-Bera    1.908 6.444 1.122 .1531 5.749 26.84
† 3.633 1.618 
                             
            
 
  *, ** and ***  indicate significance at p < .1,  p < .05, and p < .01 respectively  
† indicate JB value higher than 9.21 and reject the null hypothesis of normality at 1  % 
       
 
Notes:  1. Coefficient is shown in the upper line (bold line), and the lower line (italic line) shows White’s (1980) adjusted t-statistics. 




DS is variously the disclosure score; overall, annual, public, private, strategic, non-financial, financial, and other disclosure score, AUD is auditor, TF is the average number of 
transaction trades per day, TSZ is the daily average trade volume, SIZE is the market value of common equity, PR is the daily averages of bid and ask prices, and PRVOL is the 










Hypothesis 5: Market liquidity and audit firm size 
 
The fifth hypothesis relates to the effect of audit firm size on the liquidity of shares 
traded on the Stock Exchange of Thailand. This hypothesis is divided into two sub-
hypotheses as follows: 
 
H5a: Companies audited by Big Four audit firms are more likely to have 
higher market liquidity than companies audited by other audit firms. 
 
H5b: Market liquidity is positively related to audit firm size. 
 
Table 8-18 and 8-19 show the results of the Mann-Whitney test which is employed 
to measure the difference between companies audited by Big Four audit firms and 
by Non-Big Four audit firms in order to test hypothesis H5a. Another hypothesis 
H5b is examined by Multivariate regression analysis, which will discuss later. 
 
Table 8-18: The mean rank of the effective relative bid ask spread between Big 
Four and Non-Big Four 
 
Ranks 
  auditor  N  Mean Rank  Sum of Ranks 
Non-Big Four  21  60.19  1264.00 
Big Four  79  47.92  3786.00 
Effective spread 
Total  100     
 
Table 8-18 shows the mean rank of the effective relative bid ask spread obtained for the 
listed companies that audited by Big Four audit firms and Non-Big Four audit firms. The 
mean rank of the effective relative bid ask spread obtained for the listed companies that 
audited by Big Four audit firms (mean rank = 47.92) is considerably less than that of the 
effective relative bid ask spread obtained for the listed companies that audited by Non-
Big Four audit firms (mean rank = 60.19). These results could imply that listed 
companies audited by Big Four audit firms have smaller effective relative bid ask spread 
than listed companies audited by Non-Big Four audit firms. This means that listed 
companies that audited by Big Four audit firms are more likely to have higher market  
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liquidity than the listed companies audited by other audit firms. However, the hypothesis 
cannot be accepted on the basis of only the mean rank score. 
 
The Mann-Whitney test was employed in order to examine whether there is a different 
of effective relative bid ask spread between these two groups is significant. The whole 
sample was divided into two groups, depending on whether the listed company was 
audited by one of the Big Four audit firms or was audited by another audit firms. The 
result of the Mann-Whitney test is as follows. 
 







Mann-Whitney U  626.000 
Wilcoxon W  3786.000 
Z  -1.722 
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed)  .085 
Exact Sig. (2-tailed)  .086 
Exact Sig. (1-tailed)  .043 
Point Probability  .001 
a. Grouping Variable: auditor 
 
As shown by the results from Mann-Whitney test, Table 8-19, there is no statistically 
significant difference in the effective relative bid ask spread between the listed 
companies that audited by Big Four audit firms and the listed companies that audited by 







Hypothesis H5b is examined by adding one more variable (Audit firm size) to equation 
(1), while the dependent variable and control variables are the same as the previous 
equation. The fourth regression equation is as follows:  
 
                  PRVOL PR SIZE TSZ TF AUD DS SPEARD 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0  
Eq. (4) 
 
where dependent variable, independent variables, and control variables are as previously 
defined. 
 
Table 8-20 presents the results from multivariate regression analysis for H5b hypothesis. 
Models (19) – (27) present the results of estimating equation (4) where the reciprocal of 
effective relative bid ask spread is the dependent variable and the independent variables 
are audit firm size, and either the overall disclosure score, the annual report score, the 
disclosure score from strategy information section, the disclosure score from non 
financial information section, the disclosure score form financial information section, 
the disclosure score from channels of information and investor relations section, public 
disclosure score, or private disclosure score respectively.  
 
The regression results reveal good fit for the model. The adjusted R squared (Adj R
2) 
ranges from 27.70 percent to 36.30 percent. Five of the seven coefficients are significant 
with p-values less than 0.1. The coefficients on trade frequency and share price are 
positive and significant. Also consistent with expectations, return volatility has a 
significant negative coefficient. The trade size coefficient is negative and significant, 
while the Company size coefficient is positive but not significant. The coefficient on the 
level of disclosure score from models (20), (21), (22), (23), (24), (25) and (26) are 
statistically significant and behave as expected (with a t-statistic of 2.41, 2.25, 3.62, 
2.86, 2.44, 2.01 and 0.77 respectively), which is positively related to the reciprocal of 
effective relative bid ask spread and significant at less than the 10 percent level. While 
only the coefficient on the level of disclosure score from model (27) that is not 
significant at the 10 percent level. The coefficient on the audit firm size from all models 
(models (19) – (27)) are not significant at the 10 percent level, however this variable has 






Table 8-20: Regression of the reciprocal effective relative bid-ask spread on disclosure score, audit firm size and control variables 
 
                     PRVOL PR SIZE TSZ TF AUD DS SPREAD 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0                                   Eq. (4) 
                                
Variable  Model 19  Model 20  Model 21  Model 22  Model 23  Model 24  Model 25  Model 26  Model 27 
  
(Without 
disc)  (Overall) (Annual)  (Public)  (Private) (Str)  (Non)  (Fin)  (Other) 
                                
              
  Disclosure score    .215  .197  .396 .308 .217 .181 .067  .1003 
     2.41**  2.25** 3.62***  2.86*** 2.44**  2.01**  .77*  1.11 
              
  Trade  frequency .324 .321 .322 .385 .375 .312 .320 .327 .323 
   2.56**  2.6**  2.60**  3.20***  3.04***  2.53** 2.57** 2.57** .256** 
             
  Trade  size  -.207 -.169 -.200 -.076 -.117 -.198 -.191 -.210 -.179 
   -2.11**  -1.74*  -2.08**  -.77  -1.17  -2.07** -1.98* -2.14** -1.78* 
             
  Company size  .161 .115 1.32  .48  .075 .093 .114 .173 .143 
    1.21 .87 1.00 .37  .57 .07 .86  1.28  1.06 
             
 Share  price  1.044  1.04  1.01  .765 900 1.01  1.008  1.04  1.059 
    2.53** 2.59** 2.52**  1.94*  2.25** 2.53** 2.48** 2.53** 2.57** 
             
 Return  volatility  -.897  -.908  -.889 -.693 -.804 -.865 -.876 -.906 -.912 
   -2.22** -2.31** -2.25**  -1.81*  -2.06** 2.20** -2.21** -2.24** -2.26** 
             
  Auditor  .113 .072 .065  .0158 .0197  .058  .85  .102  .113 
   1.25  .81 .71 .18 .21 .64 .95  1.11  1.25 
                                









Table 8.20 : continued 
                                
Variable  Model 19  Model 20  Model 21  Model 22  Model 23  Model 24  Model 25  Model 26  Model 27 
  
(Without 
disc)  (Overall) (Annual)  (Public)  (Private) (Str)  (Non)  (Fin)  (Other) 
                                
              
  N  100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
  Adjusted R
2  0.280 0.345 0.311 0.363 0.332 0.316 0.281 0.277 0.282 
  F  7.43*** 7.53*** 7.37*** 9.07*** 8.03*** 7.56*** 7.43*** 6.43*** 6.56*** 
  Breusch-Pacan  1.39 0.91 0.61  3.09*  2.74* 2.96*  1.39  1.3  1.85 
  Jarque-Bera   4.550 1.485 1.967 9.789
† 7.582 2.996 4.371 3.854 4.145 
                                
              
 
  *, ** and ***  indicate significance at p < .1,  p < .05, and p < .01 respectively  
† indicate JB value higher than 9.21 and reject the null hypothesis of normality at 1  % 
         
 
Notes:  1. Coefficient is shown in the upper line (bold line), and the lower line (italic line) shows White’s (1980) adjusted t-statistics. 
2. Jarque-Bera statistic, the critical value for the null hypothesis of normality distribution is 5.99 at the 5 percent significance level, and 9.21 at the 1 percent significant level. 
 
 
SPREAD is the reciprocal of the effective relative bid-ask spread, DS is variously the disclosure score; overall, annual, public, private, strategic, non-financial, financial, and other 
disclosure score, AUD is auditor, TF is the average number of transaction trades per day, TSZ is the daily average trade volume, SIZE is the market value of common equity, PR is the 









Hypothesis 6: Analysts following and information disclosure 
 
The sixth hypothesis relates to the association between the size of the analyst following 
and the level of companies’ disclosures. 
 
H6:  There is a positive relationship between financial analyst following and 
the level of disclosure. 
 
The above hypothesis H6 is examined by estimating a regression model where the 
number of analysts following the company is the dependent variable, and the disclosure 
score is independent variable. Measures of the average number of transaction trades per 
day, the daily average trade volume, the market value of common equity, the daily 
averages of bid and ask prices, the standard deviation of daily share price are the control 
variables. Thus, the fifth regression equation is as follows:  
  
                PRVOL PR SIZE TSZ TF DS ANA 6 5 4 3 2 1 0     Eq. (5) 
 
where ANA denotes the number of the analysts following. DS is variously the overall 
disclosure score, the annual report score, the disclosure score from strategy information 
section, the disclosure score from non financial information section, the disclosure score 
form financial information section, the disclosure score from channels of information 
and investor relations section, public disclosure score, or private disclosure score 
respectively. All control variables are as previously defined. 
 
Table 8-21 presents the results from multivariate regression analysis for the sixth 
hypothesis. Based on the prior research (Lang & Lundholm, 1993, 1996), the coefficient 
for the level of disclosure is predicted to be positive. The sign predicted for each control 
variable is as discussed previously. Models (28), (29), (30), (31), (33), (34), and (35) are 
estimating equation (5) where the dependent variable is the number of the analysts 
following and the independent variable is variously the overall disclosure score, 
disclosure score from annual report, the disclosure score from strategy information 
section, non-financial section, channels of information and investor relations section, 
public disclosure score, or private disclosure score respectively.   
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The regression results reveal good fit for all models. The adjusted R
2 for each regression 
model, range from 27.23 percent to 72.58 percent.  Model (34), using the public 
disclosure score, has the highest adjusted R
2 which is 72.58 percent, while the private 
disclosure score model (model 35) shows an adjusted R
2 at 67.96 percent.  The 
coefficients for the disclosure scores in models (28), (29), (30), (31), (33), (34), and (35) 
are, as expected positive, (0.236, 0.157, 0.238, 0.216, 0.198, 0.873 and 0.784 
respectively). The coefficient in model (29) is significant at the 10 percent level, in 
models (31) and (33) it is significant at the level of 5 percent level, and in models (28), 
(30), (34), and (35)  at the 1 percent level. 
  
Model (32) present the results of estimating equation (5) where the dependent variable 
is the number of the analysts following and the independent variable is the disclosure 
score from non financial information section. The adjusted R
2 for this model is 24.96 
percent. The results indicate negative but not significant, relationship between the 
number of the analysts following the company and the level of disclosure. The 
coefficient on the disclosure score is -0.048, with a t-statistic of -0.55.  
 
Based on this findings, model (32) suggest that hypothesis H6 cannot be accepted. 
However, with respect to hypothesis H6, the results from models (28), (29), (30), (31), 
(33), (34), and (35) indicate a positive and significant relationship between the number 
of the analysts following a company and the level of the company’s disclosure. These 
results suggest that the more the listed companies disclose voluntary information, in 
particular for the overall disclosure, the annual report, strategy section, non-financial 
section, the channels of information and investor relations, the greater the analyst 
following. In addition, the views of financial intermediaries, as reflected the ratings of 





Table 8-21: Regression of the number of analysts following on disclosure score and control variables 
 
                PRVOL PR SIZE TSZ TF DS ANA 6 5 4 3 2 1 0  Eq.  (5) 
                             
Variable  Model 28  Model 29  Model 30  Model 31  Model 32  Model 33  Model 34  Model 35 
      (Overall)  (Annual)  (Str)  (Non)  (Fin)  (Other)  (Public)  (Private) 
            
  Disclosure  .236 .157 .238 .216 -.048  .198 .873 .784 
   2.67***  1.79*  2.74***  2.42**  -.55  2.20**  12.74***  11.20*** 
            
  Trade  frequency .331 .329 .340 .332 .329 .329 .192 .197 
    2.65*** 2.58** 2.73***  2.64*** 2.54** 2.61** 2.44** 2.32** 
            
  Trade  size  -.296 -.332 -.327 -.319 -.336 -.284 -.474 -.105 
    -3.02*** -3.37*** -3.39*** -3.27*** -3.35*** -2.81***  -.73  -1.54 
            
  Company  size  .077 .103 .058 .069 .106 .080  -.075  -.038 
    .59 .78 .44 .53 .78 .61  -.92  -.43 
            
  Share  price  .723 .715 .678 .700 .795 .816  -.108  .110 
    1.85* 1.79* 1.73* 1.78* 1.97*  2.07** -.43  .41 
            
  Return  volatility  -.644 -.633 -.578 -.620 -.686 -.713 .016 -.169 
    -1.68*  -1.61 -1.50 -1.60  -1.73*  -1.84* .07  -.64 
            









Table 8.21 : continued 
 
                             
Variable  Model 28  Model 29  Model 30  Model 31  Model 32  Model 33  Model 34  Model 35 
      (Overall)  (Annual)  (Str)  (Non)  (Fin)  (Other)  (Public)  (Private) 
            
  N  100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
  Adjusted R
2  .3414 .2723 .3033 .2917 .2496 .2844 .7258 .6796 
  F  9.55*** 7.18*** 8.18***  7.8***  6.49*** 7.56***  44.68***  35.99*** 
  Breusch-Pacan  0.03 0.63 0.84 0.09 1.10 2.38 0.40 1.65 
  Jarque-Bera    5.863 7.292 7.609 7.956 5.644 4.958 2.217 2.135 
             
            
 
  *, ** and ***  indicate significance at p < .1,  p < .05, and p < .01 respectively  
† indicate JB value higher than 9.21 and reject the null hypothesis of normality at 1  % 
       
 
Notes:  1. Coefficient is shown in the upper line (bold line), and the lower line (italic line) shows White’s (1980) adjusted t-statistics. 




ANA is the number of analysts following the company, DS is variously the disclosure score; overall, annual, strategic, non-financial, financial, other, public, and 
private disclosure score, TF is the average number of transaction trades per day, TSZ is the daily average trade volume, SIZE is the market value of common equity, PR 





8.4 Sensitivity analysis  
 
As discussed in the previous chapter, sensitivity analysis is useful when the researcher 
is attempting to determine which variables are the key drivers of the results. In this 
study, five additional tests are performed in order to establish the robustness of the 
results. The sensitivity analysis is divided into six cases as follow.  
 
  The first is to change the dependent variable.  
  The second is to change the disclosure score variables.  
  The third is to change the measure of analysts following.  
  The fourth is to exclude some variables where there is a problem of 
multicollinearity.  
  The fifth is to exclude the outliers.  
  The sixth is to exclude companies in the Financials Industry Group.  
 
The results for each case of the sensitivity analysis tests are shown below.  
 
Case I : Change the dependent variable 
 
For the first sensitivity test, the variable for market liquidity, the key variable of this 
study, was changed from the reciprocal effective bid-ask spread (model 1) into the 
quoted bid-ask spread (model 36) and relative bid-ask spread (model 37). Quoted bid-
ask spread is the difference between the bid and the ask price, while the Relative bid-
ask spread is defined as the ask price minus the bid price, divided by the midpoint 
(the average of the bid-ask prices).  
 
As can be seen from Table 8-22, the regression results reveal good fits for the 
effective relative bid-ask spread model (model 1) with an adjusted R
2 of 0.3352, while 
the quoted spread model (model 36) and the relative bid-ask spread model (model 37) 
did not reveal a good fit. The highest adjusted R
2 from the effective relative bid-ask 
spread model suggests that 33.52 percent of the effective relative bid-ask spread 






Table 8-22: Sensitivity analysis case I : Change the disclosure score variable 
 
                PRVOL PR SIZE TSZ TF DS SPREAD 6 5 4 3 2 1 0      Eq. (1) 
 
                 
Variable    Model 1  Model 36  Model 37 
     (Effective  relative) (Quoted)  (Relative) 
                 
          
 Disclosure  score    .265  -.014  -.150 
     3.05**  -1.67*  -1.84* 
          
 Trade  frequency    .320  -.022  -.110 
     2.63**  -1.84*  -.88 
          
 Trade  size    -.176  .006  .096 
     -1.85*  1.03  1.94* 
          
 Company  size    .066  -.091  .001 
     .52  -4.57***  0.02 
          
 Share  price    1.104  1.041  .220 
     2.90***  11.45***  .59 
          
 Return  volatility    -.959  .020  -.229 
     -2.56**  .26  -.64 
          
 N    100  100  100 
 Adjusted  R
2   0.3352  .0907  .0080 
 F    18.21***  16.2***  0.87 
 Breusch-Pacan    0.51  54.21*** 13.75*** 
 Jarque-Bera      5.099  192.433
† 210.628
† 
                 
          
 
  *, ** and ***  indicate significance at p < .1,  p < .05, and p < .01 respectively  
† indicate JB value higher than 9.21 and reject the null hypothesis of normality at 1  % 
   
Notes:  1. Coefficient is shown in the upper line (bold line), and the lower line (italic line) shows White’s (1980) 
adjusted t-statistics. 
2. Jarque-Bera statistic, the critical value for the null hypothesis of normality distribution is 5.99 at the 5 




SPREAD is variously the bid-ask spread; the reciprocal of the effective relative bid-ask spread, quoted 
spread, and relative bid-ask spread, DS is the overall disclosure score, TF is the average number of 
transaction trades per day, TSZ is the daily average trade volume, SIZE is the market value of common 





The results from Table 8-22 also show that most variables, both key variables and 
control variables, behave as predicted (the results from model 1 show different 
coefficient signs from model 36 and model 37, because it is the reciprocal model.). 
Furthermore, the coefficient and the level of significance for all of the variables from 
the quoted spread model (model 36) and the relative bid-ask spread model (model 37) 
are nearly the same as for the variables from the effective relative bid-ask spread 
model (model 1). These findings suggest that both the quoted spread and the relative 
bid-ask spread behave as predicted relative to the disclosure and control variables, 
which implies that these sensitivity analysis tests support the reported results from the 
effective relative bid-ask spread model (model 1). 
 
Case II : Change the disclosure score variables 
 
For the second sensitivity test, the variable for disclosure score, the key variable of 
this study, was changed from the overall disclosure score (model 1) into the raw 
disclosure score (model 38) and the rank overall disclosure score (model 39) 
respectively.  
 
Disc is the raw disclosure score which is calculated as the total disclosure index score 
divided by the total maximum score for that company (on a scale from 0.00 to 1.00 
with a larger number indicating more information disclosure). Overall is an equal 
weighted average of the four major categories of information types, the strategic 
information score, non-financial information score, financial information score, and 
the other channels of information (on a scale from 0.00 to 1.00 with a larger number 
indicating more information disclosure). Rank overall 
20 is the percentile of 
company’s disclosure rank score which zero is the lowest ranking disclosure score 






                                                 
20 the rank ordered computed by:    1 1   company of number rank   
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Table 8-23: Sensitivity analysis case II : Change the disclosure score variables 
 
                PRVOL PR SIZE TSZ TF DS SPREAD 6 5 4 3 2 1 0      Eq. (1) 
 
                 
Variable    Model 1  Model 38  Model 39 
     (Overall)  (Raw  score) (Rank  overall) 
                 
          
 Disclosure  score    .265  .184  .228 
     3.05**  2.07*  2.61** 
          
 Trade  frequency    .320  .271  .321 
     2.63**  2.13**  2.60** 
          
 Trade  size    -.176  -.206  -.167 
     -1.85*  -2.13**  -1.73* 
          
 Company  size    .066  .071  .093 
    .52  .53  .72 
          
 Share  price    1.104  1.142  1.131 
     2.90***  2.93***  2.94*** 
          
 Return  volatility    -.959  -.993  -.991 
     -2.56**  -2.58**  -2.61** 
          
 N    100  100  100 
 Adjusted  R
2   0.3352  .3006  0.3184 
 F    18.21***  8.09***  9.32*** 
 Breusch-Pacan   0.51  0.26  1.00 
 Jarque-Bera      5.099  5.93  5.994 
                 
          
 
   *, ** and ***  indicate significance at p < .1,  p < .05, and p < .01 respectively  
† indicate JB value higher than 9.21 and reject the null hypothesis of normality at 1  % 
   
Notes:  1. Coefficient is shown in the upper line (bold line), and the lower line (italic line) shows 
White’s (1980) adjusted t-statistics. 
2. Jarque-Bera statistic, the critical value for the null hypothesis of normality distribution is 5.99 




SPREAD is the reciprocal of the effective relative bid-ask spread, DS is variously the disclosure 
score; overall, raw disclosure score and rank disclosure score, TF is the average number of 
transaction trades per day, TSZ is the daily average trade volume, SIZE is the market value of 
common equity, PR is the daily averages of bid and ask prices, and PRVOL is the standard deviation 






As can be seen from Table 8-23, all models show the significant of the ANOVA test 
beyond the 0.001 level. The regression results reveal good fits for the models, the 
adjusted R
2 ranging from 30.06 to 33.52. The highest adjusted R
2 from the overall 
disclosure score model suggests that 33.52 percent of the effective relative bid ask 
spread variation is explained by the overall disclosure score and control variables.  
 
Moreover, the results from Table 8-23 show that all variables, both key variable and 
control variables, from the raw disclosure score model (model 38) and the rank 
disclosure score model (model 39)  behave in the same way as the key variable and 
the control variables from the overall disclosure score model (model 1). Furthermore, 
the coefficient and the level of significance for all of the variables from (model 38) 
and (model 39) are nearly the same as for the variables from the overall disclosure 
score model (model 1). These findings suggest that both the raw disclosure score and 
the rank overall disclosure score are positively related to the market liquidity, which 
implies that these sensitivity analysis tests support the reported results from the 
overall disclosure score model (model 1).   
 
Case III : Change the measure of analyst following 
 
For the third case of sensitivity test, the measure of analyst following was changed 
from the number of analyst following the listed company as shown on the Securities 
Analysts Association’s web site (Analysts web: model 28) to the number of analysts 
following the listed companies as derived from the questionnaire survey (Analysts 
Q’naire: model 40).  
 
The results from Table 8-24 indicate that the adjusted R
2 from Analysts Q’naire 
model (Adj R
2 30.07 percent) is lower than the adjusted R
2 from Analysts web model 
(Adj R
2 31.14 percent) which suggests that the Analysts web model provides a better 
fit.  However, the results for both models shown that all variables behave in the same 
way and the coefficients and the levels of significance for all of the variables are 
nearly the same. These findings suggest that the Analysts Q’naire is positively related 
to the overall disclosure score, which could be implies that this sensitivity analysis 
test support the reported results from the Analysts web (model 28).  
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Table 8-24: Sensitivity analysis case III : Change the measure of analyst 
following 
 
                PRVOL PR SIZE TSZ TF DS ANA 6 5 4 3 2 1 0       Eq. (5) 
                 
Variable    Model 28    Model 40 
     (Saa’s  web)    (Q’naire) 
               
          
 Disclosure  score    .236    .145 
    2.67***    1.69* 
          
 Trade  frequency    .331    .377 
    2.65***    3.11*** 
          
 Trade  size    -.296    -.236 
      -3.02***  -2.48** 
          
 Company  size    .077    .065 
     .59    .52 
          
 Share  price    .723    .839 
     1.85*    2.22** 
          
 Return  volatility    -.644    -.631 
     -1.68*    1.69* 
          
 N    100    100 
 Adjusted  R
2   .3414    .3007 
 F    9.55***    8.09*** 
 Breusch-Pacan    0.03    1.43 
 Jarque-Bera      5.86    1.39 
                 
          
 
   *, ** and ***  indicate significance at p < .1,  p < .05, and p < .01 respectively  
† indicate JB value higher than 9.21 and reject the null hypothesis of normality at 1  % 
 
          
Notes:  1. Coefficient is shown in the upper line (bold line), and the lower line (italic line) shows 
White’s (1980) adjusted t-statistics. 
2. Jarque-Bera statistic, the critical value for the null hypothesis of normality distribution is 




ANA is the number of analysts following the company, DS is the overall disclosure score, TF is the 
average number of transaction trades per day, TSZ is the daily average trade volume, SIZE is the 
market value of common equity, PR is the daily averages of bid and ask prices, and PRVOL is the 






Case IV : Exclude some variables where there is a problem of multicollinearity 
 
Exclude return volatility  
 
For the fourth sensitivity test, some control variables are excluded from the regression 
model. As discussed in the previous section, Table 8-12 shows a high correlation 
between share price and return volatility. This could lead to the problems of 
multicollinearity. In order to resolve this problem, the variable with the lower 
correlation coefficient with dependent variable is removed from the model. As show 
in Table 8-13, return volatility (r=0.230) has the lower correlation coefficient with the 
reciprocal of the effective relative bid ask spread than share price(r=0.438). Hence, 
return volatility is excluded from the model (Eq.1). The regression specification is as 
follows:   
 
              PR SIZE TSZ TF DS SPREAD 5 4 3 2 1 0           Eq. (6) 
 
As can be seen from Table 8-25, the regression results show a good fit for the model, 
with 27.62 percent of the variation in the effective relative bid ask spread being 
explained by the overall disclosure score and control variables. The overall disclosure 
score coefficient is positive and significant at the 0.01 level. This finding shows that 
the overall disclosure score is positively related to the market liquidity, providing 














Table 8-25: Sensitivity analysis case IV : Exclude return volatility 
 
 
              PR SIZE TSZ TF DS SPREAD 5 4 3 2 1 0           Eq. (6) 
 
        
Variable Model  41 
        
    
 Disclosure  score  .237 
   2.63*** 
    
 Trade  frequency  .427 
   3.57*** 
    
 Trade  size  -.151 
   -1.52 
    
 Company  size  .160 
   1.23 
    
 Share  price  .164 
   1.49 
    
  N 100 
  Adjusted R
2 .2762 
  F 8.56*** 
  Breusch-Pacan 0.4 
  Jarque-Bera   5.45 
        
    
 
   *, ** and ***  indicate significance at p < .1,  p < .05, and p < .01 respectively  
† indicate JB value higher than 9.21 and reject the null hypothesis of normality at 1  % 
 
 
Notes:  1. Coefficient is shown in the upper line (bold line), and the lower line (italic 
line) shows White’s (1980) adjusted t-statistics. 
2. Jarque-Bera statistic, the critical value for the null hypothesis of normality 




SPREAD is the reciprocal of the effective relative bid-ask spread, DS is the over all 
disclosure score, TF is the average number of transaction trades per day, TSZ is the daily 
average trade volume, SIZE is the market value of common equity, and PR is the daily 









Exclude trade frequency and return volatility 
 
In a further sensitivity test, trade frequency and return volatility are excluded from the 
regression model. As the results in Table 8-12 show, there are two pairs of control 
variables with high correlations. The first pair is trade frequency and trade size, and 
the other pair is share price and return volatility. To deal with this problem of 
multicollinearity, one variable from each pair was removed from the model (Eq.1).  
The criteria employed in is to exclude variables from the model by considering each 
pair of variables, and leave only the variable that has the highest correlation with the 
dependent variable, the reciprocal of the effective relative bid ask spread. For the first 
pair, trade frequency and trade size, the results in the Table 8-13 show that trade size 
(r=0.525) has a higher correlation with the reciprocal of the effective relative bid ask 
spread than trade frequency (r=0.284). For the second pair, share price and return 
volatility, the results in the Table 8-13 show that share price (r=0.438) has higher 
correlation with the reciprocal of the effective relative bid ask spread than return 
volatility (r=0.230). Therefore, the trade frequency and return volatility variables 
were removed from the model (Eq.1). The regression specification is as follows:   
 
            PR SIZE TSZ DS SPREAD 4 3 2 1 0             Eq. (7) 
 
As can be seen from Table 8-26, the regression results do not show a good fit for the 
model, the adjusted R
2 is 18.70 percent. The coefficient on the overall disclosure 
score is 0.245 and behaves as expected with a t-statistic of 2.57, and significant at less 











Table 8-26: Sensitivity analysis case IV : Exclude trade frequency and return 
volatility 
 
            PR SIZE TSZ DS SPREAD 4 3 2 1 0           Eq. (7) 
 
        
Variable Model  42 
        
    
 Disclosure  score  .245 
   2.57** 
    
 Trade  size  -.318 
   -3.42*** 
    
 Company  size  -.085 
   -.73 
    
 Share  price  .137 
   1.17 
    
  N 100 
  Adjusted R
2 .1870 
  F 6.69*** 
  Breusch-Pacan 0.01 
  Jarque-Bera   3173.57
† 
        
    
 
   *, ** and ***  indicate significance at p < .1,  p < .05, and p < .01 respectively  
† indicate JB value higher than 9.21 and reject the null hypothesis of normality at 1  % 
 
 
Notes:  1. Coefficient is shown in the upper line (bold line), and the lower line (italic 
line) shows White’s (1980) adjusted t-statistics. 
2. Jarque-Bera statistic, the critical value for the null hypothesis of normality 




SPREAD is the reciprocal of the effective relative bid-ask spread, DS is the over all 
disclosure score, TSZ is the daily average trade volume, SIZE is the market value of 











Case V : Exclude outliers and influential observations 
 
In statistics, unusual observations are generally either outliers or influential data 
points. Outlier refers to case “when extreme values occur on one variable or a 
combination of variables, these data points are termed outliers” (Hutcheson and 
Sofroniou, 1999: 19). The outliers can have an undue influence or can be distorted on 
some statistical analyses, in particular parametric statistic. According to de Vaus 
(2009), there is no precise statistical definition of an outlier. However, a common 
approach to defining outliers in univariate analysis is the number of standard 
deviations the case lies from the mean. For bivariate and multivariate analysis, 
statistics based on standardized residuals was employed. Cases with value above ± 3 
will be defined as the outliers. For influential observations, Cook’s distance was 
employed. Fox (1997) quoted in de Vaus (2009, p.94), suggests a value of 4/(n-k-1), 
where n is the number of cases and k is the number of independent variables, as a cut-
off for detecting influential observations.   
 
From the analysis, Table 8-27 (model 43a), one observation has been identified as the 
outlier and was excluded from the model, the overall disclosure score model (model 
43a) explained 35.4 percent as measured by the adjusted R
2 which is approximately 2 
percent greater than for the full sample model (model 1). This suggests that when the 
outlier is excluded from the full samples model, the effective relative bid ask spread 
variation is better explained by the overall disclosure score and control variables. 
Moreover, both key and control variables behave in the same way as the result from 
the full samples model (model 1) with the better level of significant. These findings 
suggest that by excluding outlier from the model, the overall disclosure score is 
positively related to the market liquidity which supports the reported results from the 
full samples model (model 1).   
 
Subsequent to the outlier tests, the data was also tested for influential observations. 
The result from Table 8-27 show that when five influential cases were excluded from 
the model, the overall disclosure score model (model 43b) explained approximately 
0.5 percent higher than for the full sample model (model 1), and both key and control 
variables are behave in the same way as the result from the full samples model (model 
1). These findings suggest that by excluding the influential observations from the  
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model, the overall disclosure score is positively related to the market liquidity which 
supports the reported results from the full samples model (model 1).   
 
Case VI : Exclude companies in the Financials Industry Group from the sample 
 
For the final sensitivity test is to exclude companies in the Financials industry group 
from the sample. As discussed earlier, some previous studies exclude companies in 
the financial sector, such as banking, finance and securities companies, because of the 
specific accounting rules applying to these companies. To address this problem, 
companies in the Financial industry group (19 companies) are excluded from the full 
sample, leaving 81 listed companies for this sensitivity test. Table 8-27 show a good 
fit when financial companies are excluded from the sample (model 44). As measured 
by the adjusted R
2, 33.49 percent of the effective relative bid ask spread variation is 
explained by the overall disclosure score and the control variables. The key variable 
and control variables from the reduced sample behave in the same way as in the full 
samples (model 1). In addition, although the coefficient on the level of disclosure 
score from the excluded sample model are slightly lower and not significance, the 
coefficient and the level of significant for the others variables are generally very 
similar to the result reported for the full samples model (model 1). Based on this 
finding the overall disclosure score, in the reduced sample, is positively related to the 
market liquidity. This sensitivity analysis tests support the reported results from the 













Table 8-27: Sensitivity analysis case V and VI : Exclude the outliers and exclude 
companies in the Financials Industry Group 
 
                PRVOL PR SIZE TSZ TF DS SPREAD 6 5 4 3 2 1 0      Eq. (1) 
                 
Variable  Model 1  Model 43a  Model 43b  Model 44 








                 
          
 Disclosure  score  .265  .237  .269  .205 
   3.05**  2.767***  3.09***  2.13** 
          
 Trade  frequency  .320  .356  .327  .298 
    2.63** 2.952*** 2.52**  2.18** 
          
 Trade  size  -.176  -.173  -.145  -.172 
   -1.85*  -1.824**  -1.49  -1.62 
          
 Company  size  .066  .105  -.200  .102 
   .52  .834  -.13  .75 
          
 Share  price  1.104  1.129  1.035  1.332 
    2.90*** 2.995*** 3.24***  3.02*** 
          
 Return  volatility  -.959  -.992  -.757  -1.19 
   -2.56**  -2.675***  -2.36**  -2.72*** 
          
 N  100  99  95  81 
 Adjusted  R
2 0.3352  .354  .3404  .3349 
 F  18.21***  9.951***  9.09***  7.71*** 
 Breusch-Pacan  0.51 0.19 0.19 .71 
 Jarque-Bera    5.099  1.295  5.335  3.226 
                 
          
 
   *, ** and ***  indicate significance at p < .1,  p < .05, and p < .01 respectively  
† indicate JB value higher than 9.21 and reject the null hypothesis of normality at 1  % 
   
Notes:  1. Coefficient is shown in the upper line (bold line), and the lower line (italic line) shows White’s (1980) 
adjusted t-statistics. 
2. Jarque-Bera statistic, the critical value for the null hypothesis of normality distribution is 5.99 at the 5 




SPREAD is the reciprocal of the effective relative bid-ask spread, DS is the overall disclosure score, TF is the 
average number of transaction trades per day, TSZ is the daily average trade volume, SIZE is the market value of 







8.5 Summary  
 
The descriptive statistics for each of the unadjusted variables are presented in this 
chapter, together with the results of tests to measure the reliability and validity of the 
key variable. This is followed by the correlation coefficients between the level of 
disclosure and the stock market liquidity.  
 
This main part of the chapter reports the results of tests of the research hypotheses. 
These tests include the benchmark test between the level of disclosure and the 
effective relative bid ask spread and the additional tests of the research hypotheses. 
The results for the sensitivity analysis tests were presented at the end of this chapter. 
The research hypotheses and the empirical results for the quantitative part will be 












Conclusions, contributions, and 





This study used a two-phase exploratory design with a qualitative method phase and a 
quantitative method phase. The first section of this chapter begins by reviewing of 
two main research objectives for the qualitative and quantitative phases of the study. 
First, the study aims to provide a better understanding of corporate disclosure and the 
use of information by financial intermediaries based on the views of the financial 
analysts and fund managers in Thailand. Second, the study aims to examine the 
relationship between the level of voluntary information and stock market liquidity. 
The second section of the chapter provides a summary of the data and research 
methodology. The third section presents the themes arising from the interviews and 
the empirical results from the quantitative part of the study. This is followed by a 
review of the major contributions of this study, and the final section is identifies 
avenues of the future research.  
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9.1 Principal research objectives and hypothesis development 
 
The thesis employed the sequential exploratory design that divided the study into two 
main parts. The first part of the study aimed to provide a better understanding of 
corporate disclosure and the use of information based on the views of the financial 
analysts and the fund managers in Thailand. The specific research objectives for this 
phase are to gain an understanding of the preferences of Thai financial intermediaries 
for sources and channels of information disclosure and to obtain their views about the 
quality of disclosure. The financial intermediaries’ views of the reasons why 
companies may choose to disclose information voluntarily, the usefulness of 
information types contained within the annual report, and the extent to which the 
auditor’s report enhances the value of the annual report. The result from this first part 
informed the second part of the study.  
 
The main purpose for the second quantitative phase of the study is to examine the 
effect of the level of voluntary information disclosure on the liquidity of shares traded 
on the Stock Exchange of Thailand. This phase also aims to investigate other key 
variables in the conceptual framework. The specific research objectives for the 
additional analysis of this phase are to examine whether each category of voluntary 
information disclose in the annual report has equal impact on the stock market 
liquidity, and to examine whether the two channels of information disclosure have 
different effects on the stock market liquidity. In addition, the relationship between 
auditor quality, as reflected in audit firm size, and information disclosure and stock 
market liquidity is examined. Finally, the relationship between analysts following and 
information disclosure is explored.     
 
9.2 Data and research methodology 
 
As stated above, this study uses the mixed method approach, and so the data 
collection and the research methods are divided into two main parts. This first 
qualitative phase is based on a series of semi-structured interviews with Thai 
securities analysts and fund managers. The interviews are analysed using grounded 
theory. What emerges from the interviews is an understanding of the corporate  
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disclosure and the link between the level and the quality of information disclosure, 
and the share prices. The findings obtained from the interview, which provides a 
better understanding of the corporate disclosure and the use of information based on 
the views of the financial analysts and the fund managers in Thailand, are used to 
inform the second phase of the research. In particular, Thai securities analysts and 
fund managers perceived listed companies as disclosing more voluntary information 
in order to improve the companies’ transparency and the investor confidence, which 
in turn, enhances the stock market liquidity.  
 
The second part of the research involves the development of the research instruments 
to measure the level of voluntary information disclosure to examine the relationship 
between the level of information disclosure and stock market liquidity.  In this phase, 
two research instruments are developed. The first research instrument is the analysts 
rating questionnaire that obtained from the opinions of financial analysts and fund 
managers about the level of information disclosure of those listed companies that they 
are currently following. The other research instrument is the disclosure index.  The 
disclosure items in the disclosure index are developed from the previous related 
research and from the qualitative findings. The measures of the level of information 
disclosure from these two approaches are then incorporated into regression models to 
explain the levels of stock market liquidity of companies in the SET 100 Index. 
 
9.3 Conclusion of themes arising from the interviews 
 
The first part of the study primarily aims to provide a better understanding of 
corporate disclosure and the use of information based on the views of Thai financial 
intermediaries. Each themes arising from the interviews is summarised below. 
 
Sources and channels of information disclosure 
 
The findings from the qualitative study indicate that the information used by Thai 
securities’ analysts and fund managers comes from both public and private 
disclosures by companies. The main public disclosures are seen to be the companies’  
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annual reports and information disclosure reports (Form 56-1), while the private 
channels of communication with companies come through personal contacts such as 
face-to-face meetings and telephone conversations with senior executives, company 
visits and contact with companies’ Investor Relation (IR) departments. 
 
Most interviewees asserted that private disclosure is their preferred channel of 
receiving information from the company because it is a two-way communication 
process that allows them to develop a clear understanding of the company, and 
acquire more in-depth information that they cannot find out from the papers or the 
annual report. The information is usually provided by the company’s top 
management. It therefore provides a good opportunity for the securities analysts and 
fund managers to ask questions on topics not covered in the annual report. In addition, 
personal contact with companies enables them to develop an understanding of 
company strategy and the future direction of company. Finally, Thai securities 
analysts and fund managers indicated that IR departments are important sources of 
information, especially in specialist industries that have complicated products or 
services.  
 
However, the findings indicate that companies’ annual reports are often seen as 
important sources of information for Thai securities analysts and fund managers in 
providing background and enabling them to identify issues to discuss in private 
contact with company management. Thus, the analysis of the annual report is a 
precursor to direct contact with the companies’ top management. 
 
Reason for disclosure and the quality of disclosure 
 
 
The results show that Thai financial intermediaries identify several reasons why the 
companies disclose information publicly. Most of the companies disclose information 
to meet SET requirements, to present a good image of the company, and to increase 
its business value and its market value. Nevertheless, the financial intermediaries 
pointed out that transparency is the most important reason for disclosure. They 
indicated that investors believe that a company will be seen to be creditable if is 
transparent. By being transparent, a company provides a clear picture of its situation  
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that enables financial intermediaries to get better understanding of the company’s 
direction.   
 
The quality of company disclosure was seen by Thai financial securities and fund 
managers to be related to two main factors: the regulator and the company itself. 
Moreover, the interviewees indicated that the quality and the level of information 
disclosures are also related to company size. They divided Thai listed companies into 
two groups: large listed companies, and the medium and small listed companies. They 
pointed out that large listed companies usually disclose information in excess of the 
requirements of the SET because the market mechanism has more influence on this 
group. On the other hand, most medium and small listed companies usually disclose 




Thai security analysts and fund managers identified that the most important reason for 
a company to disclose voluntary information is that to increase company’s 
transparency and increase, or restore, investor confidence. This in turn is seen to lead 
to an increase the stock market liquidity and the share price.  
 
The annual report 
 
It is common to distinguish between two types of information disclosed by the 
companies in their annual reports: quantitative information and qualitative 
information. Thai financial intermediaries use both quantitative and qualitative 
information, with different preferences for information type. Some financial 
intermediaries interviewed indicated a preference for quantitative information, while 
others indicated that they preferred qualitative information. Most of the interviewees, 
however, stated that they pay attention in both types of information equally. 
Quantitative information is perceived to be more about the past and is used in 
analysing trends in order to forecast the future, whereas qualitative information may 
provide a guide to the future direction of the company. Therefore, without both types 
of information, the analyses will not be complete.   
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Some of the interviewees indicated that the most useful parts in the annual report are 
those sections containing qualitative information, rather than quantitative information. 
This is because they could obtain much of the financial information before receiving 
the annual report. The qualitative information not only provides background for 
private contact with the company, it also provides the executives’ views of the 
company’s future direction, and so provides a context for interpreting the quantitative 
information. So predictions about future financial performance may be based on past 
tends and the narrative disclosures about the future direction of the company.  
 
Audit firm size and the annual report 
 
Thai financial intermediaries generally indicated that the audit is important. In 
particular, they suggested that as the auditors verify the accuracy of the financial 
statements, thereby increasing the credibility of the financial report. Most of the 
interviewees perceived that big, or the international, audit firms as being more 
credible than smaller or local audit firms. Others interviewees, however, indicated that 
they did not put too much weight on the reputation of audit firms because they 
believed that all audit firms licensed by the Securities and Exchange Commission of 
Thailand (SEC) met the minimum requirement of the SEC and so audit to a least the 
minimum standards set by the SEC. These financial intermediaries are therefore 
indifferent about the size of the audit firm. 
 
9.4 Conclusion of the results from the quantitative studies 
 
The second part of the study primarily investigates whether the level of voluntary 
information disclosure by Thai listed companies affects the liquidity of shares traded 
on the Stock Exchange of Thailand. Specifically, it examines the relationship between 
stock market liquidity and: (i) categories of information disclosure; and (ii) channels 
of information disclosure. The results of the statistical tests performed in this study 
support the general hypothesis that higher levels of voluntary information disclosure 
mitigate the information asymmetry in the market capital, and so enhance the stock 
market liquidity. The second part of the study also aimed to investigate further the  
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relationship between information disclosure, stock market liquidity, and the other key 
variables in the conceptual framework. In particular examining the relationship 
between information disclosure and: (i) audit firm size, and (ii) number of analysts 
following the company. The results are discussed below. 
 
Hypothesis 1: Market liquidity and information disclosures 
 
The first hypothesis is that a higher level of voluntary information disclosure helps to 
reduce the information asymmetry between a company’s managers and investors, and 
between informed and less informed investors, and so enhance the company’s stock 
market liquidity. As stated earlier, there are two research instruments used for 
measuring the level of voluntary information disclosure. The first instrument is the 
disclosure index, and the other instrument is the analysts rating. Thus, the first 
hypothesis was broken down into four sub-hypotheses in order to check the validity of 
the instruments.    
 
The results provided in Table 8-14 show that sub-hypotheses for the first hypothesis 
can be accepted. These four sub-hypotheses relate to the disclosure scores from the 
disclosure index instrument (models (1) and (2)), i.e. the overall level of the 
information disclosure and the level of information disclosure in the annual report, 
and the disclosure scores from the analysts rating instrument (models (3) and (4)), i.e. 
public and private disclosure score. All four results from sub-hypotheses support the 
first hypothesis and indicate the higher coefficient on the disclosure score from the 
results using the analysts rating than the results using disclosure index approach.  
 
The difference between the results of these two research instruments may, however, 
be due to the limitation of the research instruments design. Both of the public and the 
private disclosure scores are obtained from an analysts rating instrument. This 
measures the level of disclosure by asking Thai securities analyst and fund managers 
to rate those companies that they are following. As the approach is subjective, there 
may be some biases in the rating. In particular, they may perceive a link between 
company disclosure and the company size. The results in the qualitative part of this 
study indicate that Thai financial intermediaries perceive larger companies as  
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disclosing more information. Thus, it is possible that the securities analysts and fund 
managers gave higher scores to the larger companies as they believed that the larger 
companies disclose more information.   
 
Overall, these results for the first hypothesis are consistent with previous studies 
where the data are obtained from developed countries (Welker, 1995; Healy, Hutton 
& Palepu, 1999; Heflin, Shaw & Wild, 2001; Petersen & Plenborg, 2006). This lends 
support to the information asymmetry theory that higher level of information 
disclosure can reduce the information asymmetry in capital markets, improve the 
efficiency of the capital markets, and enhance stock market liquidity. Specifically, the 
results emphasise the importance of public information disclosure as a variable that 
affects stock market liquidity. In addition, it is possible to conjecture from the results 
of this study that differences in the results of studies on corporate disclosure may be 
explained in terms of the approaches used to measuring disclosure. 
 
Hypothesis 2: Market liquidity and categories of information disclosures 
 
The evidence in support of the first hypothesis that public information disclosure is a 
key factor affecting the stock market liquidity leads the researcher to the second 
hypothesis. By using the self-constructed disclosure index approach, it is possible to 
examine the impact of categories of information disclosure on stock market liquidity. 
The disclosure index score is a weighted average score of four categories: (1) the 
strategic information section, (2) the non-financial information section, (3) the 
financial information section, and (4) the other channels of information and investor 
relations section. Specifically, the first category, the strategic information section, 
consists of voluntary disclosure in the annual report that includes general corporate 
information, company strategy, production, research and development, market 
strategy, competition, outlook, and future prospects. The second category, the non-
financial information section, consists of information about directors, employees, and 
social policy and value added. The third category, the financial information section, 
consists of voluntary disclosure in the financial review and the management 
discussion and analysis. The final category consists of voluntary disclosure from the 
other channels of information and investor relations and includes the information  
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from the company’s website, and the information about the investor relations 
department. Thus, the second hypothesis focuses on the relationships between the four 
categories of voluntary information disclosure from the disclosure index instrument 
and stock market liquidity.  
 
To assess the differential impact of these four detailed categories of the disclosure 
index, the first sub-hypothesis (H2a) concerns the impact of the four detailed 
categories of voluntary information disclosure from the disclosure index instrument 
on stock market liquidity was examined.  
 
The results shown in Table 8-15, model (5), which support hypothesis H2a, show that 
the relationship between the market liquidity and the information disclosure between 
the four specific categories of voluntary information disclosure from the disclosure 
index varies. This evidence suggests it is the voluntary information from the strategic 
and the financial sections that is useful in reducing information asymmetry between 
the managers and the investors, or between informed and less informed investors, 
which in turn increase companies’ stock market liquidity. These results are consistent 
with the arguments from the previous studies (Dye, 1998; Bushman & Smith, 2001; 
and Hope, 2003) that not all types of information disclosure may be of equal value to 
securities analysts and fund managers, or even to general investors.  
 
The results provided in Table 8-15, models (6) – (9), also show that the four detailed 
categories from the disclosure index instrument have different impacts on the stock 
market liquidity. From the results, the coefficients for each category of information 
disclosure take on the expected sign, but only the coefficients for two detailed 
categories of voluntary information disclosure, the strategic and the financial sections, 
are statistically significant. These findings imply that the market liquidity is positively 
related to the level of voluntary information disclosure in the strategic and the 
financial sections of the annual report.  
 
The results suggest that the most important impact on the stock market liquidity is the 
strategic section, followed by the financial section. It can be concluded from these 
results that it is voluntary disclose of qualitative information, in particular information 
from the strategic section in the annual report, that reduces information asymmetry  
214 
 
and enhances the companies’ stock market liquidity, rather than the financial 
information from financial section. One plausible explanation is that the qualitative 
information, such as information on corporate strategy, competition and, outlook and 
future prospects sections, provides a guide to the future direction of the company. 
This information helps the financial intermediaries and the investors to forecast the 
potential of the company.  
 
However, it is not possible to conclude that other categories of information disclosure, 
such as non-financial information, and the other channels of information and investors 
section, do not have an effect on the stock market liquidity. As can be seen from the 
results from model (1) in Table 8-14, the coefficient for the overall disclosure score 
that includes all categories of information disclosure is statistically significant. This 
may suggest that a combination of the categories of information disclosure provides 
additional and useful information for investors.        
 
To summarise, the analysis and evidence for the second hypothesis suggests that the 
voluntary information disclosure in the strategic and the financial sections are the 
primary factors driving the mitigation of information asymmetry between managers 
and investors, and between informed and less informed investors in the capital 
market. Higher level of voluntary information disclosure in the strategic and financial 
sections, therefore, helps enhance companies’ stock market liquidity. This result is 
interesting as it suggests that it is the qualitative information from the strategic 
section, rather than the voluntary information from financial section, that has most 
impact on the companies’ stock market liquidity.  
   
Hypothesis 3: Market liquidity and channels of information disclosure 
 
By using the analysts rating approach it is possible to examine the differential impact 
of the public and the private channels of disclosure on stock market liquidity. For the 
third hypothesis, two sub-hypotheses are examined. The first sub-hypothesis explores 
the relationship between market liquidity and the analyst rating score varies between 
the channels of disclosure, while the second examines whether the private channel of 
disclosure has a higher effect on market liquidity than the public disclosure channel.   
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The results provided in Table 8-16, show support to the first sub-hypothesis that both 
the public and private disclosure information from the analysts rating instrument have 
impact on the stock market liquidity. These results also indicate that only voluntary 
information disclosure from the public channel that can reduce information asymmetry 
and enhance the stock market liquidity. The empirical results do not show any 
evidence to support the second sub-hypothesis, because the coefficients indicate that 
voluntary information from public channel is more likely to have higher effect on the 
stock market liquidity than voluntary information from private channel. 
 
It can be concluded that for these data in Thai context, voluntary information 
disclosure via the public channel, such as the company’s annual report, rather than the 
private channel, is the primary factor in reducing the information asymmetry in the 
capital market and in improving the companies’ stock market liquidity. This is 
consistent with many of the prior empirical findings in developed economies. For 
example, Healy, Hutton and Palepu (1999) found that increases in the disclosure rating 
are followed by increases in the stock market liquidity. Heflin, Shaw and Wild (2001) 
found that it is the quality of accounting information from the quarterly and other 
communications, rather than the private communications with analysts, that is useful 
in mitigating the risk of associated with informed traders and enhance market 
liquidity.  
 
In short, the results in this study suggest that the relationship between the stock market 
liquidity and the channels of information disclosure are likely driven by the public 
disclosure channel. It is interesting as the result suggests that it is the public disclosure 
channel, rather than the private disclosure channel, that enhances market liquidity.  
 
Hypothesis 4: The size of the audit firm and information disclosures 
 
The fourth hypothesis is that the level of voluntary information disclosure by listed 
companies is positively associated with the size of the audit firm. The empirical results 




The results provided in Table 8-17, models (11) – (16) for the disclosure index 
instrument, indicate that the level of voluntary information disclose in the annual 
report, strategic section, and financial sections is positively, and significantly related to 
the size of the audit firm. Similarly, models (17) – (18) for the analysts rating 
instrument, show that both voluntary disclosure via the public and private channels are 
significant and positively related to the size of the audit firm. This result supports the 
hypothesis that the audit firm size has an effect on the level of voluntary information 
disclosure. There are two interpretations of this finding. First, it is possible that those 
companies that are audited by large audit firms are encouraged by the audit firms to 
disclose more voluntary information, in particular information disclose in the annual 
report, strategy section, and financial section, and via both public and private channels. 
The alternative explanation is that those listed companies that are willing to disclose 
more voluntary information and are more likely to choose large/international audit 
firms. 
 
These empirical results are consistent with previous studies. For example, Singhvi and 
Desai (1971), and Wallace and Naser (1995) find that the audit firm size is positively 
related to the disclosure level. Moreover, the results are consistent with the findings 
from the fifth theme in qualitative part of this study. As most of the financial 
intermediaries assert that the financial statements audited by larger audit firms are 
more credible than those audited by smaller firms.  
 
However, since the analysts rating instrument is completed by the financial 
intermediaries, it should be noted that the disclosure ratings from this research 
instrument be biased by their views about the relationship between disclosure quality 
and audit firm size. It is therefore possible that financial intermediaries will rate the 
disclosure quality of companies audited by large/international audit firms higher than 
those companies audited by smaller firms.   
 
In summary, the evidence supports the fourth hypothesis that there is a relationship 
between audit firm size disclosure; particularly in the annual report, and the strategic 
and the financial sections. There are two possible ways to explain this relationship. 
The first is that the large/international audit firms may encourage their clients (listed  
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companies) to disclose more voluntary information. Alternatively, the good listed 
companies, who disclose more voluntary information, may choose large audit firms.       
 
Hypothesis 5: Market liquidity and audit firm size 
 
The fifth hypothesis examines the relationship between market liquidity and the size of 
the audit firm. This hypothesis is divided into two sub-hypotheses. The first sub-
hypothesis is that stock market liquidity is positively related to audit firm size, while 
the second is that listed companies audited by Big Four audit firms are more likely to 
have higher market liquidity than the listed companies that audited by other audit 
firms.  
 
The results for the fourth hypothesis show that the size of audit firm has a significant 
positive associated with the level of voluntary information disclosure. The results for 
the first, the second, and the third hypotheses show that the level of voluntary 
information disclosure is also significantly positively related to market liquidity. The 
results for H1, H2, H3, and H4 suggest that there should be a relationship between the 
audit firm size and the market liquidity.      
 
The results for the fifth hypothesis, in Table 8-18 and 8-19 do not provide support the 
first sub-hypothesis (H5a), as there is no statistically significant difference in the stock 
market liquidity between the listed companies that audited by Big Four audit firms and 
the listed companies audited by Non-Big Four audit firms. The empirical results, 
therefore, do not support the first sub-hypothesis of the fifth hypothesis (H5a). One 
possible explanation for the difference between the companies audited by Big Four 
and Non-Big Four not being significant, which consistent with the findings from the 
fifth theme in the qualitative part, is that investors believe that all audit firms that are 
licensed by the SEC meet the minimum requirement of the SEC and so provide 
appropriate audit services. Another possible explanation may be the skewness of the 
sample in this study. 
 
The results provides in Table 8-20, also indicate that there is no significant   
relationship between the stock market liquidity and the audit firm size for this current  
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data set, although the coefficients are in the predicted direction. An explanation for 
this may because the audit firm size also has an impact on the disclosure score, as the 
results show in the fourth hypothesis. Thus, when both variables, audit firm size and 
the disclosure score, are included in the same model, it is possible that the audit firm 
size is dominated by the disclosure score.  
 
In summary, this empirical evidence is that while companies audited by Big Four 
firms are likely to have higher market liquidity than companies audited by the other 
audit firms, the results are not statistically significant.  
 
Hypothesis 6: Analysts following and information disclosure 
 
The sixth hypothesis is that there is a positive relationship between the number of 
financial analysts following a company and the level of disclosure. The empirical 
results for the sixth hypothesis are considered separately for the two research 
instruments.  
 
For the disclosure index instrument, the results shown in Table 8-21, models (28) – 
(33), indicate that the overall score for voluntary information disclosure, voluntary 
information in the annual report, voluntary information disclosure of strategic section, 
voluntary information disclosure of non-financial section, and the channels of 
information and investor section are significant and positively related to the number of 
the analysts following the companies. One explanation for this is that the number of 
analysts following the companies affects the level of voluntary information disclosure. 
Alternatively, it may be that when the companies disclose more voluntary information, 
in particular for the overall disclosure, information in the annual report, the strategic 
section, non-financial section, and the other channels of information and investor 
relation section, the number of the analysts following the companies increase. Thus, 
from these empirical results it is possible to conclude that not all sections of 




For the analysts rating instrument, the results presented in Table 8-21, models (34) – 
(35), show that voluntary disclosure via the public and private channels, is 
significantly, and positively, related to the number of analysts following the 
companies. This evidence again suggests that the level of voluntary information has an 
effect on the number of analysts following the companies. This can be interpreted as 
indicating that higher levels of voluntary information disclosure via both public and 
private channels encourage analysts to follow the companies. As stated earlier, 
because the analyst rating instrument is a subjective measurement approach, the 
disclosure ratings from this research instrument may biased. As can be seen from 
Table 8-12, both public and private disclosures reveal very high correlation with the 
number of analysts following the companies. Therefore, it is more likely that the 
analysts will give a higher rating to the companies that they are following.   
 
These empirical results are consistent with previous studies. Lang and Lundholm 
(1996) found evidence that the analysts are attracted to companies that disclose more 
information. Hope (2003) found that analyst coverage is positively related to the 
overall disclosure score, and the results also indicated that not all forms of disclosure 
are equally important to the financial analysts. Specifically, Hope (2003) found 
evidence that the analysts following is more strongly related to the extent of note 
disclosure than to the comprehensiveness of the basic financial statements.  Moreover, 
these results are consistent with the findings from the fourth theme in qualitative part 
of this study. As some of Thai securities analysts and fund managers indicated that 
they prefer qualitative information which provides a guide the direction for the future 
of companies, rather than to the quantitative information. Some of the interviewees 
also asserted that the most useful parts in the annual report are those sections 
containing qualitative information because they can obtain the quantitative 
information and some financial information from other sources before they receive 
the annual report.   
 
In addition, the empirical results indicate that the number of analysts following 
companies is associated with company size. As can be seen from the results in Table 
8-21, the coefficient of the company size is positive, which suggests that company size 
is an important determinant of analysts following. This is consistent with the empirical 
results from the previous studies carried out in different context, such as Lang and  
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Lundholm (1996) in the U.S., Hope (2003) in the international context, and Lakhal 
(2007) in France. Furthermore, it is possible to conclude from these results that the 
securities analysts are more likely to follow large companies because these companies 
offer better disclosure policies and disclose more voluntary information than smaller 
companies. This is also consistent with the findings from the qualitative part. As the 
securities analysts indicated that the quality and the level of information disclosure is 
associated with the company size, asserting that large listed companies usually 
disclose information in excess of the SET’s requirements, while the smaller listed 
companies disclose at the minimum or standard requirements.    
 
As a conclusion, the evidence supports the sixth hypothesis that level of voluntary 
information disclosure is associated with analyst following, particularly the overall 
disclosure score, the information from annual report, strategic section, non-financial 
section, and information from the other channels of information and investor relation 
section. The empirical results also indicated that company size is associated with 
analysts following. There are two possible explanations for the results: (i) higher 
levels of voluntary information lead to higher analysts following; or (ii) larger analyst 
following leads to more voluntary disclosure.  
 
9.5 Contributions of the study to the literature 
 
The study contributes to the corporate disclosure literature through developments in 




This study contributes to the methodology by being the first study to use a mixed 
method design to examine the relationship between the level of voluntary information 
disclosure, the stock market liquidity, auditor quality, and analyst following. 
Specifically, the study applied a two-phase exploratory design meaning that it is 
divided into two mains parts.  
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The research findings from the qualitative part of the study help the researcher to 
scope the conceptual framework for the quantitative study and to develop appropriate 
research instruments. In this study, two appropriate research instruments, a disclosure 
checklist instrument and a questionnaire survey for the analysts rating instrument, for 
Thai listed companies were developed and employed. Moreover, the research findings 
also indicate new variables that may be related to voluntary disclosure and stock 
market liquidity. These are incorporated into the conceptual framework for the second 
phase of the study. Additionally, the findings from qualitative method phase also help 
to explain the empirical results from the quantitative method phase. 
 
This study also contributed to the literature on corporate disclosure, especially to the 
Thai literature, by using two approaches to measuring disclosure quality, the 
disclosure index and the analysts rating. The benefit of using two research instruments 
is that it enables an assessment of the validity of the research instruments and so 
increase a confidence on the results.   
 
Finally, this study added to the disclosure literature in emerging market, in particular 
to Thai capital market, by developing a disclosure checklist and an analyst rating 
score. 
 
Theoretical and empirical contributions 
 
The research findings and empirical results from both qualitative and quantitative 
parts contribute to the literature in the area of corporate disclosure, especially for 
emerging economies like Thailand, by providing a greater understanding on the use of 
information by Thai financial intermediaries and further evidence on how the level of 
voluntary information disclosure affects stock market liquidity. As stated earlier, most 
studies on corporate disclosure are conducted in the developed economies. This study, 
therefore, offers a contribution to the literature by extending the scope of enquiry to 
an emerging economy, Thailand. The empirical results indicate that disclosing more 
voluntary information, particularly through public disclosure, reduces information 
asymmetry, improves investor confidence and enhances the stock market liquidity. 
These results are, therefore, consistent with the other results from previous studies 




The major theoretical and empirical contributions of this study are summarised in turn 
as follows: 
 
Market liquidity, information disclosures, categories of information disclosures, 
and channels of information disclosures 
 
The empirical results from the benchmark test, Hypothesis 1, of this study contribute 
to the literature by showing that levels of voluntary information disclosure are 
associated with the liquidity of the disclosing company’s shares. This may be 
interpreted as demonstrating that by reducing information asymmetry, both between 
managers and outside investors, and between investors, listed companies improve 
investor confidence, which in turn, enhances the market liquidity of their shares.  
 
The empirical results for Hypothesis 2 have implications for an understanding of how 
different sections of the annual report affect stock market liquidity. Specifically, the 
results indicate that the information from the strategic information section and the 
information from the financial section of the annual report are the main factors that 
impact on the stock market liquidity. The results demonstrate that the voluntary 
information disclosed in the strategic section has the greatest impact on stock market 
liquidity, while the information in the financial section has the next level of impact. It 
is possible to conclude from this evidence that the qualitative information, which 
provides a guide to the future direction of the company, has an impact on the 
information asymmetry between the market participants and so on stock market 
liquidity.    
 
The findings also have implications for an understanding of how the private and 
public disclosure channels affect stock market liquidity. The results for Hypothesis 3 
indicate that it is the public voluntary information available to all investors, 
particularly the information disclose in the annual report, rather than the 
management’s private communications with the financial intermediaries, that 
enhances stock market liquidity. One possible explanation for these results is that the 
public disclosure is available for all market participants, and so reduces not only the 
information asymmetry between managers and outside investors, but also between  
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different groups of investors. On the other hand, private disclosure benefits one group 
of investors, such as the financial analysts and inside investors, against others. This 
finding lends support to information asymmetry theory in that it is public disclosure, 
rather than the private disclosure, that mitigates the information asymmetry between 
the market participants and improves the stock market liquidity.  
 
These findings for Hypothesis 1, 2, and 3 have implications for both listed companies 
and accounting regulators.  
 
The results provide strong evidence on those sections of the annual report that have an 
impact on stock market liquidity. If listed companies focus on improving the 
voluntary information disclosure, in particular of strategic and financial information, 
they may improve investor confidence and increase the liquidity of their shares. These 
findings should also be of benefit to accounting regulators, in particular on the 
importance of certain types of qualitative information to stock market liquidity.  
 
Audit firm size and information disclosure 
 
The empirical results for Hypothesis 4 should be benefit for the listed companies 
when they are choosing an audit firm. The results indicate that there is a significant 
and positive relationship between the audit firm size and the level of voluntary 
information disclosures. It may be that by choosing a large/international audit firm, 
companies may be encouraged to disclosure more information. Listed companies, by 
providing more information, may increase investors confidence and attract more 
investors’ attention, which in turn, leads to higher market liquidity.   
 
The size of audit firm, and market liquidity 
 
The results for Hypothesis 5 indicate that there is no significant relationship between 
the audit firm size and the market liquidity. This is consistent with the views of some 
of the securities analysts and fund managers that the size of audit firm does not matter 
as all audit firms meet the minimum requirements of the SEC, which are sufficient to 




Analysts following and information disclosures 
 
The empirical results for Hypothesis 6 should be benefit for the listed companies. In 
the context of the capital markets, the financial analysts are the most important 
information intermediaries, as they serve to increase the credibility of the issuer 
disclosure (listed companies) and to overcome the investors’ uncertainty. Therefore, 
listed companies should benefit from knowing: what type of information financial 
analysts are interested in; and the impact of disclosure on the analysts following.  
 
As the results report that not all sections of information disclosure are related to the 
size of analyst following. The empirical evidence indicates that higher levels of 
voluntary information disclosure, particularly the overall disclosure score, information 
from the strategic and information the other channels of information and investor 
relations sections, have an important impact on the number of analysts following 
companies. Therefore, if the listed companies improve and disclose more voluntary 
information in particular sections, it is possible that they will attract a large analysts 
following.    
 
9.6 Limitations and suggestions for future research 
 
This study based on the voluntary disclosure data of the listed companies from the 
SET 100 index. This limitation may restrict the generalisability of the findings to only 
those top listed companies included in the SET 100 index. Thus, to complement the 
arguments provided by this study, future research in this area may increase the sample 
size in order to discover whether the results are restricted to the top listed companies 
or are general to all listed companies. Such a study may compare companies in the 
SET 100 index with other listed companies to see if there are differences.  
 
In Thailand, most listed companies have concentrated ownership structures with 
family members owning a significant proportion of the outstanding shares. The 
concentrated ownership may have a significant effect on stock liquidity, especially as 
reflected in the bid-ask spread. A future study may include share ownership structure 
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Appendix A:  Interview schedule  
Interview Schedule 
  Semi-structured interviews 
  Specific questions will be drawn from this list depending on the particular 
interviewee 
Background questions:  
  Name 
  Gender  
  Age   
  Education 
  Company      
Questions about source of information:  
  Could you please read this list all through, and then tell me which sources of 
information that you currently use.  
  Which sources of information are important when you analyses companies     
Questions about disclosure and the quality of disclosure:  
  What do you understand about disclosure 
  What is the objective of disclosure  
  What did you understand about good disclosure characteristic, is its effect on 
pricing          
Questions about voluntary disclosure: 
  What do you think about voluntary disclosure 
  Does voluntary disclosure enhances the value of the annual report  
Questions about information:  
  Does type of the information (qualitative and quantitative) effect when you 
analyses companies  
  Which sections of the annual report do you consider when analyses 
companies, and which one is the most important section. 
Questions about auditor: 
  Is the audit important 
  Whether or not auditors significantly enhance the credibility of reported 
financial statements  
  Is the reputation of the audit firm or auditor associate with listed company 
disclosure in order to value added to the annual report  
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Appendix B:  The summary of open and axial codes 
 
List of open categories and the related open concepts 
 
Theme I: Sources and channels of information disclosure 
  Private disclosure 
  Annual  report 
   Advantage  of  annual  report 
    S t u d y   i n   d e t a i l  
   Limitation  of  annual  report 
    N o t   u p - t o - d a t e  
    One  way  communication 
 Public  disclosure 
  Personal  contact 
   Advantage  of  personal  contact 
    In-depth  information  and  clearly  understand 
    Acquire  top  executive’s  vision 
    Two  way  communication 
   Limitation  of  personal  contact 
    Individual  skill  of  the  audiences 
  IR  department 
   Advantage  of  IR  department 
    In-depth  information   
The familiar of analysts and top manager 
   Dose  it  cause  familiarity  problem     
How to prevent familiarity problem 
 
Theme II: Disclosure and the quality of disclosure 
  Disclosure definition and objective 
    Advertise and manipulate their stock 
    Channels of monitoring performance 
    Concerned with many people 
    Good image and value added 
  Mandatory 
  Provide  benefit  information 
   Information  for  investment  purposes 
  Transparency 
 Good  characteristics 
    Accurately, truly, reliability and clearly 
    Assign the company’s speaker 
    Disclose the information regularly and timely 
    Equally for all investors 
  Relevant  and  adequate information 
    Provide obviously channels of disclosure 
    Follow the requirement (Mandatory) 
  Transparency   
Neutral 
Factor related to quality of disclosure 
  Regulator 
Listed company itself 
   Large  company 
   Medium  and  small  company  
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Disclosure and the information asymmetry   
The effect of disclosure on stock pricing 
  Good  disclosure 
  Transparent  disclosure 
 
Theme III: Voluntary disclosure 
  The reason of engage in voluntary disclosure 
    Advertise the company  
    Improve their transparency  
    Lift up the quality 
Increase the company value and restore investor confidence  
Increase the stock premium 
  Voluntary disclosure enhances the value of the annual report 
  The limitation of the voluntary disclosure 
    Too much and too complicate information 
    Solution for the problem  
   Form  IR  department 
      Give additional information to the right person 
 
Theme IV: Type of information and section in the annual report 
  Type of information 
  Qualitative  information 
  Quantitative  information 
  Most preference section in the annual report 
    Section related to qualitative information  
   Acquire the executive’s view / the company’s future direction 
    
Theme V: Auditor and the credibility of the annual report 
  The important of auditor and the credibility of annual report 
  Auditor reputation and the credibility of the annual report 
   More  reliability  and  confident 
   Scarcely  doubt  about  the  accuracy 



























Private disclosure  1.  Sources and channels of information 





Disclosure definition and objective 
2.2  Characteristics of good disclosure 
2.3  Factor related to quality of disclosure 
2.4  Disclosure and the information 
asymmetry 
2.  Disclosure and the quality of 
disclosure 






The reason to disclose voluntary 
3.2  Voluntary disclosure enhances the 
value of the annual report  3. Voluntary  disclosure 






Type of information 
4.  Type of information and section in the 






The important of auditor and the 
credibility of annual report 
5.2  Auditor reputation and the credibility 
of the annual report 
5.  Auditor and the credibility of the 
annual report 






















The summary of the final coding analysis: open and axial codes 
 
 
Theme I: Sources and channels of information 
 
Brief descriptions of categories  Open codes    Axial codes 
 






The interviewees’ perceptions of the advantage of annual report 
 
  
The interviewees’  perceptions of the limitation of the annual report 
 
  
The interviewees identified public disclosure sources which they use when analysing 
the company 
 
Public disclosure   
The interviewees’ perceptions of the advantage of personal contact 
 
  
The interviewees’  perceptions of the limitation of personal contact 
 
  
The interviewees’ perceptions of the advantage of IR department 
 
  
Perceived the familiarity of analysts and top manager 
 
  
    
 
 








Theme II: Disclosure and the quality of disclosure 
 
Brief descriptions of categories  Open codes    Axial codes 
 
 
    




The interviewees’ perceptions about the objectives of disclosure 
 
  








The interviewees’ perceptions of the relationship between disclosure and the 
information asymmetry  




Impact of disclosure on stock pricing of interviewees  The effect of disclosure 
on stock pricing 
 
 
    
Disclosure and the 







Theme III: Voluntary disclosure 
 
Brief descriptions of categories  Open codes    Axial codes 
 
 
The reasons for voluntary disclosure given by interviewees 
 
 




The interviewees’ perceptions of voluntary disclosure and  
the credibility of the annual report 
Voluntary disclosure 






















Theme VI: Type of information and section in the annual report 
 





   
Type of information disclosure given by the interviewees  Type of information 
 
 
The interviewees’ referenced section in the annual report   Most referenced section 
in the annual report 
 
 
    
Type of information 









Theme V: Auditor and the credibility of the annual report 
 
Brief descriptions of categories  Open codes    Axial codes 
 
 
    
Perceived importance of audit  The importance of auditor 




Perceived importance of auditor in enhancing the value of the annual report 
 
  
The interviewees’ perceptions of auditor reputation and the credibility of the annual 
report 
Auditor reputation and the 




The interviewees’ perceptions of the relationship between auditor reputation and the 
share price 
The auditor reputation and 




Auditor and the 








Appendix C:  The analytical of open coding and axial coding 
 
Theme I: Sources and channels of information 
 
From the interviews, most of the interviewees stated that there are two main sources 
of information which they used. The first source of information is public disclosure 
which comes from the annual report and the corporate financial statements. Another 
source of information is private disclosure which come from personal contact with the 
listed company such as an interviewing the company top executives, telephone, 
company visit and contact company’s IR department. Both sources of information are 
often used by the interviewees because they are convinced that this information come 
from the reliable source.  
In case A: ‘There are two main sources that I use in analyzing the 
company; corporate financial statements, and an interviewing the 
company’s top executives. Both sources of information come from the 
credible source, because we get it directly from the company not from 
other people. For financial statements, they are verified by auditor before 
they announce to public as public information. For the part of chief 
executive officer (CEO) interviewing, either the president or chief 
financial officer (CFO) will give their point of view about the company 
and the overview of the industry as a whole. Therefore, both sources of 
information are very important.’ (Securities analyst) 
 
Private disclosure  
 
Private disclosure is one of the most important sources of information that the 
interviewees usually used for making a decision. The interviewees defined that private 
disclosure means personal contact between them and the company. For example, 
interviewing the company’s top executive, telephone, company visit or even when 
they contact the company’s IR department. Most interviewees asserted that private 
disclosure is their preference channel of receiving information from the company 
because it is two ways communication which allow them to understand the company 
clearly. One of the interviewees informed that  
 
In case A: ‘To get direct information from the company is very useful 
and is as important as the company information present in the media. 
That is why the companies always have road show. The listed companies 
organize the road show in order to arrange the meeting between the 
investors and the companies’ executive. The company executive take this   
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opportunity to inform the investor all about what they need to know such 
as, the direction of the company and how the company operate under 
these circumstances, high competition, fluctuated currency value, 




The channels which the interviewees can receive the information directly from the 
company, such as, company visiting and shareholders meeting. Most interviewees 
prefer this channel because they could acquire more in-depth information which they 
cannot find out from the papers or the annual report. The information from this source 
usually provided by the company’s top management, therefore it is the good 
opportunity for the interviewees to ask some strategy questions or some important 
questions which they cannot find the answer from the annual report. 
 
   Advantage of personal contact 
  In-depth information and clearly understand  
The first advantage of personal contact is that these sources of information 
give the interviewees considerable in-depth information. Therefore, it helps 
them to achieve a better understanding about the company 
 
In case F: ‘From the personal contact we can ask the strategic questions, 
the questions about the direction of the companies in the future, or some 
questions about pricing their products, and etc.’ (Fund manager) 
 
 
One of the interviewees stated that personal contact allows them to understand 
the company clearly, even though they acquire the same information which 
they can find from the public. 
 
In case E: ‘When I do the company visit and meeting with the company’s 
top manager, they will give me the same information that they provide 
for the public. Even though it is the same information (as they disclose to 
public), it is better, because I can ask them some questions about what I 
do not understand clearly.’ (Fund manager) 
 
  Acquire top executive’s vision 
The information from the personal contact is different from the narative 
information or financial statements that the company discloses. One of the 
analysts informed that from the personal contact they get the top executives’ 
vision, the company’s problems and the way how the company top executive  
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plan to solve the problems. This information is important and they can also use 
it when they evaluate the company top executive performance. Moreover, 
there is support from fund manager side  
 
In case F: ‘For general information, we can easily acquire it, but that 
information did not indicate anything about the direction of the 
companies in the future. Due to, an investment is based on the future, 
therefore the personal contact will be more useful than the information 
from the annual report.’ (Fund manager) 
 
  Two ways communication 
Another, advantage of the personal contact is two-way communication. When 
they have any doubt questions; they can ask directly the company’s top 
management and be able to get an immediate answer. Moreover, they can raise 
questions or when the companies’ top executives answer their questions, they 
can observe the companies’ top executives re-action and evaluate them. This 
allows them to obtain in a clearer and more accurate understanding of the 
company.   
 
   Limitation of personal contact 
Even though there are several advantages of the personal contact, but it would be 
useless for anyone who has no experience, since they could not catch any important 
information which affects the company risk. 
 
In case I: ‘For the company visiting, if the audience has no experience, 
they will not catch any important information. There, we will meet the 
company’s top manager who would announce only the good things about 
the company and sometimes we will meet the analysts who try to find out 
from the company’s executives where the numerical (numbers) come 
from; meanwhile the company’s top manager could not answer those 
questions It seems like we did not get any information from the company 
visiting.’ (Fund manager) 
 
Investor Relation (IR) department  
Most interviewees asserted that IR department is one of the important sources of 
information, especially in the special industries which have very complicate products 
or services. In Thailand, only a few listed companies have an IR department, because 





   Advantage of IR department 
The interviewees prefer this channel of information because they can acquire in-depth 
information of the company. Moreover, they indicated that this channel of information 
would be very useful for the individual investors.  
 
In case F: ‘The information that the investor relations departments 
provide are quite in-depth, especially in the industry which their 
products quite complicated such as petrochemical or whatever they are 
specialist. Therefore, IR department is very benefit for us.’  
 
‘……..If we talk about general companies, where their products or 
services are not too complicate, their IR department might be very useful 
for individual investors but not for me because I am an institutional 
investor with lots of data and be able to access from many source of 
information. In contrast, the companies where their products are 
complicated, the IR department would be very useful and dependable 
(for me and every one) since the analysts can hardly understand them.’ 
(Fund manager) 
 
Other private sources of information 
Besides personal contact and the IR department, analyst meetings are perceived as 
the other private source of information that the interviewees usually used for 
making a decision. The interviewees argued that this part is not differ from an 
interviewing the company top executive, the only thing is the format chosen, 
either one by one or one by others analysts.  
 
The personal relationships between analysts and top management 
Personal contact is one of the private disclosure channels, which the analysts/fund 
managers used when they need some more information from the company. They have 
the opportunity to contact the company’s top management in person and ask for the 
additional information, which could leads to personal relationships between 
analysts/fund managers and top manager. Therefore, this question ‘Assuming some 
analysts/fund managers familiar with top manager, would it be possible that the 
analysts/fund managers will receive more information than the other?’ were asked, 
and the interviewees replied that 
In case A: ‘An individual familiarity would be possible. However, it 
depends on top manager of the listed companies, they should know how 
much they can disclose and they should have professional ethics. In my 
view, of course the analysts who have been working in this career for a 
long period of time have more opportunity to contact with many top 
managers than analysts who just started their career. Therefore, top  
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managers should be aware of how much the information should be 
disclosed.’ (Securities analyst) 
 
 
In case D: ‘Uhmm… it is partly possible. Actually, there is SET laws 
which has already coped this problem. Although some of the analysts get 
more information than the others, I do not think that they can use or get 
benefit form that insider information.’ (Securities analyst) 
 
However, some interviewees suggested that if the companies have good disclosure 
format, for example, provide the analysts with a fact sheet or an information book 
which update all the time. Whenever the analysts/fund managers visit the companies, 
the companies will give analysts/fund managers these fact sheets or make slide 
presentations to provide an overview of the companies. Consequently, everybody will 
receive the same and equal information; therefore there is no problem about personal 




Public disclosures come from a variety of sources including through form 56-1, the 
annual report, and company’s website. These secondary data is very important 
because most interviewees asserted that they have to study them very carefully before 
taking a company visit.  
In case C: ‘Those channels of information (the annual report, financial 
statements, or the company’s website) are suitable for raw data which 
enable us to  study before asking some in-depth questions. (Securities 
analyst) 
 
 Annual  report 
Annual report is the raw data which the interviewees indicated that they usually use. 
 
  Advantage of annual report 
  Study in detail  
The annual report is important for the interviewees. Most of them stated that 
before they participate in the company visit or conduct an interview with 
companies’ top executives; they have to study the companies’ details 
thoroughly in order to formulate others in-depth questions.  
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In case B: ‘The annual report is the necessary condition and it’s a 
must for everyone to look at. Every time I do a company visit, I will 
study the annual report thoroughly.    
 
‘……..The reason is that the questions we ask during the company visit 
are not about the numbers as we can find out all that information from 
the papers. Therefore, we have to prepare ourselves to be ready before 
we meet the companies’ top executive, at least 90 percent, and ask 
them more about the company direction  and overall.’ (Securities 
analyst) 
 
  Limitation of annual report 
  Not up-to-date 
Most interviewees indicated that the annual report is delay in publication. 
Therefore, they are looking for the other source of information which the 
companies also disclose for the Sock Exchange of Thailand such as the 
information from an online SETSMART (SET Market Analysis and Reporting 
Tool) and form 56-1. 
In case F: ‘I seldom used the information from annual report because of 
its delay and not up-to-date. We have to wait for the annual report to be 
prepared for almost three months after the closing date, whiles we can 
have the financial statements soon after its disclosed as an online 
financial statements on the Stock  Exchange of Thailand website.’ 
 
‘…..Uhmm… For me, the annual report is nothing, because there is quite 
a delay. I do not mean that the annual reports have no information, but it 
takes a long period of time before we get the annual reports. When we 
get it, we already knew all of the information which it contains. Actually, 
the top executives prepared the annual report since the end of the year, 
but kept it for and announcement in April of the following year. During 
this period, we have a chance to meet the top executive and we can 
acquire up to date information, so the annual report becomes just like 
the library for us to search the past, the history, and the development of 
the company. We did not use the annual report as the information for 
making a decision of buy or sell the stock, because this information is 
quite out of date.’ 
 
‘…..Uhmm…  It does not mean that we did not pay any attention to the 
annual report but because we can access most information before we 
have the annual report. Therefore, I just look at… Uhmm… the section 
of corporate governance, audit committee report, nominating committee 
report, and risk management committee report. I pay attention on these 
sections in the annual report. If you asked about the important 
information in the annual report, I would say that all of the financial 
data are very important.  Since we already have this fact before the 
annual report be present and we couldn’t wait that long, so most of the 
time we obtained the financial data from the website not directly from  
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the annual report. For example, in some situations if we have to wait for 
the information in the annual report until the following April, at that 




  One way communication 
 
Another limitation of the annual report is because of its one way 
communication. 
 
In case G: ‘…the information disclosed via the public media seemed to 
be well arranged and it is one-way communication. This channel might 
not be good channel since we are probably missed some good 
information. For instance, if we have some questions, we might be 
allowed to ask them (the company) through email. The answers, which of 
course are in letters, might not express their views or opinions, whilst 
two way communications would fulfil the need of getting better 
information.’ (Fund manager) 
 
Other public sources of information 
Besides the annual report, there are some other public sources of information that the 
interviewees usually used when making a decision. Those sources of information are: 
 
  Company presentations of the preliminary and interim results; the 
interviewees indicated that this part will link with annual report and interim. 
Some companies provide explanations, whilst others do not explain.     
  Preliminary profit announcements; the interviewees stated that they also use 
this source but keep watching the numbers active, because there is quite few in 
Thailand.  
  Trade journals; analysts asserted that there are very few in-depth analyses of 
industries in Thailand. Most of the commercial banks in Thailand do the in-
depth analysis by themselves. An example from fund manager side is  
 
‘We did not directly used information from trade journals since we are a 
mutual fund and got some good analytics services from the brokers. These 
analytic reports by brokers were prepared from many sources of 
information including trade journals, though we did not directly used 
information from trade journals but it was indirectly informed in that 
research.’ (Fund manager) 
 
  Other analysts; almost all the interviewees asserted that they normally refer 
to international analysts who have a broader point of view than local analysts.  
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Most international analysts view the whole sector, like viewing the whole 
region for petrochemical, focusing the whole sector of shipping transport 
while local analysts have a narrow focus. 
 
In case G: ‘For analyzed data I usually use the information from brokers, both 
domestic and international brokers. Uhmm…. Seemingly, the information from 
international brokers has more quality than from domestic brokers; the reason 
is that international brokers have to serve their information to international 
investors who are more professional. Whenever they look on the financial 
data, they use the same pattern such as financial ratios and the companies’ 
characteristics.’ (Fund manager) 
 
  Datastream online database; for analysts side, they stated that this is quite 
essential and most of them are already have it, while some fund managers 
indicated that  they did not use the Datastream because their company did not 
have this program. However, most brokers use Datastream, so they can get it 
indirectly from the brokers’ analyses.  
  Annual General Meeting (AGM); few interviewees stated that they acquire 
the important information from the annual general meeting.  
 
In case I: ‘From the shareholders meeting we usually get more important 
information because the company’s top manager (top executive) would 
attend the meeting and have to present the company’s view. It’s happened 
sometimes that they have to give some additional information, for 
example, the company’s top management has to ask the shareholders for 
the right to issue a company bond. If we wonder why they have to issue the 
bond, e.g. does the company have enough working capital, the top 
executive should be able to explain the reason why. If the explanation does 
not sound reasonable, the shareholders will ask more questions. That 
means we will get more information.’ (Fund manager) 
 
On the other hand, some interviewees argued that they did not get in-depth 
information from the annual general meeting. For example 
 
In case F: ‘I rarely use the information from this source because we did 
not get adequate information from the Annual General Meeting (AGM). In 
AGM there are many investors attending, thus we scarcely get in-depth 
information. Therefore, we attend the AGM in order to protect our rights 
rather than get some information for analysis.’ (Fund manager) 
 
     Market news; one analysts stated that 
In case A: ‘I, myself, rarely use the information from the newspapers due 
to the lack of creditability and the lack of guarantee for its accuracy. It 
does not assist for analysis but it might help in informing the mass 
communication’s mood. Some people might see the important role of 
using technical analysis in determines the timing for buying or selling  
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the stock, they sometimes using the graphs as part of the information. 
The most important thing for sources of information is the fundamental 
or facts should be primarily consideration.’ (Securities analyst) 
 
 
Theme II: Disclosure and the quality of disclosure 
 
The second theme is about disclosure and the quality of disclosure. In this theme, 
there were five following subsections of connected theme including definition and 
objective of disclosure, good characteristics of disclosure, factor related to quality of 
disclosure, disclosure and information asymmetry, and the effect of disclosure on 










Disclosure definition and objective 
 
The interviewees argued that there are several reasons why a company discloses more 
information; 
  Advertise and manipulate their stock; the interviewees stated that the 
company may disclose information because it has some other hidden 
objectives; such as to promote their share price. 
 
In case B: ‘Some companies want to manipulate their stock, so they will 
disclose only the good news.’ (Securities analyst) 
 
In case G: ‘Anyway, sometimes listed companies disclose their 
information such as the information which has an effect on the company 
performance, stock pricing, or many people because they have some 
hidden reasons.’ (Fund manager) 
 
  Channels of monitoring performance; the information disclosure is an 
important mechanism for shareholders to use it as a channel for monitoring 
the executives’ performance and the companies’ operation as performance.  
Therefore, the information disclosed by the companies should be clear, 
accurate reliable and timely. 
  Good image and value added; the companies disclose their information so as 
to increase their value. Whenever listed companies represent the good image 
for the investors, there will be an increase in their stock premium. 
  Mandatory; another objective why the company disclose their information is 
because of the SET requirements. 
  Provide benefit information; the company discloses information because 
they want to provide some benefit information to the investors. 
In case B: ‘From the analysts’ aspect, the disclosure helped us to 
understand the company’s main points and their profitability. There are 
varieties of disclosure formats, for example the one which was required 
to disclose or voluntary disclosure about the fact of going concern. The 
most important thing is that the companies’ top executives should have 
an ethic in disclosing the information.’ (Securities analyst) 
 
In case F: ‘Uhmm…the definition… is that the providers should provide 
the information that is benefit for an investment, not only post the news 
about what  you did , but should give adequate details of those 
information for the investors to analyses. For example, assume that 
company A announced the news about their taking over company B but 
did not give any further information. This means that company A  
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followed the minimum requirement by SET, not disclosure. Disclosure 
means to disclose all information which has some materiality and 
relevance to decision making or affect on stock pricing. What to disclose 
is about things that happened, why it happens and its effect on the 
investors. Moreover, you should disclose all the information timely and 
fairly to everyone in order to protect all investors from some group of 
people who can access and acquire the benefit from this information 
before public.’ (Fund manager) 
 
  Transparency; information disclosure and transparency. 
In case A: ‘For the transparency of the company itself. It is very 
important, if the investors believe that the company has transparency, be 
honest and discloses adequate information for the public to be able to 
analyze with no doubt. For instance, the company discloses margin, 
company growth or the explanation for the poor operating, performance 
etc. This will restore the investor credibility and the understanding of the 
company’s direction. Since it is not possible for the company to meet the 
investors or analysts all time, the transparent public disclosure will 
answer questions, at least 80%-90%, and enable both investors and 
analysts to analyze more easily.’ (Securities analyst) 
 
In case F: ‘Disclosure seemed like the transparency of the companies 
because the investors are the stake holders of the companies. Therefore, 
they should have the right to know the direction and the progress of the 
companies. The important thing is that the companies should fairly 




Good disclosure characteristics 
 
The interviewees indicated that there are several characteristics of good disclosure; 
 
  Accurately, truthfully, reliably and clearly; most interviewees stated that 
the companies with good information disclosure should disclose their 
information clearly, accurately, reliably and truthfully. 
  Assign the company’s speaker;  the interviewee from fund manager side 
indicated that 
In case I: ‘Good disclosure characteristic… Uhmm…. If we are talking 
about information other than that which is disclosed in the stock market, 
actually, there is no one endorses that information, sometimes they are 
from IR department and sometimes they are from the company’s top 
management. Some companies do not formally assign who should be the 
company’s speaker. For instance, if I want the information about 
marketing, I will make a phone call directly to interview the company’s  
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marketing executive. If I want to know about financial information, I will 
call CFO.  
 
‘...If it is an ideal company with good disclosure characteristic, I think 
the company should assign the company’s speaker which has similar 
characteristic to the IR department. From this speaker, we would get the 
reliable information which comes from the same source of information 
as from the company. That is what we want.’  
 
 
However, I do not require that the companies should have such a 
speaker. As I stated above, we visit the companies, but we did not believe 
all of the information which they give us. For the companies which we 
used to investing, we tried to investigate whether their top managers 
were able to do the thing they had promised in the past or not. This 
would be the record of that companies’ top managers and if we regularly 
invest (in the SET), we would be able to black list some of those 
companies’ managers. We could mention that any of those managers 
who would never be able to do what they said and sometimes they just 
said in order to promote their share price. Therefore, the market 
mechanism will be the thing which rechecks itself. If asking whether it is 
necessary or not that the company’s assign speaker, the answer will be 
“not necessary”, but asking about our need, the answer will be “yes”.’ 
(Fund manager) 
 
  Regular and timely;  the interviewees asserted that the company that 
perceived as doing a good job of disclosing financial information to investors 
should disclose the information regularly and timely. Moreover, they should 
disclose both good and bad news. 
In case A: ‘The most important thing is the companies should disclose 
the information regularly. Moreover, the companies should disclose both 
bad and good news. Some companies disclose only good news and avoid 
explanation of the bad news, while other companies explain everything 
that happens to the companies every quarter.’ 
 
‘….Regular disclosure is quite difficult. After the companies disclose the 
information they should prepare to answer the following questions. For 
instance, if the companies have good operation of performance the 
investors will ask the question why the companies pay the small 
dividend, or when the companies do not operate as well as they should, 
the investors will ask for the reason.’ 
 
‘….the CEO should meet and supply some fact sheets to the investors 
and the journalists for the clear understanding about the companies, and 
for accurate news.’ (Securities analyst) 
 
  Equally for all investor; the companies with good disclosure should treat all 
investors equally in order not to give some advantage to some investors.   
  247
  Relevant and adequate; the interviewees indicated that the companies which 
are doing good job in disclosure should disclose adequate and relevant 
information to investors. 
In case A: ‘Companies should disclose adequate and relevant 
information to investors.  Full disclose may be harmful to the company. 
For example, if the companies disclose their customer name list or their 
export market share, the companies may loose. Thus, they should 
disclose the information in an appropriate level.’ (Securities analyst) 
 
In case B: ‘Mention about good disclosures, I think the companies 
should disclose appropriate information, not too much and not too little, 
in order not to mislead the investor.’ (Securities analyst) 
 
  Provide obviously channels of disclosure; a company with a good disclosure 
system should provide a convenient and easy channel of accessing information 
for all investors to search for additional information; such as company web-
site to search for the previous financial statements and annual reports.  
 
In case F: ‘Uhmm… the companies should obviously have channels for 
their disclosure. It means that if something happens to the company the 
investors will know which channels they can follow up and check the 
companies’ news besides the channels that the companies use under the 
SET mandatory.  The examples are the IR department or the companies’ 
website for the investors to follow up the news. The obvious channels of 
disclosure will be very helpful for the investors especially for those who 
did not invest in that company or did not follow up the companies’ news 
for a long time. Supposing that these investors want to reinvest in that 
company, they should be able to know the company’s disclosure system, 
the way the companies disclose their information.’ (Fund manager) 
 
  Follow the requirement (Mandatory); most of the interviewees stated that 
the information that the company discloses should meet the requirements of 
SET. 
 
In case G: ‘In my point of view, good disclosure characteristic means the 
companies should follow the SET disclosure requirements and they 
should disclose both the good and bad sides of the company.  Some 
companies will disclose only the good sides in order to advertise 
themselves.’ (Fund manager) 
 
  Transparency; a company with a good disclosure should be transparent. 
  Neutral;  the company that doing good job in disclosure should disclose 





Factor related to quality of disclosure 
 
Although there are several factors that are related to the quality of disclosure, the 
interviewees indicated only two main important factors which affect both the quality 
and the level of disclosure.  
 
The regulator; most interviewees asserted that the more the regulators strict with the 
listed companies, the higher the disclosure quality. Consequently, the listed 
companies will have the same standard. 
In case A: ‘…..for example, the commercial banks are under the Bank of 
Thailand control, therefore the commercial banks have to disclosure the 
information according to the regulations that are set up by the Bank of 
Thailand. These regulations force the commercial banks to give more 
details and a higher level of disclosure.’ (Securities analyst) 
 
However, some companies have no regulatory control, but they also provide good 
quality of disclosure. 
In case A: ‘…. some companies had no regulatory control like PTT 
Chemical Public Company Listed, or Advanced Info Service Public 
Company Listed but they do have a higher level disclosure. This results 
in a good feeling to the public, they feel that the disclosed information 
are full transparent. Meanwhile, some other companies try to hide from 
the analysts and it is interesting to know that many of them have faced 
the financial crises.  Their financial statement announcements 
concentrate on the amount of numbers rather than the explanation.   
Based on this kind of information, the public users do not understand 
what has happened to these companies and come up with many 
questions. If the companies do not disclosure the information, the 
analysts will not have the accurate information to analyse.’ (Securities 
analyst) 
 
Company itself; another factor is the listed companies themselves whether or not 
they want to disclose and how much do they want to disclose. 
In case A: ‘… depend on the listed companies themselves whether they 
want to disclose or not and how much do they want to disclose. In the 
past, the Siam Cement Public Company Limited is one of the best 
models. For example, if the analyses ask the company’s manager about 
the company break down, the manager will not answer this question 
directly, instead, they will explain about their total sale size not 
individual sales of steel nor sales of cement nor the margin in order to 
protect it from the competitor. Now the concept has been changed due to 
all the competitors are in the competitive market.’  (Securities analyst)  
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It is also depend on the company. Thai companies can be divided into two groups. 
Large listed companies, and the medium and small listed companies. 
 
In case F: ‘The first group is the stable companies such as the large size 
listed companies which have professional management. Uhmm… the 
market mechanism has more influence on the companies in this group 
than disclosure. When these companies disclose information, it will 
increase their stock premium. Therefore, companies in this group usually 
disclose more information than the investors need and more than 
required by the SET.’  
 
‘….the second group is medium size and small size listed companies. 
These companies usually disclose their information at the minimum 
requirement of the SET. Therefore, the requirement from the SET has 
more influence on companies in this group.’ (Fund manager) 
 
Disclosure and the information asymmetry 
 
An information asymmetry is present when some parties to business transactions may 
have an information advantage over others. Information asymmetry causes the market 
to become inefficient.  
In case F: ‘… Uhmm…in small listed companies, some top executives 
does not know nor clearly understand the policy of how to properly 
disclose information, so it causes an information asymmetry. For 
instance, when some small groups of investors make an appointment 
with the (small) companies’ top executive, sometimes these top 
executives were not careful with the information which they had 
disclosed. They forget that that information should be disclosed to public 
at the same time. Sometimes top executives in small listed companies 
announce the information in their small meeting. Consequently, those 
small groups of investors who attend that meeting will get the benefit.’ 
(Fund manager)      
 
Therefore, it would be possible if the company provides quality disclosure, it could be 
reduce this problem from the capital market. The question was asked whether 
disclosure could reduce information asymmetry problem in the capital market, most 
of the interviewees agreed that it could reduce some of the problem but not the whole.  
 
In case B: ‘An adequate disclosure could reduce some information 
asymmetry problems and the rest is dependent on the capability of the 
analyst. The ones who have more competence and more experience will 
be able to get more information.’ (Securities analyst) 
 
In case C: ‘Yes, it can solve some problems but still some are left 
because there is unequal information access among groups of investors,  
250 
 
due to some information access channels being difficult and expensive to 
access.’ (Securities analyst) 
 
In case D: ‘Yes, if the companies treat all investors equally. Everyone 
should acquire the same information at the same time. Therefore, no one 
should get more information than the others, and the information 
asymmetry problem should be decrease.’ (Securities analyst) 
 
However, one institutional fund manager commented that for individual investors, 
although the company provides good in disclosure, the information asymmetry still 
exists. 
 
In case G: ‘May I divide the investors in to two groups, institutional 
investors and individual investors. For institutional investors, mostly it is 
their duty to follow up the information, if they missed some part of the 
information that means they are deficient in their responsibility. For the 
individual investors, it would be difficult for them to access the 
information. Almost ninety percent of them are unable to catch up the 
information in time because it is not their job to follow up the 
information. Even though there is good disclosure in the capital market, 
the information asymmetry problems still happen. Therefore, the other 




The effect of disclosure on stock pricing 
 
Disclosure can affect stock pricing in two ways. The first way is about disclosure of 
information, and the second way is about the news that the companies release. Most 
of the interviewees asserted that information disclosure does not affect on stock 
pricing as much as the news that announced by the companies.  
In case F: ‘….if we used the word “information” for something 
significant to the share price (or relate to the share price). If the 
companies disclose the same information and give all of the details at 
once to everybody, allow them to have enough time to analyse the 
information, the share price will vary according to the fundamental 
factors. In contrast, if the companies disclose or announce their 
information during a buy and sell period the changing of the share price 
will be very volatile and it will not depend on the fundamental factors. 
Well, if we define the information disclosure’ (Fund manager) 
 
Moreover, good disclosure also effect on stock pricing 
 
In case B: ‘Good disclosure would increase the stock premium.  Good 
disclosure means that the companies disclose their information, both  
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positive and negative. The companies should disclose relevance 
information with accuracy, these would increase their transparency. For 
instance, in the past CP (Charoen Pokphand Foods Public Company 
Limited) stock did not reach a higher premium when they traded because 
the investors wondered about the accuracy of their information and did 
not trust the information disclosed. Compared with the Advanced 
(Advanced Info Service Public Company Limited) stock and the PTT 
(PTT Public Company Limited) stock which reach higher premium when 
traded, that because of their transparent disclosure.’ (Securities analyst) 
 
In case F: ‘…. If “information” is means everything that can effect on 
the share price, therefore the companies should have a clear, complete 
and timely disclosure system. Good disclosure system will allow analysts 
and the investors to receive the information at the same time. If it is not 
timely or each group of investors did not receive the same information 
these will absolutely effect on the share price. Moreover, it will be an 
advantage or disadvantage for some group of people who acquire the 
information faster or slower than the other group, or difference in 
analyse capability.’ (Fund manager) 
 
 
Another characteristic of good disclosure that should be effect on the stock pricing is 
transparency. 
 
In case A: ‘The transparent disclosure should effect on pricing. A 
company with transparent disclose is more likely to have a higher share 
price than the company without transparent disclosure. For example, 
both companies may have an equal profit, but the P/E of the company 
which discloses unclear information would not be as high as the P/E of 
the transparent company. Some studies indicate that the transparent 
company’s stock premium is about 20-25 percent higher than the share 
price of the companies without transparency.’ (Securities analyst) 
 
 
In case C: ‘….the more transparent of the listed companies, the higher 
stock premium the companies get because the investors do not doubt the 
companies’ transparency. The obvious example for this case is PTT 
public company limited. PTT gives more details when it discloses 
information; the investors have no doubt about the company, 
consequently the company get a higher stock premium.’ (Securities 
analyst) 
 
Another insight from the interviews, the interviewee indicated that if the information 
asymmetry reduced, it would lift up the stock liquidity 
 
In case E: ‘Uhmm….. it will attract investors’ attention. If the companies 
neither disclose adequate information nor arrange a company visit 
(especially, top manager meeting), the institutional investors will ignore 
the companies’ stocks. When the institutional investors are not interested 
in those stocks, the remainder of investors would be only individual  
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investors and the company’s executives. Consequently, those stocks will 
lose stock liquidity’ (Fund manager) 
 
 
Theme III: Voluntary disclosure 
 
The reasons to engage in voluntary disclosure  
 
The interviewees indicated that there are several reasons why companies engage in 
voluntary disclosure; 
  Advertise the company; one institutional fund manager stated that 
 
In case G: ‘The more the companies disclose their information, the more 
the companies get the benefit. It seems like the companies advertise 
themselves to the investors for their better understanding of the 
companies and to persuade the investors to invest in the companies.’ 
(Fund manager) 
 
  Improve their transparency;  most of the interviewees indicated that a 
company engages in voluntary disclosure because it would like to improve its 
transparency. The more the company disclosed the additional information for 
investment, the more the company looks clearly for the investors. For 
instance, some companies set up an IR department and a company website, 
where it can regularly update the information for their investors.  
  Increase the quality;  most of the interviewees asserted that companies 
engage in voluntary disclosure because this will increase the quality of their 
disclosure.  
  Increase the companies’ value and restore investor confidence; voluntary 
disclosure will help to increase the companies’ value. The more the 
companies disclose the information, the more people clearly understand the 
companies.  Moreover, voluntary disclosure is beneficial for the companies 
that need to restore investor confidence, especially in a country that has a 
financial crisis like that experienced in Thailand. Thus, improving investor 
confidence should begin with the corporate transparency and accountability 
first. 
In case F: ‘… The large size listed companies would be more 
professional; they realized how important the information is. They know 
that if they  want to increase their companies’ value or persuade the  
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investors to invest in their stock, they have to disclose clear information. 
Therefore, they are willingly to disclose additional information and think 
that it does not cost anything….’ (Fund manager) 
 
  Increase the stock premium; most companies engage in voluntary disclosure 
because they want the investors pay attention in their stock and increase their 
stock premium. 
 
In case D: ‘To disclose more information than the minimum level of the 
SET requirement is good for the company and it would make investors 
understand the company clearly, which will consequently effect on the 
P/E. However, too much information disclosure might be either 
endangering the companies as well because it might be benefit for their 
competitors’ (Securities analyst) 
 
In case F: ‘Actually, most companies that have an IR department that 
feeds their information to the investors; they usually arrange the meeting 
for analysts and investors quarterly. These meeting also cost the 
companies, but the companies will get the benefit from these costs in the 
form of a stock premium. Therefore, the companies pay attention on the 
voluntary disclosure.’ (Fund manager) 
 
Voluntary disclosure enhances the value of the annual report 
 
Most of the interviewees agreed that voluntary disclosure enhances the value of the 
annual report. The more information disclosed, the more investors clearly understand 
the company’s annual report. Consequently, they should be able to make a better 
investment decision. 
 
In case A: ‘Voluntary disclosure enhances the value of the annual report 
and benefits the investor.  Moreover, it would be better, if the company 
has it own website to disclose their information to public and always 
update the information.’ (Securities analyst) 
 
Moreover, the interviewees stated that companies should disclosure both good and 
bad.  
 
In case G: ‘Yes, voluntary disclosure enhances the company’s value. The 
companies should disclose both good side and bad side, which will be 







The limitation of the voluntary disclosure 
 
Most of the interviewees indicated that additional information is good and of benefit 
for the investors, especially for the sophisticate investors because they are able to 
understand the information clearly and are able to analyse the information.  However, 
the provider should be aware and consider the information disclosed in the annual 
report or others channel too, because not all of the investors are sophisticated. If the 
companies disclose too much information, it could make the unsophisticated investors 
confused and might not be of benefit to them.  
In case B: ‘Additional disclosure is good, but if the companies disclose 
too much information, I do not think it would be of benefit; too much 
information would make investors confused. Not all of the investors are 
sophisticated in this field, only some groups of investor could interpret 
and understand the annual report clearly. Therefore, if the companies 
give too much information, it would make investors confused and be 
misleading. However, some sophisticated investors who prefer more 
information maybe dispute this idea, and ask the companies to make 
voluntary disclosure.’ (Securities analyst) 
 
Therefore, the interviewees suggested that the companies should form their IR 
department to provide more information for the investors.  
In case B: ‘Some companies form an IR department to provide more 
information to the analysts and investors because some sophisticate 
information will be too complicated for some investors.’ (Securities 
analyst) 
 
Another way that the interviewees suggested is the companies should give the 
additional and complicated information to the analysts who could interpret and 
understand that information. 
In case B: ‘…..The companies could solve this problem by passing the 
information to the right person, such as analysts; who has the capability 
to interpret the information instead of to all investors. Therefore, when 
the companies need to give some additional information, they should not 
give that information directly to the public because it can cause many 
problems. If the companies give too much information, it is useless for 
some investors who are not sophisticated and cannot interpret it. It 
would be better if the companies give that information to the analysts 
because they would know how to interpret and make it simple to 
understand for the unsophisticated person. They have their own ways to 





Theme VI: Type of information and section in the annual report 
 
Type of information 
There are two types of information disclosed by companies; quantitative and 
qualitative. Quantitative information is considered as the information in numerical 
form or involves a measurement of any kind, while qualitative information is not. 
Qualitative information could be much more than just written document in words or 
text; for example an in-depth interview, direct observation and so on. Some of the 
interviewees indicated that they preferred quantitative information such as financial 
information from the financial statements or ratios rather than qualitative information.  
In case F: ‘…..Actually, I use both types of data and focus more on the 
quantitative data because we can look for all ratios from that.  These 
ratios present the performance of the company and at the same time we 
use it as a double check tool for us; whether the top executives can 
deliver what they had committed to in the past through the financial 
statement or not. Therefore, the quantitative data is very useful for us to 
forecast the company’s share price in the future.’ (Fund manager) 
While some of the interviewees asserted that they preferred qualitative information 
much more that quantitative information. 
In case B: ‘…..I think qualitative is more important than quantitative. 
Actually, most analysts prefer knowledge based information to indicative 
information. For example, if some companies announce their strength 
and good news, in fact I do not think they should do like that, instead of 
doing thing like that, it would be better if they could inform us with their 
important quantitative and qualitative information to analyze and allow 
us to raise any question. The companies should provide the fundamental 
information, for example, give some information about what happens 
with this year’s sales and briefly explain or forecast the future, but do 
not express their own idea, otherwise it will be too much judgement.’ 
(Securities analyst) 
However, others interviewees stated that qualitative information also important when 
making decisions, because they do not want to miss some points of view; for instance, 
companies’ competitive situations, companies’ problems, and companies’ 
competitors.  
In case F: ‘…..The qualitative data is also important too.  As we already 
know that the quantitative data is the historical data, but to forecast the  
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future we need the qualitative data to plug in. For example, if we want to 
forecast how much the sales will increase, what the margin will be, how 
much the bottom line is, how much dividend should be paid, etc. All of 
these need qualitative data such as industry trend, top executive forecast 
on product price or their competence to plug in with all the numerical 
data in order to have a forecast data.’ (Fund manager) 
Although, there are two views on type of information, but most of the interviewees 
stated that they pay attention in both type of information equally. The quantitative 
information will be used in analyses of trend in order to forecast the future, while the 
qualitative information will add up some other important information which are not in 
the numbers, such as competitive condition etc. Therefore, without one of both, the 
analyses will not be complete.    
In case A: ‘…..both types of information are important. Without one side 
of the information the analysis will not be complete. Sometime 
quantitative information does not come from financial statements, it may 
be comes from statistics or from the analysis of specialists in the 
industry. Therefore, I can’t identify which type of information is the most 
important.’ (Securities analyst) 
 
 
Most preference section in the annual report 
 
Most interviewees indicated that the most useful sections in the annual report are 
sections related to qualitative information, rather than quantitative information such as 
financial information which they could access before they received the annual report. 
 In case F: ‘Uhmm…  It does not mean that we did not pay any attention 
to the annual report but because we can access most information before 
we have the annual report. Therefore, I just look at… Uhmm… the 
section on corporate governance, audit committee report, nominating 
committee report, and risk management committee report. I pay 
attention on these sections in the annual report. If you asked about the 
important information in the annual report, I would say that all of the 
financial data are very important.  Since we already have this fact before 
the annual report be present and we couldn’t wait that long, so most of 
the time we obtained the financial data from the website not directly 
from the annual report. For example, in some situation if we have to wait 
for the information in the annual report until the following April, at that 
time the overall situation or figure might be changed already.’ (Fund 
manager) 
 
The interviewees prefer the qualitative sections because these sections informed them 
of the executives’ visions and the company’s future direction.  
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In case H: ‘Uhmm… the first sections that I consider is the message from 
the chairman, vision and mission, Management’s Discussion Analysis 
and financial highlights.’ (Fund manager) 
 
In case A: ‘Vision is important. Sometimes the message from the 
chairman would inform the vision of the companies.’ (Securities analyst) 
 
Moreover, the interviewees pay attention in the companies’ historical information, 
because this information shows the companies’ performance and development. 
In case B: ‘Uhmm..It should be the historical information structure. I 
read some of the opening statement, thoroughly pay attention to the audit 
report and financial data but not much on the rest.’ (Securities analyst) 
 
In case G: ‘…..the historical data. I usually look at the performance of 
the companies in the past 3 – 5 years. The more far back the information 
available is, the more visibility the development of the company.’ (Fund 
manager) 
 
Furthermore, the interviewees asserted that the more the companies disclose historical 
information, the more they get benefit. 
In case B: ‘….The analysts can keep that as the reference information 
and the information such as time series data is also of benefit to us too. 




Information required as additional disclosure in the annual report 
 
Some of the interviewees stated that the annual report already covered all necessary 
the information; therefore they need it more up to date.  
In case F: ‘…In my opinion I think the annual report has covered them 
all. This question should asked of the individual investors, because they 
really need the information from the annual report and they might need 
some additional information.  For the institutional investors, it is already 
covered because they are able to access many sources of information 
they need before the annual report announced.’ (Fund manager) 
 
In case G: ‘…Actually, the annual report provides some necessary 
information, but I also prefer online information because it is more up to 
date.’ (Fund manager) 
  
While others interviewees indicated that they need more information on corporate and 
management structure and historical trends. 
In case A: ‘…corporate and management structure, results of the 
operation of the companies in the past.  Historical information is very  
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important, because analysts are trend analysts. Therefore, the more the 
companies disclose their historical information, the easier for analysts to 
analyse. The analysts’ duty are analysing the strength and weakness of 
the companies.’ (Securities analyst) 
 
 
Theme V: Auditor and the credibility of the annual report 
 
The importance of the auditor and the credibility of the annual report 
 
Most of the interviewees indicated that the audit is important. Besides, they perceived 
that the auditors are increasing the credibility of the financial report, because the 
auditors are the one who verified the accuracy of the financial statements. Thus, if the 
financial statements are confirmed by the auditors, it means that those statements are 
accurate and reliable within the accounting principles. 
 
In case A: ‘Auditors are very important in enhancing the credibility of 
the financial statements and annual report, because it is the view from 
the third party who gains nothing from the company or the manager.’ 
(Securities analyst) 
 
In case F: ‘…the auditor enhances the credibility of the information 
disclosure for companies’ financial statement, and the quality of the 
auditor is highly required.’ (Fund manager) 
 
Dose auditor reputation matter (auditor reputation and the credibility of the 
annual report) 
 
The reputation of the audit firm is important. From the interviews, it seems that big 
size audit firms or international audit firms are getting more advantage than smaller 
size audit firms or local audit firms.  
In case A: ‘The reputation of the audit firm has an important role and is 
associated with the disclosure. An international audit firm or the audit 
firm with much experience would have more credibility than a local 
audit firm. However, some listed companies have limited budgets; thus, 
they cannot hire an international audit firm because they cannot afford 
the audit fee. Therefore, if the audit firm is licensed and approved by the 
Securities and Exchange Commission, that firm would have more 
credible and reliable.’ (Securities analyst) 
 
Most interviewees have confidence on the statements audited by big audit firms.   
They do not doubt in an accuracy of the financial statements which are audited by the  
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big audit firms because they believe that those statements are well examined by audit 
team. According to the big audit firms are well known than small audit firms; 
somehow, if there are any mistakes in the financial statements that are audited by the 
big audit firm, it could cause a huge negative effect on their reputation. Moreover, big 
audit firm usually have more money to invest in their audit team and audit tools which 
effect on the audit process.   
In case D: ‘Uhmm….. Big Four audit firms are usually more reliable 
than the local audit firms, because they are international. Uhmm.....   
Compared with local firms, these firms are quite big firms, so they have 
more money; to develop and invest in their auditors and audit tools for a 
better audit process. Besides, the Big Four audit firms also have their 
own research departments and other support departments to study in, 
search for, and prepare some up-to-date information or some specialist 
information for their auditors. Therefore, it would not be a problem for 
the Big Four audit firms if they have to audit the companies which need 
very specialist or have very complicated product lines. The Big Four 
audit firms’ auditors could ask their support departments whenever they 
have some problems or need some more specialist information, while it 
would be difficult for the local audit firms because setting up the support 
departments consume a lot of money.’ (Securities analyst) 
 
Some of the interviewees stated that the reputation of audit firm enhances the 
credibility of the annual report because they perceived that financial statements which 
are audited by the big audit firms are more reliable and more confident, when 
compared with the ones from the small audit firms. 
In case E: ‘Uhmmm….. Reputation?…….if you are talking about 
reputation, there are some different among audit firms, something 
related to credibility. We usually give more credit to big audit firms than 
small audit firms. We have to pay more attention in the statements that 
are verified by small audit firms. However, some audit firms that meet 
the requirement and approved by the Securities and Exchange 
Commission of Thailand (SEC) also provided us an odd statements, and 
most of the odd statements are come from small audit firms. 
Consequently, the images of small audit firms are in the negative side, 
but I did not mean all of the small audit firms. There are some good 
small audit firms too. Therefore, we should be careful when looking at 
the financial statements.’ (Fund manager) 
 
In case F: ‘For psychology, they are different.  At present, the Securities 
and Exchange Commission of Thailand (SEC) declared the list of 
auditors who have qualification to audit listed companies and I am not 
supposed to criticize whether their audit quality is different, we assumed 
that there is no difference.  In fact, if they are Big Four, we will more 
confident as their teams have more quality and better prepare. For  
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example, some listed companies may choose some audit firm on SEC list 
because the audit fee is cheaper, or because they can influence on audit 
firm, or can endorse some accounting transaction.  If they choose Big 
Four instead, we ensure that they have internal audit and will not allow 
their auditors or staff to act against the regulations.  I admit that I have 
some bias. If the report was audited and certified by Big Four audit firm, 
I am sure that I can rely on those figures. If not, I can hardly rely on and 
have to investigate the details carefully. I believe that there are 
difference in the result, their effort, their certified, and interfere by listed 
companies.’ (Fund manager) 
 
Moreover, the interviewees indicated that when they used the financial statements 
audited by big audit firms, it seems that they do not scarcely doubt about the accuracy 
of the statements.  
In case G: ‘…. When we read through the audit report which verified by 
the reputation audit firm, we scarcely doubt about the accuracy of the 
statements. In contrast, if the statements are verified by a no name audit 
firm; we have to do double jobs, first, to read through the audit report 
and concern whether this audit report is correct or not, and second, we 
can rely on the auditors or not. Comparing between the audit report 
which verified by the reputable audit firm and the no name audit firm, it 
easier for us to use and work on the financial report from the reputatable 
audit firm than the no name audit firm.’ (Fund manager) 
 
In case I: ‘In Thailand, I would say that there is nothing to inform that 
we will discount for the IPO price if your financial statements were 
audited by Big-Four. If not, the company executives might be in trouble 
to answer the analyst’s questions. It seems like you have two financial 
statements, if one was verified by Big-Four audit firm, the analysts may 
not ask any questions. If not, the company’s executives would probably 
face many questions even in the details of the numerical data. Especially 
for the listed companies which used to be the family business companies 
before, they would be asked a lot of question and the companies would 
be more doubt in their transparency if they were not audit by reliable 
audit firms. However, if asking whether there are any different in share 
price, I would say that there are no differences.’ (Fund manager) 
 
However, some of the interviewees argued that even though the audit is very 
important and increases the credibility of the financial statements, but they did not put 
too much weight on the reputation of the audit firms. They only pay much more 
attention to the company itself.  
 
In case B: ‘…For me, the reputation of the audit firm does not enhance 
the creditability of the annual report. The thing that I am concerned is 
the company itself, and the company share price depends on its 
performance not the audit firm. If the companies show good  
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performance, it means that they are a success, but if not, it means that 
they failed. Even though the unsuccessful company hired a Big Four 
audit firm, it could not turn from unsuccessful result to be the success 
one.’ (Securities analyst) 
 
Furthermore, they asserted that the reputation of the audit firm does not effect on the 
stock premium. 
 
In case F: ‘… I do not think it (the reputation of the auditor) is important. 
Uhmm… for example, assume that there are two financial statements. 
The first statement verified by a Big Four, while another statement 
verified by audit firm ABC which is approved by the Securities and 
Exchange Commission of Thailand (SEC). If you ask that whether the 
reaction of the share price of these companies is different or not, I do not 
think it is different. The reason is that they have met the minimum 
requirement of the SEC which means that they must be approved beneath 








(A) Strategic information: 
  General corporate information 
    brief history of company 
   organizational  structure 
  Corporate strategy 
    a statement of coporate goals or objectives is provided 
    a general statement of corporate strategy is provided 
    actions taken to achieve the corporate goal are discussed 
    planned actions to be taken in future years are discussed 
    a time frame for achieving corporate goals is provided 
    strategy towards environmental issues is provided 
    detailed segment performance is provided 
    risk policy are provided 
    commercial risk assessments are provided 
    financial risk assessments are provided 
    interest or exchange risks are discussed 
    other risk assessments are provided 
  Production 
    a general description of the business is provided 
    the principal products/services are identified 
    specific characteristics of these products/services are described 
    investments in production are discussed 
    rejection/defect rates  are discussed 
    volume of materials consumed is discussed 
    changes in production methods are discussed 
    changes in product materials are discussed 
  Research and development 
    corporate policy on research and development 
    discussion of future research and development activities 
    number employed in research and development 
    forecast of research and development expenses 
    discussion of new product development 
  Market strategy  
    sales and marketing strategy is provided 
    distribution channels are described 
    sales and marketing costs are provided 
    brand equity/visibility rating are discussed 
    customer turnover rates are discussed 
    customer satisfaction level is discussed 
    amount of new orders placed this years is provided  
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  Competition and outlook 
    the principal markets are identified 
    specific characteristics of these markets are described 
    the market sizes are estimated 
    market share are provided 
    change in market share is discussed 
    a forecast of market share is estimated 
    barriers to entry are discussed 
    the market growths are estimated 
    impact of barriers to entry on profits is discussed 
    the impact of competition on profits is discussed 
    impact of barriers to entry on future profits is discussed 
    the impact of competition on future profits is discussed 
  Future prospects 
    qualitative forecast of sales 
    quantitative forecast of sales 
    qualitative forecast of profits 
    quantitative forecast of profits 
    qualitative forecast of cash flows 
    quantitative forecast of cash flows 
    assumptions underlying the forecasts 
    current period trading results - qualitative 
    current period trading results - quantitative 
(B) Non financial information: 
  Information about directors 
    age of the directors 
    educational qualifications (academic and professional) 
    commercial experience of the executive directors 
    other directorships held by executive directors 
  Employee information 
    line of business distribution of employees 
    categories of employees by gender 
    number of employees  
    reasons for changes in employee numbers or categories 
    amount spent on education or training 
    categories of employees trained 
    number of employees trained 
    data on accidents 
  Social policy and value added information  
    safety of products (general) 
    the safety and welfare policy/ benefits of employees are discussed 
    provident fund for employees are discussed 
    environmental protection programs - qualitative 
    environmental protection programs - quantitative 
    charitable donations (amount) 
    community programs (general)  
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(C) Financial information: 
  Financial review 
    return on assets or sufficient information to compute return on asset   
         (i.e. net income, tax rate, interest expense and total assets is provided) 
    net profit margin or sufficient information to compute net profit margin  
         (i.e. net income, tax rate, interest expense and sales is provided) 
    return on equity or sufficient information to compute return on equity 
        (i.e. net income and stockholders equity) is provided 
   profitability  ratios 
   liquidity  ratios 
   other  ratios 
  Management discussion and Analysis 
    change in sales 
    change in operating income 
    change in cost of goods sold 
    change in cost of goods sold as a percentage of sales  
    change in gross profit 
    change in gross profit as a percentage of sales 
    change in selling and administrative expenses 
    change in interest or interest income 
    change in net income 
    change in inventory 
    change in account receivable 
    change in capital expenditures or R&D 
(D) Channels of Information and Investor Relations:  
  Company offer multiple channels of access to information 
   annual  report 
   company's  website 
   analysts  meeting 
  Company's website 
   business  operation 
    up-to-date financial statements 
    financial statement within last 3 years 
    up- to- date press release 
   shareholding  structure 
   organisation  structure 
    corporate group structure 
    downloadable annual report 
    invitation for general shareholders' meeting 
    provided up-to-date minutes from shareholders' meeting 
    available both in Thai and English language 
  Investor relations department 
    investor relation department 
    provided an obviously channel to contact  
         e.g. telephone number or email address 
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1.  What is your professional background? 
 Financial analyst   Fund manager  Other (specify)…………… 
 
2.  How long have you been working in this career? 
 under 5 yrs  5 – 10 yrs   11 – 15 yrs  16 – 20 yrs  over 20 yrs 
 
3.  Please indicate below which of the industry groups do you following? 
(More than one may be chosen) 
 Agro & Food Industry     Financials   
 Industrials     Property & Construction  
 Resources      Services    















In this section there is a list of securities in the SET100 Index (July 1, 2008 – 
December 31, 2008) classified by industry group. 
 
Instructions:   
 
Please rate the level of a company’s voluntary disclosure on the scale of 1-5 by 
circling the appropriate number where 1 is the lowest level of information disclosure 
and 5 is the highest level of information disclosure. 
 
The level of the company’s disclosure is divided into; 
 
1. Public disclosure;    i.e. annual report, quarterly and other published 
information, etc. 
 
(Please consider)   The timeliness and comprehensiveness of the information 
disclosed by the company.  
 
 
2. Private disclosure;  i.e. communication between you and the company’s 
top executive or IR department, company visit etc. 
 
(Please consider)   Accessibility,  knowledge ability, and responsiveness of 




NOTE !  Only rate those companies that you are currently following and do not 
rate the others 
 
 





Industry group: Financials   
No. Company  Name      Level  of company's disclosure 
       Public  Disclosure    Private Disclosure 
1  ACL BANK PUBLIC COMPANY LIMITED  ACL    1 2 3 4 5    1 2 3 4 5 
2  BANK OF AYUDHYA PUBLIC COMPANY LIMITED  BAY     1  2  3  4  5     1  2  3  4  5 
3  BANGKOK BANK PUBLIC COMPANY LIMITED  BBL    1 2 3 4 5    1 2 3 4 5 
4  KASIKORNBANK PUBLIC COMPANY LIMITED  KBANK     1  2  3  4  5     1  2  3  4  5 
5  KIATNAKIN BANK PUBLIC COMPANY LIMITED  KK    1 2 3 4 5    1 2 3 4 5 
6  KRUNG THAI BANK PUBLIC COMPANY LIMITED  KTB    1  2  3  4  5     1  2  3  4  5 
7  THE SIAM COMMERCIAL BANK PUBLIC COMPANY LIMITED  SCB    1 2 3 4 5    1 2 3 4 5 
8  SIAM CITY BANK PUBLIC COMPANY LIMITED  SCIB    1  2  3  4  5     1  2  3  4  5 
9  TISCO BANK PUBLIC COMPANY LIMITED  TISCO    1 2 3 4 5    1 2 3 4 5 
10  TMB BANK PUBLIC COMPANY LIMITED  TMB    1  2  3  4  5     1  2  3  4  5 
11  ADKINSON SECURITIES PUBLIC COMPANY LIMITED  ASL    1 2 3 4 5    1 2 3 4 5 
12  ASIA PLUS SECURITIES PUBLIC COMPANY LIMITED  ASP    1  2  3  4  5     1  2  3  4  5 
13  BUALUANG SECURITIES PUBLIC COMPANY LIMITED  BLS    1 2 3 4 5    1 2 3 4 5 
14  BFIT SECURITIES PUBLIC COMPANY LIMITED  BSEC    1  2  3  4  5     1  2  3  4  5 
15  KIM ENG SECURITIES (THAILAND) PUBLIC COMPANY LIMITED  KEST    1 2 3 4 5    1 2 3 4 5 
16  KGI SECURITIES (THAILAND) PUBLIC COMPANY LIMITED  KGI    1  2  3  4  5     1  2  3  4  5 
17  PHATRA SECURITIES PUBLIC COMPANY LIMITED  PHATRA    1 2 3 4 5    1 2 3 4 5 
18  THANACHART CAPITAL PUBLIC COMPANY LIMITED  TCAP    1  2  3  4  5     1  2  3  4  5 






Industry group: Property & Construction  
No. Company  Name      Level  of company's disclosure 
       Public  Disclosure    Private Disclosure 
1  RICH ASIA STEEL PUBLIC COMPANY LIMITED  RICH    1 2 3 4 5    1 2 3 4 5 
2  SAMCHAI STEEL INDUSTRIES PUBLIC COMPANY LIMITED  SAM    1  2  3  4  5     1  2  3  4  5 
3  THE SIAM CEMENT PUBLIC COMPANY LIMITED  SCC    1 2 3 4 5    1 2 3 4 5 
4  SIAM CITY CEMENT PUBLIC COMPANY LIMITED  SCCC    1  2  3  4  5     1  2  3  4  5 
5  TPI POLENE PUBLIC COMPANY LIMITED  TPIPL    1 2 3 4 5    1 2 3 4 5 
6  TATA STEEL (THAILAND) PUBLIC COMPANY LIMITED  TSTH    1  2  3  4  5     1  2  3  4  5 
7  AMATA CORPORATION PUBLIC COMPANY LIMITED  AMATA    1 2 3 4 5    1 2 3 4 5 
8  ASIAN PROPERTY DEVELOPMENT PUBLIC COMPANY LIMITED  AP    1  2  3  4  5     1  2  3  4  5 
9  BANGKOK LAND PUBLIC COMPANY LIMITED  BLAND    1 2 3 4 5    1 2 3 4 5 
10  CH. KARNCHANG PUBLIC COMPANY LIMITED  CK    1  2  3  4  5     1  2  3  4  5 
11  CENTRAL PATTANA PUBLIC COMPANY LIMITED  CPN    1 2 3 4 5    1 2 3 4 5 
12  HEMARAJ LAND AND DEVELOPMENT PUBLIC COMPANY LIMITED  HEMRAJ    1  2  3  4  5     1  2  3  4  5 
13  ITALIAN-THAI DEVELOPMENT PUBLIC COMPANY LIMITED  ITD    1 2 3 4 5    1 2 3 4 5 
14  LAND AND HOUSES PUBLIC COMPANY LIMITED  LH    1  2  3  4  5     1  2  3  4  5 
15  L.P.N. DEVELOPMENT PUBLIC COMPANY LIMITED  LPN    1 2 3 4 5    1 2 3 4 5 
16  METROSTAR PROPERTY PUBLIC COMPANY LIMITED  METRO    1  2  3  4  5     1  2  3  4  5 
17  MAJOR DEVELOPMENT PUBLIC COMPANY LIMITED  MJD    1 2 3 4 5    1 2 3 4 5 
18  POWER LINE ENGINEERING PUBLIC COMPANY LIMITED  PLE    1  2  3  4  5     1  2  3  4  5 
19  PREUKSA REAL ESTATE PUBLIC COMPANY LIMITED  PS    1 2 3 4 5    1 2 3 4 5 





No. Company  Name      Level  of company's disclosure 
       Public  Disclosure    Private Disclosure 
21  ROJANA INDUSTRIAL PARK PUBLIC COMPANY LIMITED  ROJANA    1 2 3 4 5    1 2 3 4 5 
22  SC ASSET CORPORATION PUBLIC COMPANY LIMITED  SC    1  2  3  4  5     1  2  3  4  5 
23  SANSIRI PUBLIC COMPANY LIMITED  SIRI    1 2 3 4 5    1 2 3 4 5 
24  SUPALAI PUBLIC COMPANY LIMITED  SPALI    1  2  3  4  5     1  2  3  4  5 
25  SINO-THAI ENGINEERING AND CONSTRUCTION PUBLIC CO.,LTD.  STEC    1 2 3 4 5    1 2 3 4 5 
26  TICON INDUSTRIAL CONNECTION PUBLIC COMPANY LIMITED  TICON    1  2  3  4  5     1  2  3  4  5 
27  TANAYONG PUBLIC COMPANY LIMITED  TYONG    1 2 3 4 5    1 2 3 4 5 
 
 
Industry group: Industrial 
No. Company  Name      Level  of company's disclosure 
       Public  Disclosure    Private Disclosure 
1  SOMBOON ADVANCE TECHNOLOGY PUBLIC COMPANY LIMITED  SAT    1 2 3 4 5    1 2 3 4 5 
2  THAI STANLEY ELECTRIC PUBLIC COMPANY LIMITED  STANLY    1  2  3  4  5     1  2  3  4  5 
3  G J STEEL PUBLIC COMPANY LIMITED  GJS    1 2 3 4 5    1 2 3 4 5 
4  G STEEL PUBLIC COMPANY LIMITED  GSTEEL    1  2  3  4  5     1  2  3  4  5 
5  SAHAVIRIYA STEEL INDUSTRIES PUBLIC COMPANY LIMITED  SSI    1 2 3 4 5    1 2 3 4 5 
6  THAI UNIQUE COIL CENTER PUBLIC COMPANY LIMITED  TUCC    1  2  3  4  5     1  2  3  4  5 
7  POLYPLEX (THAILAND) PUBLIC COMPANY LIMITED  PTL    1 2 3 4 5    1 2 3 4 5 
8  PTT CHEMICAL PUBLIC COMPANY LIMITED  PTTCH    1  2  3  4  5     1  2  3  4  5 






Industry group: Agro & Food Industry 
No. Company  Name      Level  of company's disclosure 
       Public  Disclosure    Private Disclosure 
1  CHAROEN POKPHAND FOODS PUBLIC COMPANY LIMITED  CPF    1 2 3 4 5    1 2 3 4 5 
2  KHON KAEN SUGAR INDUSTRY PUBLIC COMPANY LIMITED  KSL     1  2  3  4  5     1  2  3  4  5 
3  MINOR INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC COMPANY LIMITED  MINT    1 2 3 4 5    1 2 3 4 5 
4  THAI UNION FROZEN PRODUCTS PUBLIC COMPANY LIMITED  TUF     1  2  3  4  5     1  2  3  4  5 
5  THAI VEGETABLE OIL PUBLIC COMPANY LIMITED  TVO    1 2 3 4 5    1 2 3 4 5 
 
Industry group: Technology 
No. Company  Name      Level  of company's disclosure 
       Public  Disclosure    Private Disclosure 
1  CAL-COMP ELECTRONICS (THAILAND) PUBLIC CO., LTD.  CCET    1 2 3 4 5    1 2 3 4 5 
2  DELTA ELECTRONICS (THAILAND) PUBLIC COMPANY LIMITED  DELTA    1  2  3  4  5     1  2  3  4  5 
3  HANA MICROELECTRONICS PUBLIC COMPANY LIMITED  HANA    1 2 3 4 5    1 2 3 4 5 
4  ADVANCED INFO SERVICE PUBLIC COMPANY LIMITED  ADVANC    1  2  3  4  5     1  2  3  4  5 
5  TOTAL ACCESS COMMUNICATION PUBLIC COMPANY LIMITED  DTAC    1 2 3 4 5    1 2 3 4 5 
6  FORTH CORPORATION PUBLIC COMPANY LIMITED  FORTH    1  2  3  4  5     1  2  3  4  5 
7  JASMINE INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC COMPANY LIMITED  JAS    1 2 3 4 5    1 2 3 4 5 
8  SAMART CORPORATION PUBLIC COMPANY LIMITED  SAMART    1  2  3  4  5     1  2  3  4  5 
9  THAICOM PUBLIC COMPANY LIMITED  THCOM    1 2 3 4 5    1 2 3 4 5 
10  TRUE CORPORATION PUBLIC COMPANY LIMITED  TRUE    1  2  3  4  5     1  2  3  4  5 





Industry group: Services   
No. Company  Name      Level  of company's disclosure 
       Public  Disclosure    Private Disclosure 
1  CP ALL PUBLIC COMPANY LIMITED  CPALL    1 2 3 4 5    1 2 3 4 5 
2  HOME PRODUCT CENTER PUBLIC COMPANY LIMITED  HMPRO    1  2  3  4  5     1  2  3  4  5 
3  LOXLEY PUBLIC COMPANY LIMITED  LOXLEY    1 2 3 4 5    1 2 3 4 5 
4  SIAM MAKRO PUBLIC COMPANY LIMITED  MAKRO    1  2  3  4  5     1  2  3  4  5 
5  ROBINSON DEPARTMENT STORE PUBLIC COMPANY LIMITED  ROBINS    1 2 3 4 5    1 2 3 4 5 
6 
BANGKOK DUSIT MEDICAL SERVICES PUBLIC COMPANY 
LIMITED  BGH    1  2  3  4  5     1  2  3  4  5 
7  BUMRUNGRAD HOSPITAL PUBLIC COMPANY LIMITED  BH    1 2 3 4 5    1 2 3 4 5 
8  BEC WORLD PUBLIC COMPANY LIMITED  BEC    1  2  3  4  5     1  2  3  4  5 
9  MAJOR CINEPLEX GROUP PUBLIC COMPANY LIMITED  MAJOR    1 2 3 4 5    1 2 3 4 5 
10  MCOT PUBLIC COMPANY LIMITED  MCOT    1  2  3  4  5     1  2  3  4  5 
11  BETTER WORLD GREEN PUBLIC COMPANY LIMITED  BWG    1 2 3 4 5    1 2 3 4 5 
12  THE ERAWAN GROUP PUBLIC COMPANY LIMITED  ERAWAN    1  2  3  4  5     1  2  3  4  5 
13  AIRPORTS OF THAILAND PUBLIC COMPANY LIMITED  AOT    1 2 3 4 5    1 2 3 4 5 
14  BANGKOK EXPRESSWAY PUBLIC COMPANY LIMITED  BECL    1  2  3  4  5     1  2  3  4  5 
15  PRECIOUS SHIPPING PUBLIC COMPANY LIMITED  PSL    1 2 3 4 5    1 2 3 4 5 
16  REGIONAL CONTAINER LINES PUBLIC COMPANY LIMITED  RCL    1  2  3  4  5     1  2  3  4  5 
17  THAI AIRWAYS INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC COMPANY LIMITED  THAI    1 2 3 4 5    1 2 3 4 5 







Industry group: Resources   
No. Company  Name      Level  of company's disclosure 
       Public  Disclosure    Private Disclosure 
1  BANPU PUBLIC COMPANY LIMITED  BANPU    1 2 3 4 5    1 2 3 4 5 
2  THE BANGCHAK PETROLEUM PUBLIC COMPANY LIMITED  BCP    1  2  3  4  5     1  2  3  4  5 
3  ELECTRICITY GENERATING PUBLIC COMPANY LIMITED  EGCO    1 2 3 4 5    1 2 3 4 5 
4  GLOW ENERGY PUBLIC COMPANY LIMITED  GLOW    1  2  3  4  5     1  2  3  4  5 
5  IRPC PUBLIC COMPANY LIMITED  IRPC    1 2 3 4 5    1 2 3 4 5 
6  THE LANNA RESOURCES PUBLIC COMPANY LIMITED  LANNA    1  2  3  4  5     1  2  3  4  5 
7  PTT PUBLIC COMPANY LIMITED  PTT    1 2 3 4 5    1 2 3 4 5 
8  PTT AROMATICS AND REFINING PUBLIC COMPANY LIMITED  PTTAR    1  2  3  4  5     1  2  3  4  5 
9 
PTT EXPLORATION AND PRODUCTION PUBLIC COMPANY 
LIMITED  PTTEP    1 2 3 4 5    1 2 3 4 5 
10  RATCHABURI ELECTRICITY GENERATING   RATCH    1  2  3  4  5     1  2  3  4  5 
        HOLDING PUBLIC CO.,LTD.                                       





Thank you for your time in completing this questionnaire. 
All your answers are completely confidential. 
Please return the questionnaire in the enclosed reply-paid envelop.      
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Appendix F:  Selection criteria for companies to be in the SET 100 Index 
 
The stocks to be included in SET 100 Index will be selected on the basis of the 
predetermined criteria that follow: 
 
1.  Eligible stocks should have been listed and traded on the SET for a 
minimum of 6 months and ranked in the top 200 on the SET’s main board 
in terms of average daily market capitalisation for the past 12 months. 
 
2.  The eligible stocks must be actively traded. 
  On the SET’s main board, the monthly turnover value of the 
eligible stock must have been more than 50 percent of the total 
average monthly turnover value per stock in the same month. 
  The above criteria should be met for at least 9 out of the 12 months 
during the evaluation period (or 3/4 of the trading period but not 
less than 6 months, if the stock has been listed for less than 12 
months). 
  If the number of eligible stocks is less than 105, the selection 
criteria would then be gradually altered until a minimum of 105 
stocks have passed the criteria: 
 
3.  Eligible stocks should maintain their share distribution or free-float 
qualifications so that their ordinary shareholders shall hold shares in 
aggregate of not less than 20 percent of the paid-up capital of the listed 
company. 
 
4.  Eligible stocks must not fall into any one of the following conditions: 
   
  The stock is being delisted or is slated to be delisted according to the 
Regulation of the Stock Exchange of Thailand. 
  The stock is being voluntarily delisted. 
  Its trading has been suspended for an extended period of time. 
  Its trading might be suspended for an extended period of time in 
the near future.  
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However, if the security in question has been listed for over 6 but for less than 
12 months then in terms of average daily market capitalisation, the security 
being considered must have been in the top 200 securities for that entire time 
period. 
 
5.  Should there be more than 100 stocks selected using the above selection 
criteria, the top 100 stocks ranked by average daily market capitalisation 
will be chosen for the SET 100 Index (the 101
st – 105
th stocks will be 
treated as replacements for the SET 100 Index).  
 
6.  Periodic Review and Adjustments 
The revisions are conducted in December and June of every year. Periodic 
adjustments and the new list of stocks will be announced as soon as the 
lists become available. The new stock lists will be used for the SET 100 
Index calculations starting with the first trading day of January and July of 
each year. 
 
For every revision, the index calculation will treat stocks withdrawn or added as 
having been delisted or newly listed, as the case may be. If some stocks are removed 
from an index, an equal number of new stocks will be added to ensure the 
uninterruption of the index.       
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Appendix G: Important statistical assumptions of multivariate analysis 
 
This study uses a multiple linear regression analysis, the Ordinary Least Squares 
(OLS) regression, in order to find the linear combination of independent variables that 
correlate maximally with the dependent variables. OLS regression is a common 
statistical technique used to regress the dependent variable and the independent 
variables. Hutcheson and Sofroniou (1999) argue that:  
 
“...OLS regression is one of the most popular statistical techniques used in 
the social sciences. It is used to predict values of a continuous response 
variable using one or more explanatory variables and can also identify the 
strength of the relationship between these variables” (Hutcheson & 
Sofroniou, 1999, p.55). 
 
“OLS regression is a powerful technique for modelling continuous data, 
particularly when it is used in conjunction with dummy variables coding 
and data transformation.” (Hutcheson & Sofroniou, 1999, p.56). 
 
There are five main conditions that the variables in the simple linear models should 
meet: normality, linearity, constant variance or homoscedasticity, independence, and 
the absence of multicollinearity. Hutcheson and Sofroniou (1999) acknowledge that if 
these assumptions are met, the residuals
21 should have the following properties: 
 
1.  They should show on obvious pattern when plotted against the 
predicted values. 
2.  They should be roughly normally distributed. 
3.  Their variance should be constant for all values of the explanatory 
variables. 
4.  Successive residuals should be independent, indicating that the value 
of one observation is not linked or dependent in some way upon the 
value of the next observation. 
 
In order to appropriate inferences to be drawn from the results of a 
statistical test it is necessary to check that the data to be analysed meet the 
assumptions of the test. (Hutcheson and Sofroniou, 1999, p.25) 
 
                                                 
21  Residuals are what are left over once a model has been fitted to the data – the differences 
between observed and predicted values (Hutcheson and Sofroniou, 1999, p.25). The residuals 
provide the diagnostic information which can be used to check for the violation of assumptions 





As the violation of assumptions is an important issue the use of multiple regression 
analysis, therefore, these problems should be eliminated before the running the 
regression model. The following discussion will show how the current researcher 




In OLS regression, there is the assumption that each variable and all linear 
combinations of the variables are normally distributed (Field, 2000). However, 
Hutcheson and Sofroniou (1999) argued that it is not always practical to test this 
directly due to the large number of tests required to examine all linear combinations 
of all variables. Therefore, instead of examining every single variable for normality, 
and using transformations, to obtain normality for each variable, it is possible to 
examine the linearity and variances of variables, together with the residuals, which 
can also indicate further information about whether the assumption of normality 
across the combinations of explanatory variables is likely to be met.  
 
According to Hutcheson and Sofroniou (1999), there are several methods that can be 
used to investigate normality. The first method is a graphical method which involves 
examining a frequency histogram for each variable. This strategy can identify 
departures from normality in a single variable, but it cannot identify departures which 
are the result of combinations of explanatory variables in the models. Therefore, 
Hutcheson and Sofroniou (1999) suggest that it is more useful to fit a provisional 
model first and then examine a histogram of the residuals.  
Another method that more useful than the frequency histogram is a normal probability 
plot.
22 Moreover, normality can also test by examine the degree of symmetry of the 
variable, Kolmogorov-Smirnov or Kurtosis test. 
 
In this study, several approaches were employed to assess the normality of the data 
distribution. For univariate analysis, histograms, normal probability plot, 
                                                 
22 In a normal probability plot, a diagonal line drawn from lower left to upper right represents the 
expected value for normal distribution. If the actual distribution of the sample forms a 
diagonal, then it can conclude that this particular variable is normally distributed.       
277 
 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov, and Skewness-Kurtosis were used to test for normality. The 
results for Normality tests show that only some independent variables that follows the 
normal distribution, while dependent variable and control variables are not normally 
distributed.  
 
 Skewness/Kurtosis  tests  for  Normality   
   -------  joint  ------ 
Variable  Obs   Pr(Skewness) 
Pr(Kurtosis)  adj 
chi2(2)  Prob>chi2 
           
effective relative spread   100      0.0000  0.0000            .  0 
quote spread  100      0.0000  0.0000            .  0 
relative spread  100      0.0000  0.0000        47.32  0 
trade frequency  100      0.0000  0.0000        41.13  0 
trade size  100      0.0000  0.0000            .  0 
company size  100      0.0000  0.0000            .  0 
share price  100      0.0000  0.0000            .  0 
price volatility  100      0.0000  0.0000            .  0 
overall disclosure score  100      0.0577  0.3549        4.43  0.1266 
annual report disclosure score  100      0.0594  0.3998         4.38  0.112 
strategic disclosure score  100      0.1170  0.4026         3.24  0.1975 
non-financial disclosure score  100      0.8798  0.5906         0.31  0.8555 
financial disclosure score  100      0.0542  0.3171         4.57  0.131 
other disclosure score  100      0.0000  0.0051        25.13  0 
public disclosure score  100      0.1167  0.7012         2.68  0.2621 
private disclosure score  100      0.1784  0.2976         2.97  0.226 
 
For the multivariate analysis, the residuals plots and the Jarque-Bera statistic
23 were 
used to test normality. The residuals plot, in Figure G-1 (for untransformed data), 
shown that the residuals of the estimation model does not follow a normal 
distribution. Together with the Jarque-Bera statistic results in Table G-1, G-2, G-3, 
and G-4, which show the Jarque-Bera test (for untransformed data) reject the null 
hypothesis of normality for all series at both  5 percent and 1 percent level, as the 
Jarque-Bera statistic show value higher than the critical value of the chi-square 
distribution at 2 degree of freedom. Therefore, both the residuals plots and the Jarque-
Bera statistic for the regression residuals
 suggest that non-normality problem may 
occur in the raw (untransformed) data. 
                                                 
23 Jarque-Bera statistic is the normality test of Jarque and Bera (1980). According to Thadewald and 
















where S is a measure of skewness and K is a measure of Kurtosis and N is the sample size. JB is 
asymptotically chi-squared distributed with two degrees of freedom, that means the null hypothesis has 
to be reject at the level   if JB   2
2 , 1     JB . The critical value for the null hypothesis of normality 
distribution is 5.99 at the 5 percent significance level, and 9.21 at the 1 percent significant level. Higher 





The second assumption is the linearity assumption, which means that the relationship 
between the dependent variable and independent variables should be a linear 
relationship. In order to check whether the assumption of linearity has been met it is 
required to examine the relationship between the pairs of variables by using 
regression scatter plots and also through a plot of the residuals. The test did not 
indicate any linear relationship between the current dependent and explanatory 
variables. Therefore, non-linearity is likely to be the second violation assumption in 
the current data. 
 
Constant variance  
 
The third assumption for data with normal errors is that the variance of one variable is 
about the same at each level of a second variable (Hutcheson and Sofroniou, 1999, p. 
27). This is known as homoscedasticity, while different levels of variance or non-
constant variance are termed heteroscedasticity. In order to check for constancy of 
variance, each variable can be investigated by the use of a scatter plot. While for the 
multiple explanatory variables, this problem can evaluate by examining the residuals 
of the fitted model. A plot of the residuals versus the fitted values should lie in a 
horizontal band if the model is a good approximation and there is no 
heteroscedasticity problem. The heteroscedasticity can be the result of non-normality 
of a particular variable, or as a result of a non-linearity relationship between variables 
in the model. Therefore, this problem can be reduced or eliminated by transforming 
variables to obtain the normality errors, and linearity (Hutcheson and Sofroniou, 
1999).  
 
In order to examine this assumption, a graphs plot of the residual for each model has 
been undertaken by using regression plots via the SPSS programme; by plotting the 
standardised predicted values of the dependent variable against the standardised 
residuals (see Field, 2000).  This test, as can be seen from Figure G-1 indicated that 
there is non-constancy in variance across the residuals, which means there is 
heteroscedasticity problem occurs in the current data. In addition, the scatter plot also 
confirms that there are the normality and linearity problems in the current data.        
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Apart from the scatter plots via the SPSS programme, other heteroscedasticity tests 
have been conducted via the STATA programme to determine the extent of the 
heteroscedasticity. The tests are based on Breusch and Pagan (1979), and Cook and 
Weisberg (1983). Overall, the results provided in Table G-1, G-2, G-3, and G-4 show 
the tests for all the estimation models (for untransformed data) indicate a significant 




Multicollinearity is another violation assumption of multiple regression. 
Multicollinearity is term used to describe a situation when the explanatory variables in 
a data set are highly correlated to one or more of the other explanatory variables in the 
model. If these relationships are perfect or very strong, the calculation of the 
regression model and the appropriate interpretation of the results can be affected 
(Hutcheson and Sofroniou, 1999). The consequences of this problem depend on the 
objectives of the analysis. If the goal of the multiple regression is for prediction, then 
multicollinearity need not present much of a problem, as it primarily affects the 
calculated importance of the explanatory variables. However, if the goal of the 
multiple regression is for explanation, the presence of a high degree of 
multicollinearity poses a serious problem for the correct interpretation of the results 
(Hutcheson and Sofroniou, 1999, p.79) 
 
Multicollinearity can be identified by correlation coefficients. Relationships between 
explanatory variables which are rise up to 0.9 or higher indicate a level of 
multicollinearity that may prove to be problematic (Hair et al., 2006). Alternatively, 
this problem can also be examined through the ‘tolerance’ and ‘variance inflation 
factor’ (VIF) statistics. Any explanatory variables which have a VIF value of 5, or a 
tolerance of 2.0 or less, are therefore of interest as they show a degree of 










Hair et al. (2006) acknowledge that there are two possible reasons for data 
transformations:  
 
‘(i) to correct violations of the statistical assumptions underlying the 
multivariate techniques, or (ii) to improve the relationship (correlation) 
between variables’ (Hair et al., 2006, p. 87).  
 
Similarly, Hutcheson and Sofroniou (1999) argued that a traditional way to deal with 
the violation assumptions of multiple regression, such as normality, linearity, and 
heteroscedasticity, is the transformation of variables by some mathematical function. 
In this context Cooke (1998) also asserted that ‘Transformation of data is useful in 
regression analysis when the relationship between the dependent variable and 
independent variables is inherently non-linear, when the distribution of the errors is 
not approximately normal, and where there are problems of heteroscedasticity or non-
independence of the error terms’ 
 
As stated above, the results of the assumptions of the residuals indicate that there are 
violation assumptions, in particular non-normality and the heteroscedasticity 
problems, occur when running the raw data (see Table G-1, G-2, G-3, and G-4). These 
problems are considered as important issues that should be reduced or eliminated 
before running the regression model. Hair et al. (2006, p. 88) suggest that 
heteroscedasticity can be remedied only by the transformation of the dependent 
variable. To meet the regression assumption, dependent variable was transformed into 
reciprocal form before incorporate into the regression model. Therefore, transforming 
data was used in the main results analyses (see the results in Table in Chapter 8) to 
deal with non-normality and the heteroscedasticity problem, and robust standard 
errors (White, 1980) was used as the further analyses (see the results in Table G-1, G-
2, G-3 and G-4).  
 
The results from Chapter 8 (main results) indicate that when transforming dependent 
variable both non-normality and the heteroscedasticity problem were eliminated. For 
the normality tests, see main results in Chapter 8, the Jarque-Bera statistic range from       
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1.485 to 12.37. The results indicate only model (3), model (10) and model (22), the 
Jarque-Bera statistics (10.15, 12.37 and 9.78 respectively) reject the null hypothesis 
that the standardized errors are normally distributed at the 1 percent significant level 
(as the JB statistic higher than 9.21). However, these values are much smaller when 
compared to the results from the further analyses which estimated by the raw data (JB 
statistic from model (47), model (54) and model (58) is 3457.15, 3467.78 and 3012.9 
respectively). Consequently, when compared the non-normality models; model (3), 
model (10) and model (22), with the other normality models, the implication of the 
results do not change. The signs of all variables are remain the same, although the 
coefficient on trade size is lost its significant.  Most importantly, the coefficient on the 
disclosure score from the non-normality models report the positive relationship to the 
market liquidity which in consistent with the results from the normality models.   
 
  The results report that there is no heteroscedasticity problem for all transformed 
estimation models in Chapter 8, however, for the untransformed data which provided 
as further analyses in Appendix G the heteroscedasticity tests indicate the problems. 
Therefore, the further analyses controlled for the heteroscedasticity problem by using 
White’s (1980) procedure, through which robust standard errors are estimated. For 
some variables the t-statistics for the robust standard errors are slightly higher than the 
(untransformed) OLS standard errors and for other they are slightly lower. Overall the 
robust standard errors do not change much from the (untransformed) OLS standard 
errors. Therefore, the results in table G-1, G-2, G-3 and G-4 reported only the adjust t-
statistics based on the White’s (1980) procedure. 
 
When compared the results of the transformed estimation models (the main results) to 
the robust standard errors (Appendix G). The results show that the all variables are 
reported in the same direction. Only company size that reports the sign switches, 
however, it is not statistically significant for both the transformed estimation models 
and the robust standard errors models. Overall the results from the transformed 
estimation models and the robust standard error are reported in the same direction, but 
the transformed estimation models reveal better results (level of significant) for each 
variable. These findings suggest that by using White’s (1980) procedure as the further 
analyses, all results are remained the same as by transforming the dependent variable  
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into the reciprocal form. Therefore, the further analyses, the robust standard errors 
results, are support the main results which reported in Chapter 8. 
 
Compared Table 8-14 and Table G-1 
 
For the further analyses, the results provided in Table G-1, the regression results of 
models (45) - (48) do not show a good fit for the model. The adjusted R squared range 
from 6.2 to 7.6 percent, and only three out of five coefficients of the control variables 
are significant with p-values less than 0.1. The coefficients for trade frequency, trade 
size, share price and return volatility are behave in the same direction as the results 
from Table 8-14, although trade frequency report no statistically significant. The 
company size coefficient is also insignificant for all models. For model (45) and (46), 
the company size coefficient reveals the same direction as the results from Table 8-14, 
while for model (47) and (48) report inverse direction. Overall, the results for further 
analyses indicate that all the coefficient variables are behave in the same direction as 
the main results. These findings suggest that the further analyses, the robust standard 
errors results, are support the main results for the first hypothesis that the market 
liquidity is positively related to the disclosure score from both the disclosure index 
instrument and the analysts rating instrument. 
 
Compared Table 8-15 and Table G-2 
 
For the further analyses, the results provided in Table G-2, the regression results of 
models (49) - (53) do not show a good fit for the model. The adjusted R squared range 
from 3.4 to 8.8 percent. Similar to models (45) – (48), only three out of five 
coefficients of the control variables; trade size, share price and return volatility, are 
significant with p-values less than 0.1 and are consistent with the results in Table 8-
15. The coefficient of trade frequency and company size report no statistically 
significant for all models. Only the coefficient of company size from model (53) that 
reveals inverse direction from the main results from Table 8-15. Overall, the results 
from the further analyses, are support the main results for the second hypothesis that 
the relation between the market liquidity and the disclosure score among the detailed 
categories for each information section varies, and the voluntary information from the 
strategic section still reveal the highest impact on the market liquidity.       
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Compared Table 8-16 and Table G-3 
 
For the further analysis, the result provided in Table G-3, the adjusted R
2 for the 
regression model (54) is 6.9 percent. Two of the five coefficients on control variables 
are significant with p-values less than 0.1. The coefficients on share price and return 
volatility are statistically significant and behave in consistent with the result from 
Table 8-16.  Although the coefficient of the trade frequency, trade size and company 
size show no statistically significant, they also reveal the similar signs to the results 
from Table 8-16. However, the result from model (54) shows that only the 
coefficients on public disclosure score reports statistically significant at the 5 percent 
level. Therefore, this result supports the main result for the third hypothesis that when 
the company discloses more information via the public disclosure channels, this will 
increase the market liquidity.  
 
Compared Table 8-20 and Table G-4 
 
For the further analyses, the results provided in Table G-4, the regression results of 
models (55) - (63) do not show a good fit for the model. The adjusted R squared range 
from 2.8 to 7.9 percent. Only three of the five coefficients of control variables; trade 
size, share price and return volatility, are significant with p-values less than 0.1 and 
the signs also follow the direction of the results in Table 8-20. For the coefficient on 
the level of disclosure score, although all estimation models show the positive 
relationship between the market liquidity and the disclosure score, only three models 
(56), (58) and (59) indicate statistically significant. For the coefficient on the audit 
firm size, the results from all models show no statistically significant at the 10 percent 
level, however, this variable has a positive relationship with the market liquidity. 
Therefore, these findings suggest that the robust standard errors results from the 
further analyses are support the main results for the fifth hypothesis, but still have no 







Table G-1: Regression of the effective relative bid-ask spread on disclosure score 
and control variables 
 
                PRVOL PR SIZE TSZ TF DS SPREAD 6 5 4 3 2 1 0    Eq. (1) 
 
                 
Variable  Model 45  Model 46  Model 47  Model 48 
   (Overall)  (Annual)  (Public)  (Private) 
                 
          
 Disclosure  score  -.176  -.181  -.264  -.217 
   -1.91*  -1.81*  -2.08**  -1.91* 
          
 Trade  frequency  -.002  -.001  -.041  -.036 
   -0.02  -.01  -.30  -.27 
          
 Trade  size  .116  .141  .060  .083 
   2.16**  3.12***  .89  1.36 
          
 Company  size  -.007  -.021  .021  .006 
   -0.09  -.25  .27  .08 
          
 Share  price  -.908  -.874  -.685  -7.68 
   -2.06**  -2.07**  -1.75*  -1.85* 
          
 Return  volatility  .860  .831  .678  .747 
   1.95*  1.96*  1.73*  1.79* 
          
 N  100  100  100  100 
 Adjusted  R
2 0.062  0.065  0.076  0.065 
 F  2.09*  2.16*  2.36**  2.16* 
 Breusch-Pacan  20.24***  29.83*** 10.14***  9.82*** 





                 
          
 
   *, ** and ***  indicate significance at p < .1,  p < .05, and p < .01 respectively  
† indicate JB value higher than 9.21 and reject the null hypothesis of normality at 1  % 
   
Notes:  1. Coefficient is shown in the upper line (bold line), and the lower line (italic line) shows White’s (1980) 
adjusted t-statistics. 
2. Jarque-Bera statistic, the critical value for the null hypothesis of normality distribution is 5.99 at the 5 
percent significance level, and 9.21 at the 1 percent significant level. 
 
 
SPREAD is the effective relative bid-ask spread, DS is variously the disclosure score; overall, annual, public, and 
private disclosure score, TF is the average number of transaction trades per day, TSZ is the daily average trade 
volume, SIZE is the market value of common equity, PR is the daily averages of bid and ask prices, and PRVOL 
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Table G-2: Regression of the effective relative bid-ask spread on categories of 
information disclosure score and control variables  
                PRVOL PR SIZE TSZ TF DS SPREAD 6 5 4 3 2 1 0    Eq. (1) 
                    
Variable  Model 49  Model 50  Model 51  Model 52  Model 53 
   (All  Part)  (Str)  (Non)  (Fin)  (Other) 
         
 Strategic    -.294  -.244       
   -2.50**  -1.61**       
         
  Non-financial -.250  -.0859    
    -2.21**   -.84     
         
  Financial  -.184    -.058  
    1.17*    -1.13  
         
  Other channels  -.048        -.0517 
   -.46        -.64 
         
  Trade  frequency  -.003 -.004 -.005 -.002  -.0003 
    -.03 -.03 -.04 -.02 .000 
         
  Trade  size  .115 .144 .126 .151 .134 
    1.98** 3.34***  2.69***  3.57*** 2.36** 
         
  Company  size  .015 .015 .016 .048 -.027 
    .15 .18 .16 .56 -.36 
         
  Share  price  -.873 -.916 -.858 -.945 -.963 
    -2.10** -2.02** -2.08**  -1.97*  -1.99** 
         
  Return  volatility  .836 .852 .819 .887 .898 
    2.01**  1.90* 1.98* 1.87* 1.88* 
         
  N  100 100 100 100 100 
  Adjusted R
2  0.061 0.040 0.088 0.035 0.034 
  F 1.72*  1.68*  2.61**  1.61*  1.59 
  Breusch-Pacan 55.66***  9.61*** 55.39***  10.97*** 8.29*** 






                    
 
    
*, ** and ***  indicate significance at p < .1,  p < .05, and p < .01 respectively  
† indicate JB value higher than 9.21 and reject the null hypothesis of normality at 1  % 
   
Notes:  1. Coefficient is shown in the upper line (bold line), and the lower line (italic line) shows White’s (1980) 
adjusted t-statistics. 
2. Jarque-Bera statistic, the critical value for the null hypothesis of normality distribution is 5.99 at the 5 
percent significance level, and 9.21 at the 1 percent significant level. 
 
 
SPREAD is the effective relative bid-ask spread, DS is variously the disclosure score; strategic, non-financial, 
financial, and other disclosure score, TF is the average number of transaction trades per day, TSZ is the daily 
average trade volume, SIZE is the market value of common equity, PR is the daily averages of bid and ask 
prices, and PRVOL is the standard deviation of daily share price.  
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Table G-3: Regression of the effective relative bid-ask spread on public, private 
disclosure score and control variables 
 
                  PRVOL PR SIZE TSZ TF DPRI DPUB SPREAD 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0      Eq. (2) 
 
        
Variable Model  54 
    (Public & Private) 
        
    
 Public  dis.  score  -.527 
   -2.02** 
    
  Private dis. score  .259 
   1.30 
    
 Trade  frequency  .038 
   .29 
    
 Trade  size  .049 
   .71 
    
 Company  size  -.028 
   -.34 
    
 Share  price  -.639 
   -1.70* 
    
 Return  volatility  .637 
   1.69* 
    
  N 100 
  Adjusted R
2 0.069 
  F 2.06* 
  Breusch-Pacan 10.79*** 
  Jarque-Bera   3467.78
† 
        
    
 
   *, ** and ***  indicate significance at p < .1,  p < .05, and p < .01 respectively  
† indicate JB value higher than 9.21 and reject the null hypothesis of normality at 1  % 
 
 
Notes:  1. Coefficient is shown in the upper line (bold line), and the lower line (italic 
line) shows White’s (1980) adjusted t-statistics. 
2. Jarque-Bera statistic, the critical value for the null hypothesis of normality 




SPREAD is the effective relative bid-ask spread, PUB is public disclosure score, PRI is 
private disclosure score, TF is the average number of transaction trades per day, TSZ is 
the daily average trade volume, SIZE is the market value of common equity, PR is the 
daily averages of bid and ask prices, and PRVOL is the standard deviation of daily share 






Table G-4: Regression of the  effective relative bid-ask spread on disclosure score, audit firm size and control variables 
 
                  PRVOL PR SIZE TSZ TF AUD DS SPREAD 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0                                   Eq. (4) 
                                
Variable  Model 55  Model 56  Model 57  Model 58  Model 59  Model 60  Model 61  Model 62  Model 63 
   (Without)  (Overall)  (Annual)  (Public)  (Private)  (Str)  (Non)  (Fin)  (Other) 
                                
              
  Disclosure  score    -.170 -.175 -.263 -.217 -.074 -.239 -.049 -.051 
     -1.62*  -1.53 -2.06** 1.91*  -.82  -1.45  -1.05  -.65 
              
  Trade  frequency  -.0002  -.002 -.001 -.040 -.036  -.03  -.005 -.002  -.0002 
    -.00 -.02 -.01 -.31 -.27 -.03 -.04 -.01 -.00 
             
  Trade  size  .147 .117 .141 .060 .083 .141 .126 .150 .133 
    3.73*** 2.29** 3.20***  .91  1.41  3.53***  2.74***  3.72*** 2.43** 
             
  Company  size  -.054 -.017 -.028 -.020 -.006 -.031 -.007 -.063 -.045 
    -.53 -.16 -.25 -.20 -.06 -.28 -.06 -.61 -.48 
             
  Share  price  -.870 -.866 -.847 -.684 -.768 -.860 -.821 -.872 -.878 
    -1.70* 1.76* -1.78* -1.55  -1.65 -1.72* 1.81* -1.71* -1.72* 
             
  Return  volatility  .813 .822 .806 .677 .747 .802 .786 .820 .821 
   1.74*  1.70*  1.71*  1.55 1.61 1.64  1.74*  1.64 1.64 
             
  Auditor  -.066 -.033 -.022  -.0009  .0002 -.046 -.029 -.057 -.065 
    -.63 -.34 -.20 -.01 .00 -.46 -.26 -.59 -.68 
                                








  Table G-4 : continued 
 
                                
Variable  Model 55  Model 56  Model 57  Model 58  Model 59  Model 60  Model 61  Model 62  Model 63 
   (Without)  (Overall)  (Annual)  (Public)  (Private)  (Str)  (Non)  (Fin)  (Other) 
                                
              
  N  100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
  Adjusted R
2  .036 .052 .055 .066 .055 .031 .079 .028 .028 
  F  1.62  1.79* 1.84* 2.00* 1.83*  1.45 1.23** 1.41  1.41 
  Breusch-Pacan 7.44***  17.81***  27.84*** 10.10***  9.83***  7.9*** 53.22***  8.43*** 5.77** 










                                
              
 
  *, ** and ***  indicate significance at p < .1,  p < .05, and p < .01 respectively  
† indicate JB value higher than 9.21 and reject the null hypothesis of normality at 1  % 
         
 
Notes:  1. Coefficient is shown in the upper line (bold line), and the lower line (italic line) shows White’s (1980) adjusted t-statistics. 
2. Jarque-Bera statistic, the critical value for the null hypothesis of normality distribution is 5.99 at the 5 percent significance level, and 9.21 at the 1 percent significant level. 
 
 
SPREAD is the effective relative bid-ask spread, DS is variously the disclosure score; overall, annual, public, private, strategic, non-financial, financial, and other disclosure score, 
AUD is auditor, TF is the average number of transaction trades per day, TSZ is the daily average trade volume, SIZE is the market value of common equity, PR is the daily averages of 
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Figure G-1: the residuals graph and plots for the estimation model when 
untransformed data  
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Figure G-2: the residuals graph and plots for the estimation model when transformed 
data 
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Appendix H: Insider trading cases in Thailand
24 
 
SEC News Release No. 20/2007   
 
Tuesday, March 13, 2007 
 
OISHI insider trading offense  
 
Bangkok, March 13, 2007 – The Settlement Committee appointed by the Minister of 
Finance under Section 317 of the Securities and Exchange Act B.E. 2535 (1992) 
imposed a penalty fine of 1,494,615.92 baht on Udomsak Chakreyavanich for insider 
trading of shares of OISHI Group Plc. (OISHI) on December 13, 2005. 
   
The SEC’s probe revealed that Udomsak, who was then president of Asia Plus 
Securities Plc., the financial advisor of OISHI on share acquisition, had used non-
public information to which he had access by virtue of his position to purchase OISHI 
shares, taking advantage of the investing public for his own or other persons’ benefit 
in violation of Section 241 and liable to the penalties under Section 296 of the Act. 
 
Insider trading, especially when material information is acquired by virtue of 
professional positions, is illegal. Such unfair misconduct is a prohibited characteristic 
of securities company directors.   
 
Udomsak no longer holds any executive positions at any securities companies. 
 
                                                 





SEC News Release No. 44/2007   
 
Friday, June 15, 2007 
 
Settlement Committee imposes fines on persons involved in trading MATI shares 
based on material nonpublic information  
 
Bangkok, June 15, 2007 – The Settlement Committee appointed by the Minister of 
Finance under Section 317 of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1992 (SEA) 
imposed fine penalties on Paiboon Damrongchaitham and Pacharee Manoonpanich in 
the amounts of 31,776,785.64 baht and 333,333.33 baht, respectively for insider 
trading of shares of Matichon Public Company Limited (MATI). 
 
The SEC’s probe revealed that during June - September 2005, Paiboon, Chairman of 
the Board of Directors of GMM Media Public Company Limited (GMMM), had been 
involved in the trading of MATI shares, which consummated on the Exchange under 
the account of Pacharee and several other accounts, based on the material nonpublic 
information that GMMM was planning to takeover MATI. 
 
Paiboon was found in violation of Section 241 of the SEA and Pacharee was charged 
as an aider and abettor under Section 241 of the SEA and Section 86 of the Criminal 
Code. 
 
The offenders agreed to enter into the settlement process and the Settlement 
Committee then ordered Paiboon and Pacharee to pay the aforementioned fines.       
293 
 
SEC News Release No. 8/2009 
 
Tuesday, January 20, 2009 
 
SEC fines nine offenders for malpractices involving TWZ, WIN and ASCON shares  
 
Bangkok, January 20, 2009 – The SEC’s Settlement Committee appointed by the 
Minister of Finance under Section 317 of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1992 
(SEA) resolved to impose fines on nine offenders for manipulating share prices of 
TWZ Corporation Plc. (TWZ) and Wyncoast Industrial Park Plc. (WIN) and insider 
trading of Ascon Construction Plc. (ASCON) shares with details as follows: 
 
TWZ price manipulation: Following the Stock Exchange of Thailand (SET)’s report 
on irregular trading of TWZ shares from December 13, 2005 to May 8, 2006 (97 
working days), the SEC probed into the case and found that Yanyong Akrajindanon, 
Eak Putagotirat, Arunya Silathong and the other two persons, with Piyanuj Rungkasiri 
as the accomplice, had entered into a continuous trading of TWZ shares, through their 
accounts and others, causing its price to be inconsistent with the normal market 
conditions and luring the general public into buying and selling TWZ shares. The 
course of action is considered a violation of Section 243 (2) of the SEA and Section 
83 of the Penal Code. With the penal provisions prescribed in Section 296 of the SEA, 
the Settlement Committee imposed a total fine of 47,637,551.16 baht on (1) Yanyong 
(29,461,550.99 baht), Eak (14,430,242.68 baht), Arunya (3,245,757.49 baht) and 
Piyanuj (500,000 baht). The other two persons, suspected of having involved in the 
course of action, are still under legal proceedings. 
 
WIN price manipulation: In another SEC’s investigation which probed into the 
abnormal trading of WIN shares during March 10-24, 2006 (11 working days), it was 
found that Suwanna Maneesawat, Pornpat Sripornpat and Thiparat Suthamsamai had 
collusively traded WIN shares in concealment, causing its prices to be inconsistent 
with the normal market conditions, to mislead and induce the general public into 
buying and selling such shares. The act is considered a contravention of Section 243 
(1) (2) in conjunction with Section 244 (2) (3) of the SEA and Section 83 of the Penal 
Code, with liabilities prescribed in Section 296 of the SEA. The Settlement  
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Committee therefore imposed a total fine of 1,500,000 baht on the three offenders or 
500,000 baht each.   
 
ASCON insider trading: According to the SET’s report and the SEC’s in-depth 
investigation, ASCON Chief Executive Officer Pattanapong Tanumathaya and 
Director Sirichai Rasameechan were found to have purchased ASCON shares, 
through their accounts and others, using the information about the company’s capital 
increase which is material to changes in its share price but had not yet been disclosed 
to the public. Their act is deemed securities trading by using inside information to 
take advantage of others which is a contravention of Section 241 and subject to 
liabilities under Section 296 of the SEA. As such, the Settlement Committee imposed 
fines on Pattanapong and Sirichai in the amount of 530,494.98 baht and 500,000 baht 
respectively. Sirichai was also subject to a further fine of 201,625 baht for failure to 
report his securities holding, which is a violation of Section 59 with liabilities 
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Appendix I: Further analysis  
Market liquidity and information disclosure in English 
 
This further analysis investigates whether there is an association between the extent to 
which listed companies disclose information in English through their website and the 
liquidity of shares traded on the Stock Exchange of Thailand. H:  Market liquidity is 
positively related to information disclosure in English. The above hypothesis is tested 
using the following model: 
 
                  PRVOL PR SIZE TSZ TF DS WEB SPREAD 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0   Eq. (9) 
 
where  RE_SPREAD is the reciprocal of the effective relative bid-ask spread and 
WEB
25 is the extent to which each company communicates its information in English. 
All control variables are as defined previously. Table I-1 presents the results of 
estimating equation (9) for the further analysis, where the reciprocal of the effective 
relative bid-ask spread is the dependent variable and information disclosure in English 
is the independent variable. 
 
The regression results show a good fit for the model. The adjusted R squared (Adj R
2) 
of 31.22 percent suggests that the effective relative bid-ask spread variation is 
explained by the disclosure score, the information disclosure in English and control 
variables. Four out of five coefficients of the control variables are significant with p-
values less than 0.01. The coefficients for trade frequency and Share price are 
positive and significant. Also, consistent with expectations, return volatility has a 
negative coefficient which is significant. The trade size coefficient is negative and 
significant, while the company size coefficient is positive but insignificant. The 
coefficients for disclosure (DS) is behave as predicted, positive (.209 with a t-statistic 
of 2.08) with the level of significant better than 5 percent. The coefficients for the 
information disclosure in English (WEB) is also as expected, positive (.039 with a t-
statistic of 0.350), but shows no statistically significant relationship with the 
dependent variable. This finding does not support the hypothesis nor warrant further 
testing, as no statistically significant relationship between stock market liquidity and 
information disclosure in English exists, although the coefficients are in the predicted 
                                                 
25 WEB is measured as an indicator variable that takes the value of one if the company disclosed 
information in English through its web site, and zero otherwise.   
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direction. The skewness of the data may explain this, with 82 of 100 companies 
disclosing information in both Thai and English through their website (the remaining 
18 companies disclosed information in Thai only). 
Table I-1: Regression of the reciprocal effective relative bid-ask spread on 
information disclosure in English 
                  PRVOL PR SIZE TSZ TF DS WEB SPREAD 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0   Eq. (9) 
Variable   Model  64 
 Disclosure  score    .209 
     2.08** 
      
  Information disclosure in English  .039 
     .35 
      
 Trade  frequency    .322 
     3.20*** 
      
 Trade  size    -.161 
     -2.63*** 
      
 Company  size    .96 
     1.12 
      
 Share  price    1.106 
     3.77*** 
      
 Return  volatility    -.969 
     -3.55*** 
 N    100 
 Adjusted  R
2   .3122 
 F    7.42*** 
 Breusch-Pacan    0.48 
 Jarque-Bera      4.891 
         
 
 
  *, ** and ***  indicate significance at p < .1,  p < .05, and p < .01 respectively  
† indicate JB value higher than 9.21 and reject the null hypothesis of normality at 1  % 
 
Notes:  1. Coefficient is shown in the upper line (bold line), and the lower line (italic line) shows 
White’s (1980) adjusted t-statistics. 
2. Jarque-Bera statistic, the critical value for the null hypothesis of normality distribution is 5.99 
at the 5 percent significance level, and 9.21 at the 1 percent significant level. 
 
SPREAD is the reciprocal of the effective relative bid-ask spread, DS is the disclosure score, WEB is 
the extent to which each company communicates its information in English, TF is the average number 
of transaction trades per day, TSZ is the daily average trade volume, SIZE is the market value of 
common equity, PR is the daily averages of bid and ask prices, and PRVOL is the standard deviation of 
daily share price. 
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